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Abstract 
 
Global warming and climate change pose a significant threat to the livelihoods of future 
generations.  Although there is a consensus of qualified climate scientists who believe 
that scientific evidence supports Anthropogenic Climate Change [ACC] theories, public 
belief in ACC theories has been much more limited.  In this dissertation, I argue that this 
disjunction between climate scientists and public opinion is a fundamentally rhetorical 
problem, requiring rhetorical solutions.  In four case studies, I analyze the Climategate 
scandal, discursive strategies of the Heartland Institute, President Obama’s environmental 
arguments and the ozone debates of the 1970s and 1980s to develop a set of persuasive 
strategies that may help environmental advocates overcome public disbelief in climate 
science. 
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A Rhetorical Investigation of Public Disbelief in Climate Science 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Introduction 
 Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC) will likely be the defining environmental 
concern of the 21st century.  The continued rise in fossil fuel consumption, and subsequent 
global warming, threatens “not only the other million species on the planet but also the 
survival of humanity itself” (Hansen, 2009, p. ix).  Current temperature projections point to 
agricultural devastation, refugee crises, heightened resource shortages and an increased 
propensity for natural disasters throughout the next decade and beyond (Mazo, 2010, p. 110).  
Moreover, because of the close connection between climate and security, global warming will 
“magnify” (Mazo, 2010, p. 142) the root causes of conflict--water shortages, food insecurity 
and energy scarcity.  Although the exact timing and magnitude of these events is uncertain, 
even “a small probability of catastrophic damage” should be enough to “err on the side of 
action” to prevent global warming (Scorse, 2010, p. 47). 
 Global warming will negatively influence the entire global population, but an 
“unequal burden” will unfortunately fall “on those who have not been primarily responsible 
for climate change” (Burkett, 2008, p. 187).  Specifically, it is the vulnerable populations of 
the global South who are: ecologically vulnerable; least equipped to adapt to changing 
temperatures; and, least capable of sacrificing economic growth to limit emissions (Burkett, 
2008, p. 187).  In the case of indigenous communities and small Pacific-island states, the 
consequence of inaction by the United States may be “annihilation” (Gordon, 2007, p. 1562).  
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Because of this range of severe consequences, “no science issue has more obvious or urgent 
political and ethical significance today than climate change” (Spoel et al., 2009, p. 49). 
 Some of these trends are already visible.  The first decade of the 21st century was the 
warmest since the keeping “of instrumental climate records” (World Meteorological 
Organization, 2011, para. 1) began in 1850.  The World Meteorological Organization (2011) 
found that in 2010 alone, “Pakistan experienced the worst flooding in its history” (para. 6), 
Eurasia saw “record high” (para. 8) temperatures, the Amazon basin was “badly affected by 
drought” (para. 18) and Africa had its “warmest year on record” (para. 3).   
 Predictions influenced by the calamities of the last decade may seem exaggerated, but 
the science supporting them has widespread support among elite climate scientists.  
Anderegg, Prall, Harold & Schneider (2010) provided strong evidence for consensus 
supporting ACC theories, especially at the most current and highly qualified levels of 
climatology.  These scholars developed a database of 1,372 climate scholars, and their works.  
Climate scholars were ranked based on their technical expertise: a method that looked at a 
variety of widely accepted standards for determining “quality, productivity and prominence” 
(p. 12109) of a scholar’s work (e.g., number of publications, number of times cited, etc.)  (p. 
12109).  Each of the 1,372 climate scholars was given a label: climate skeptics were labeled 
UE (unconvinced by the evidence) and supporters of the anthropogenic climate theory were 
labeled CE (convinced by the evidence).  This study found that 98 percent of the top 50 
climate researchers were labeled CE.  Moreover, only three percent of the top two hundred 
climate scholars were labeled UE, while 97 percent of the top 200 scholars agreed with the 
basic tenets of ACC theories--that global warming is happening, anthropogenic and a 
potential danger (p. 12107).  Interestingly, researchers with the fewest climate publications 
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comprised approximately 80 percent of the UE group (p. 12108).  This independent 
investigation found that “top CE researchers have much stronger expertise in climate science 
than those in the top UE group” (p. 12108). 
Another study found that of 928 randomly selected peer-reviewed articles in scientific 
journals, “none of the papers disagreed with the consensus position” (Oreskes, 2004, p. 1686) 
that global warming is real, human induced, and an environmental concern.  A report from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (2010) looked at 22 indicators of climate change (e.g., 
emissions, atmospheric energy, precipitation, cyclone intensity, etc.) and found “indisputable 
evidence” (p. 1) to support the basic tenets of the global warming hypothesis.  Although 
skeptics have pointed to several other possible causes, such as “solar activity, volcanic 
activity, cosmic rays” and “orbital cycles” each of these “do not show trends capable of 
explaining” global warming (Rahmstorf, 2008, p. 47).  Prothero (2012), a professor of 
geological sciences, pointed to conclusive geological evidence that contemporary warming 
trends are greatly exacerbated by human influence: 
Geologists and paleoclimatologists know a lot about past greenhouse worlds, and the 
icehouse planet that has existed for the past 33 millions years…we know the variations 
in the earth’s orbit (the Milankovitch cycles)…our pumping greenhouse gases into our 
atmosphere…has pushed the planet into a “super-interglacial,” already warmer than 
any previous warming period…This is decidedly not within the normal range of 
‘climate variability,’ but clearly unprecedented in human history.  Anyone who says 
this is ‘normal variability’ has never seen the huge amount of paleoclimatic data that 
show otherwise. (p. 19) 
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 Thus, whatever disagreement does exist among climate scientists, it occurs very much on the 
fringe of the field. 
Despite this visible evidence of environmental harm and scientific consensus 
supporting ACC theories, the general public has not viewed global warming as a top priority.  
For example, a Pew (2011) poll found that only 38 percent of polled adults believe that 
“global warming is occurring mostly because of human activity, such as the burning of fossil 
fuels” (para. 4).  Nine months before, Gallup found that “the percentage of Americans who 
now say reports of global warming are generally exaggerated is by a significant margin the 
highest such reading in the 13-year history of asking the question” (Newport, 2010, para. 3).  
For those who supported the global warming hypothesis, “the share of Americans who view 
dealing with global warming as a top priority has” (Pew, 2012, para. 8) declined to 25 
percent.  Of the 25 “top policy priorities for 2012” listed by the poll, “global warming” 
finished dead last (Pew, 2012, table 1).  Importantly, a larger percentage of the US population 
agrees with the statement “there is a lot of disagreement among scientists about whether or 
not global warming is happening” (Leiserowtiz, et al., 2011, p. 18) than agree with the 
statement “most scientists think global warming is happening” (Leiserowtiz, et al., 2011, p. 
18).  And, for the first time in the 25-year period that Gallup has polled the issue, “a majority 
of Americans say economic growth should be given the priority, even if the environment 
suffers” (Newport, 2009, para. 1).   
 A recent Yale Project on Climate Change Communication report has found some 
evidence for optimism.  The project determined that a majority of Americans polled believed 
that extreme weather events in 2011 were tied to global warming (Leiserowitz, 2012, para. 
49).  However, this finding is somewhat misleading because the same survey found that just 
 5 
“12 percent” of those polled were “firmly convinced that [anthropogenic global warming is] 
happening, human caused” and “urgent” (Leiserowitz, 2012, para. 8).  Thus, the newest 
available evidence indicates that public skepticism continues to pose problems for 
environmental advocates hoping to achieve progressive policy change through concerted 
public action.  
There are several explanations for this divergence between climate science and public 
opinion, but overcoming this divergence is a fundamentally rhetorical problem.  Protecting 
the environment requires persuading the public to change feelings of “indifference,” “denial” 
and “resistance” toward environmental problems (Feygina et al., 2010, p. 326).  In this 
chapter, I lay the groundwork for a study of contemporary rhetorical explanations of public 
disbelief in climate science and argue for rhetorical correctives that may help overcome public 
skepticism of ACC theories.  In particular, I examine case studies on the Climategate 
controversy, anti-environmental think tanks, President Obama’s environmental rhetoric, and 
the rhetoric of ozone scientists who served as public intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s, to 
develop a multivariable illustration of public disbelief of well-grounded climate science.  
Although these case studies examine a broad period of time and reflect different contexts, 
each provides evidence that illuminates the causes of public disbelief in climate science and 
the failure to achieve environmental legislation that is consistent with scientific findings.   
In the case of Climategate, the issue is how an accusation of conspiracy influenced 
public opinion far after climate scientists were exonerated of the charge by several 
independent investigations.  In the case of anti- environmental think tanks, the issue is how 
members of conservative anti-environmental organizations co-opt environmental discourse to 
make their messages seem mainstream and reasonable. In the case of President Obama’s 
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environmental rhetoric, the issue is how foregrounding of economic and national security 
arguments shifts policy debates away from environmental science and towards values that 
may not be consistent with environmental protection.  Finally, in the case of ozone scientists 
in the 1970s and 1980s, the issue is how scientists fought back against public disbelief in 
climate scientists, influential industrial opposition and political inertia to achieve regulations 
on CFC production and use.  These four case studies, although by no means exhaustive, 
combine to provide both a multivariable explanation for public disbelief in climate science 
and a set of rhetorical correctives that may remedy this problem for environmental advocates. 
This chapter contains three sections: a review of literature; a rationale for this topic; 
and, a plan for development of the dissertation.  The review of literature will include 
psychological, sociological and rhetorical scholarship investigating public disbelief in climate 
science and policy inertia.  The rationale section will argue for the importance of scholarly 
attention on public opinion concerning global warming science.  Achieving progressive 
environmental policy requires aligning public opinion with climate science, a goal that can 
only be achieved through persuasion.  In particular, this section will emphasize the 
importance of motivating the public to change harmful consumption habits and using public 
opinion to achieve environmental regulations.  The final section, focusing on the plan for 
further development, will explain the case study method and sketch the topics of the following 
chapters. 
Review of Literature 
Long-term global warming trends are “not easily detected by personal experience” 
(Swim et al., 2010, p. 6) and, even when detected, they are poorly understood.  “Emotional 
reactions” mediated by “cultural values and beliefs” are more likely to influence perception of 
 7 
risk than an objective read of scientific data (p. 6).  Because science qua science has 
historically been an ineffective persuasive tool, a nuanced analysis of the mediators between 
science and the public is necessary.  Academics have investigated a wide range of 
explanations for the failure of climate science to resonate widely with the U.S. public.  In 
particular, psychologists, sociologists and communication scholars have provided substantive 
analyses of the relationship between climate science and public opinion.  Because global 
climate change is a “complex and multifaceted phenomenon” that can only “be understood 
from a number of perspectives,” I find this interdisciplinary scholarship helpful for building 
rhetorical theories concerning climate science (p. 11). 
Psychological explanations for public disbelief in climate science are important for 
building “behavioral models” and “providing deeper understanding of individual” tendencies 
(Swim et al., 2010, p. 8).  Feygina et al. (2010), a team of psychologists, use the System 
Justification Theory to contend that humans are psychologically driven to “deny 
environmental problems and resist meaningful attempts” (p. 328) to reform the status quo.  
According to this study, people who are asked to change their consumption habits are 
predisposed to “defend and bolster” (p. 328) the existing, polluting, system.  Therefore, the 
desire to avoid change is a great source of cognitive dissonance, and produces “apathy, denial 
and resistance” among people who are “faced with evidence of environmental problems” (p. 
326).   
These psychological proclivities are even stronger when faced with evidence of unfair 
distribution of climate catastrophes.  Feinberg and Willer (2010) found that the “just-world 
theory” shows that “individuals have a strong need to perceive the world as just” and, 
therefore, may have difficulty accepting the fact that impoverished nations will be forced to 
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suffer for pollution from industrially developed nations (p. 34).  Clearly, psychological 
dispositions are substantial impediments to public belief in climate science.  However, these 
tendencies are not determinative; and, devising “persuasive communication” can reverse this 
motivation and “channel it in a pro-environmental direction” (Feygina, 2010, p. 336).  Based 
on this psychological evidence, it may be helpful to portray climate change as a great risk to 
the status quo, and therefore use the tendency to avoid change to advance a progressive 
environmental agenda. 
Sociologists have a “valuable array of perspectives, theories, methods, and tools” 
(Nagel, Dietz and Broadbent, 2008, p. 9) to advance the understanding of the relationship 
between climate science and human behavior.  Because there are “social causes,” “social 
impacts” and “social dimensions of mitigation and adaptation,” the field of sociology has seen 
prolific scholarship concerning global climate change (Nagel, Dietz and Broadbent, 2008, p. 
11).  Brechin (2003) found that “although the scientific community” speaks with a “unified 
voice concerning” climate change, members of the public “harbor considerable uncertainties” 
about the nature of the problem (p. 106).  He found that although citizens of the U.S. are some 
of the most educated in the world, they are some of the least informed about the relationship 
between fossil fuel emissions and global climate change (p. 107).  
 Importantly, sociologists have expanded on psychological theories about individual 
behavior to examine the “interrelation of the collection of these forces” (Fisher, 2003, p. 8).  
By focusing on complex challenges faced by organizations and nation-states that serve as the 
foundation for the “global environmental system” (p. 8), sociologists have developed a 
theoretical framework for understanding the factors that mediate scientific data and public 
understanding.  Seen from this perspective, environmental attitudes are not merely 
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psychological dispositions; instead, they are influenced by science, the media, civil society, 
the market and the state (p. 14).  Therefore, “understanding the formation of a global climate 
change regime requires an appreciation of the roles of social actors” and the “role they play in 
affecting the global environmental system” (p. 18).  This prescription for a study of 
interconnected factors demands a broad contextual analysis of a wide range of variables that 
influence public opinion about climate science and the development of progressive 
environmental policy (p. 23)--exactly the project fulfilled by the following chapters. 
 Communication scholars, taking a message-centered approach, are uniquely suited to 
explain public disbelief in climate science.  Several barriers to public acceptance of climate 
science and subsequent changes in attitudes have been explored.  The media has been the 
focus of much of this criticism.  Zhao et al. (2011) found empirical evidence that the 
“inaccurate representation of the science of global warming in the U.S. media…contributed to 
the lack of urgency” (p. 714) among the U.S. public.  The desire to portray both sides of every 
issue through balanced reporting has created “discursive and real political space for the U.S. 
government to shirk responsibility and delay action regarding global warming” (Boykoff & 
Boykoff, 2004, p. 134).  Nisbet (2009) agreed: “by giving equal weight to contrarian views on 
climate science, journalists presented the false impression that there was limited expert 
agreement on the causes of climate change” (para. 27).  “Confusion,” “complexity” and a 
“lack of understanding among journalists” contribute to the perception that climate science is 
extremely uncertain (Zhao et al., 2011, p. 715).  Moreover, the tendency to watch “political” 
news instead of “science/environment” news contributes to the belief that climate science is 
driven by partisan ideology (Zhao et al., 2011, p. 727).  Kim (2011) determined that public 
anger towards news media made it an ineffective mediator between scientific data and public 
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consumption (p. 690).  Ceccarelli (2011) found that global warming uncertainty is 
“manufactured” in the public sphere when media commentators announce “that there is an 
ongoing scientific debate in the technical sphere” when there is “actually an overwhelming 
scientific consensus” (p. 196).   
Lakoff (2010) noted that cognitive frames shape reaction to environmental messages 
(p. 70).  In particular, he found that concepts like “environment,” (p. 76) “Nature” (p. 76) and 
“environmental action” (p. 77) all trigger cognitive responses that align with pre-determined 
ideology.  Therefore, in order to develop an “effective long-term messaging” (p. 79) 
campaign, leaders should “frame issues in terms of moral values” (p. 79), “tell stories that 
exemplify your values and rouse emotions” (p. 79) and “address everyday concerns” (p. 80). 
 However, this media-centered approach has been criticized.  Brulle (2010) argued: 
“the top-down messaging approach used by Lakoff” focuses too heavily on “mass advertizing 
[sic] techniques” instead of the “public debate” that is necessary to create truly informed 
opinions (p. 90).  Brulle (2010) found that this “manufactured” approach creates “the need for 
continuous spin wars to maintain public support” instead of mobilizing a truly capable 
citizenry (p. 90).  Moreover, relying solely on media-produced messages “will further the 
professionalization of the environmental movement and lessen its political mobilization 
capacity” (p. 91).  Although Brulle’s read of Lakoff uncharitably ignored his focus on non-
advertising mediums, Brulle’s argument is worthy of consideration.   
It is indisputable that public understanding of climate science is mediated by popular 
news sources.  Thus, in developing a successful rhetorical campaign to align public opinion 
with the findings of climate science, it is likely insufficient to focus solely on media-driven 
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messages.  The media cannot be ignored, but news reporting of climate science is just one of 
the many factors that informs and influences public understanding of climate science.  
 Several other discursive variables have been examined as well.  Peterson (2004) 
investigated how the rhetorical presidency shapes public beliefs concerning “social 
responsibility and the material world” (p. 3).  She found that “symbolic and instrumental 
messages” are central to understanding the political practices found at the “intersection 
between the environmental movement and environmental policy” (p. 3).  Walker and Walsh 
(2012) argued that the trope of “scientific uncertainty” (p. 4) can be appropriated by 
environmentalists to motivate concern among the public.  Instead of being used to justify 
inaction, “invocations of scientific uncertainty” (Walker and Walsh, 2012, p. 4) can provide a 
warrant to avoid future possible disasters.  And, Mellor (2009) found that the discourse about 
“inaccuracies” (p. 147) in An Inconvenient Truth provided ammunition for skeptics of climate 
science more broadly.  
 In sum, there is a strong foundation for a rhetorical investigation of public disbelief in 
climate science.  There is ample discussion of environmental messages, media influence and 
public perception.  However, there has been a tendency to underestimate the value of climate 
science as a salient motivator for progressive environmentalism.  For example, Simpson 
(2011) argued that the “epistemological limits” (para. 3) of science and the “erosion of public 
trust in science” (para. 6) make climate science an ineffective rhetorical tool for 
environmental advocates.  In concurrence, Furedi (2008) noted, “turning science into an 
arbiter of policy and behaviour only serves to confuse matters” (p. 33).  According to this 
essay, science can provide “facts” but “it cannot say very much” about “what we should do 
about” environmental problems (Furedi, 2008, p. 33).   
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Although some skepticism towards science is surely warranted, I argue that a 
persuasive depiction of scientific findings concerning climate data, informed by the theories 
reviewed thus far, can positively influence public opinion.  In fact, many of the contemporary 
failures of climate science to affect change can be traced to the lack of investment by 
scientists in public debate.  The goal for environmental advocates should not be to merely 
convince the public that a scientific consensus exists; rather, it should be “mobilizing a 
relatively aware constituency” (Carvalho and Peterson, 2009, p. 141) to change its behavior.  
Instead of calling for a scientific retreat, this dissertation makes the case for a sustained 
commitment by climate scientists and other environmental advocates to defend scientific 
findings as one tool in their rhetorical arsenal.  
Rationale 
 There is a need for scholarly attention to public disbelief in climate science.  Every 
person contributes to global warming through consumption of fossil fuels, and global 
warming has the propensity to impose substantial harm across the world.  Although a range of 
factors (e.g., influence of the fossil fuel industry, conservative media, economic decline 
moving the environment down the list of public priorities, widespread anti-intellectualism, 
extreme complexity of climate science, etc.) influence public opinion concerning the accuracy 
of ACC theories, successfully deployed environmental communication can overcome these 
barriers.  In this section, I outline the importance of scholarly attention to environmental 
communication, particularly the relationship between climate science and rhetoric.  In doing 
so, I argue that overcoming the rhetorical deficiencies outlined in each case study to align 
public opinion with the scientific agreement regarding the ACC hypothesis is necessary to 
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promote progressive environmental policy and motivate changes in individual consumption 
habits. 
 The field of environmental communication serves practical and ethical purposes.  For 
example, Robert Perkowitz (2010), Founder and President of ecoAmerica, stated that 
environmental scholarship has “been used to refine and enhance the communications of” (p. 
69) congressional representatives, non-governmental organizations, corporations and 
foundations.  However, he noted that most communication studies on global warming “do not 
provide the kind of information” (p. 68) that environmental advocates need.  In particular, he 
noted the lack of focus on “practical leverage points and obstacles involved in motivating” (p. 
68) environmentally sustainable behavior.  Therefore, practical and audience-centered 
environmental criticism may help advocates “find new ways of generating…support for 
effective climate action” (p. 69).  The defeatist perception of the liberal public sphere as 
terminally stagnant is incorrect; change certainly can occur.  The challenge is motivating the 
public to embrace attitudes and actions that improve environmental sustainability in an era of 
rampant consumerism (Rowland, 2006, p. 214).  Practically, the goal of this dissertation is to 
add to the existing conversation concerning the relationship between climate science and 
rhetoric. 
 These practical goals rest on fundamental ethical assumptions that are intrinsic to the 
field of environmental communication.  Cox (2007) argued for four ethical “tenets” (p. 15) of 
the field of environmental communication: 
(1) Environmental communication seeks to enhance the ability of society to respond 
appropriately to environmental signals relevant to the well-being of both human 
civilization and natural biological systems 
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(2) On a societal level, representations of ‘‘environment’’--including governmental 
information, scientific advisory systems, and decision processes--should be 
transparent and accessible to members of the public. Relatedly, those affected by 
threats to environmental quality should have the resources and ability to participate 
in decisions affecting their individual or communities’ health and well-being 
(3) Individual and societal opportunities and capacities to study, interact with, and 
share experiences of the natural world and to engage others’ communication about 
such experiences are inherently good and should be nurtured. 
(4) Scholars, teachers, and practitioners have a duty to educate, question, critically 
evaluate, or otherwise speak in appropriate forums when social/symbolic 
representations of ‘‘environment,’’ knowledge claims, or other communication 
practices are constrained or suborned for harmful or unsustainable policies toward 
human communities and the natural world. (p. 15-16) 
Seen this way, environmental communication scholarship can (practically) contribute to 
society’s environmental competence and (ethically) promote an agenda of environmental 
sustainability (Cox, 2007, p. 16).  Therefore, exposing ideology, uncovering deceitful 
rhetorical tactics and prescribing tools to counter anti-environmental rhetoric fits squarely 
within the tenets endorsed by the field of environmental communication. 
 This orientation is even more important given the public nature of environmental 
crises.  There is “substantial empirical evidence that non-governmental” political opinions are 
“important determinants of public policy” (Lewis, 2005, p. 21).  The ability for public opinion 
to apply “external pressure” holds “sway in policy-making decisions” at the highest levels of 
government (p 21).  “Politicians” and “governmental officials” “pay attention to public 
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opinion reflected in polling data” (Sparrow, 2008, p. 579).  Even more, “if public opinion is 
especially one sided, it may actually be controlling” (p. 579).   
Longitudinal historical analysis supports the claim that “the government, as elected 
representatives of the people, is actually attentive to” (Pulia, 2001, p. 8) public opinion 
concerning the environment.  For example, “support for environmental protection peaked in 
the early 1990s and the government responded with” (p. 8) a range of environmental 
legislation.  However, as public support cooled, “the government responded in 1995 with a 
virtual shutdown in environmental legislation” (p. 8).  Given this evidence, substantial public 
support for climate regulation may be the only way to overcome political inertia and industrial 
influence blocking progressive climate policy.  
 Even absent change in government policy, convincing the public that ACC theories 
are accurate has the potential to drastically change individual consumption habits.  If 
members of the public believe that fossil fuel consumption has negative consequences, it 
“may increase the possibility of individual behavior change” (Oppenheimer and Todorov, 
2006, p. 5).  The anxiety produced by confronting one’s own consumption habits has the 
propensity to be disabling.  However, this confrontation can also allow consumers to 
“question underlying assumptions” and “stimulate thought” concerning new paths towards 
environmental sustainability (Princen, Maniates and Conca, 2002, p. 14).  For example, 
individuals may reduce consumption by buying “high fuel-economy cars or compact 
fluorescent light bulbs” (Oppenheimer and Todrov, 2006, p. 5).  Although these changes may 
seem superficial, if they were broadly implemented, they would have a significant cumulative 
effect. 
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 There are substantial impediments to changing public opinion and achieving 
progressive environmental legislation.  Psychological, sociological, political and ideological 
barriers work individually and collectively to promote inertia and inaction.  However, each of 
these can be countered by an effective rhetorical campaign in defense of ACC theories and 
environmental regulation.  The case studies examined in this dissertation provide evidence 
that although the barriers to effective environmental communication are formidable, they are 
not impenetrable.   
Forthcoming Chapters 
 Each of the following chapters analyzes at a set of texts that help to explain public 
attitudes about climate science.  Since each text operates as only one variable in a larger 
societal conversation, a case study approach is justified to “generate findings of relevance 
beyond the individual cases” (Fidel, 1984, p. 273). 
First, a case study approach is warranted because each of the cases represents one of 
the aspects of public disbelief.  Therefore, each chapter represents one avenue for 
understanding why climate science is disregarded by much of the public.  Although “it is 
impossible for a case study to tell the whole story” (Runyan, 1982, p. 444), each new glimpse 
provides a “representative anecdote” (Burke, 1969, p. 59) of a multidimensional problem.  
Each acts as an “allegory” for reaching particular conclusions and “for formulating 
hypotheses for further” research (Schell, 1992, p. 2).  In this way, each representative 
anecdote (complex deduction of the subject at hand) will provide an example with both 
“scope” and “simplicity” of the relationship between climate science, relevant texts and 
audience beliefs (Burke, 1969, p. 59).  Because a representative anecdote develops and 
reinforces the norms of the broader symbol system, it is “especially valuable for a critical 
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analysis of the implicit assumptions and values held by a particular culture as manifested in 
that culture’s mediated texts” (Harter and Japp, 2001, p. 413).  By finding patterns of 
contemporary discourse, each case study exposes “values, concerns, and interests in regard 
to” “attitudes and understandings” of climate science (Brummett, 1984, p. 164).   
Each case study works together to provide a cumulative explanation.  Each study itself 
analyzes one representative anecdote, but including multiple case studies in one volume 
overcomes the common criticism of the case study method--that there is too much focus on a 
single cause, at the expense of other explanations (Runyan, 1982, p. 445).  Although it may be 
possible to use case studies to distort facts through “selective presentation of the evidence” 
(Runyan, 1982, p. 445), the combination of multiple case studies serves to reduce the 
likelihood of distortion.  The final chapter seeks to provide a solution that overcomes the 
diverse causes of public disbelief in climate science by finding a remedy that has the potential 
to address each of the problems found in the case studies. 
Second, each case study builds upon and refines a range of contemporary rhetorical 
theories.  Only a case study approach would allow a rich discussion of theories as diverse as 
conspiracy theory, definition, media criticism, framing, and counterpublics.  This will provide 
contributions to the sub-discipline of environmental communication as well as providing 
refinement of other rhetorical theories.  In what follows, I detail each of the proposed case 
studies. 
Chapter two will consist of a case study of the Climategate controversy.  I examine the 
hack and subsequent release of emails sent by climate scientists at the Climate Research Unit 
[CRU] at the University of East Anglia.  The subjects of the emails pertained to climate 
research that was conducted between 1996 and 2009.  Although most of the emails covered 
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highly technical climate jargon, a small subset of the emails became widely publicized by the 
blogosphere and news media for their supposed discordance with the Anthropogenic Climate 
Change (ACC) hypothesis and their suggestion that there had been interference with the 
independence of the peer-review process (Flam, 2009, para. 4-5).  In particular, I trace the 
influence of the essay: Climategate: Warmist conspiracy exposed? (Bolt, 2009)--written just 
days after the release of the hacked CRU emails.  I find that the accusations made in media 
reports, despite being entirely inaccurate, resonated widely because of the charge of 
conspiracy.  This resonance was amplified by rampant anti-elitism; the charge’s consistency 
with existing ideology; the perception of an accurate charge; and, the failure of scientists to 
effectively respond to the charge of conspiracy.  I conclude that this incident demands a 
revision of contemporary rhetorical theories concerning conspiracy theory--namely those that 
rely heavily on Hofstadter’s (1996) “paranoid style” (p. 4).  Instead of merely looking at form 
and facticity to determine the power of a particular charge of conspiracy, rhetorical scholars 
must examine a broader set of contextual variables. 
Chapter three will consist of a case study of the naming and definition strategies of 
organizations that promote anti-environmental and industrial propaganda.  I examine two 
bodies of rhetoric: (1) the names of anti-environmental organizations; (2) the newsletters and 
op-eds published by conservative think tanks that define their interests, goals and 
membership.  I find that these organizations have used naming and definition strategies to co-
opt messages from the mainstream environmental movement, breeding perceptions of 
inconsistency, skepticism and contrarianism.  More specifically, groups that align with the 
environmental countermovement have used names (e.g. The Heartland Institute, Citizens for 
the Environment, Global Climate Coalition, National Wetlands Coalition, Greening Earth 
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Society, etc.) that give the perception of environmental friendliness while subtly manipulating 
public and political opinion to trust anti-environmental messages.  This re-defining strategy 
has allowed these organizations to more effectively question climate science, portray fringe 
environmental theories as mainstream, undermine widely supported scientific theories, and 
degrade support for progressive environmental regulation.  I use the Heartland Institute as a 
representative anecdote. 
Chapter four will consist of a rhetorical examination of the first 18 months of 
President Obama’s environmental rhetoric.  I examine the texts of President Obama’s 
speeches and highlight the main rhetorical strategies that he used to frame his environmental 
agenda.  In particular, I find that he foregrounded economic and national security frames, at 
the expense of frames that focused on environmental or climate science.  For example, instead 
of arguing for the environmental benefits of his green jobs package or the scientific consensus 
supporting ACC theories, he consistently noted economic and national security justifications.  
I trace public opinion concerning climate science and support for climate policies and find 
that his messages did little to induce public support for either.  I conclude that this approach 
of foregrounding non-environmental arguments backgrounded environmental science and 
subsequently undercut his environmental agenda. 
The final chapter will consist of a case study of the rhetoric of climate scientists in the 
1970s and 1980s who performed as public intellectuals to influence public policy.  I examine 
how the public discourse of two climate scientists at the University of California-Irvine, Frank 
Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina, served as the foundation for the development of a 
broader counterpublic of ozone scientists.  In particular, I push the outer edges of the 
construct of counterpublic theory to find that, contrary to Warner (2002), climate scientists 
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who made their findings public became counterpublic by expressing opposition to a powerful 
public, opening discursive space by making their comments public and rhetorically 
participating in multiple publics (scientific and lay) simultaneously.  I argue that this 
counterpublic role served a vital function that shaped public opinion to favor strict federal 
regulations and galvanized international support for the Montreal Protocol.  I conclude that a 
new wave of public intellectualism by climate scientists may be one way to reverse public 
disbelief in climate science concerning global warming.  Instead of merely taking refuge in 
peer review, environmental scientists who make their message public may overcome public 
skepticism and political inertia to achieve progressive environmental legislation. 
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Chapter 2 – Climategate: A Case Study in the Intersection of Facticity and Conspiracy 
Theory 
Introduction 
In November of 2009 over one thousand illegally obtained emails from the Climate 
Research Unit at the University of East Anglia were made public via the Internet.  The 
subjects of the emails pertained to climate research that was conducted between 1996 and 
2009.  Although most of the emails covered highly technical climate jargon, a small subset of 
the emails became widely publicized by the blogosphere and news media for their supposed 
discordance with the Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC) hypothesis and their suggestion 
that there had been interference with the independence of the peer-review process (Flam, 
2009, para. 4-5).  Within days, James Delingpole (2009b), a libertarian journalist at The 
Telegraph, coined the incident “Climategate” (para. 35)--analogizing the emails to the 
suppression and manipulation of evidence in the Watergate scandal of the Nixon 
administration in the United States.  Although climate science had been under attack for quite 
some time, climate skeptics declared that the emails were the “final nail in the coffin” for the 
ACC “myth,” because they showed the “conspiracy behind [italics added]” the evidence 
supporting the scientific consensus in favor of ACC theories (Delingpole, 2009b, para. 1). 
 Despite these charges of conspiracy and scientific inaccuracy, climate skeptics could 
not have been more incorrect.  Six distinct and independent scientific investigations 
(Pennsylvania State University, House of Commons, University of East Anglia Scientific 
Assessment Panel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Commerce 
and National Science Foundation) were conducted over the allegations, and each of them 
found that no scientific misconduct occurred (Cook, 2010, para. 2).  In many instances, the 
“American people were lied to about” (Romm, 2011, para. 6) the content of the emails, 
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because snippets were “taken completely out of context” (Romm, 2011, para. 25).  However, 
public discontent was not ameliorated by these exonerations of the climate scientists.  
Although the “accusations thrown at the researchers involved [had] been proven baseless,” 
and the evidence for ACC remained “as it was a year ago,” “huge damage” had been done “to 
the reputation of climate science” (Nature, 2010a, para. 2).  Specifically, the charge of 
conspiracy “really hurt” the “public perception” of climate science (Baker, 2010, para. 5).   
Although simple disagreements over climate science have influenced public opinion 
by sending the signal of scientific uncertainty, the charge of conspiracy strongly influenced 
public opinion (Diethelm & McKee, 2009, p. 2-3).  The immediate effect of the news media 
coverage of the emails on public opinion was substantial: “over half (53%) said that the 
stories had caused them to have much less (29%) or somewhat less (24%) trust in scientists” 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2009, p. 6).  In particular, 69% of respondents in a nationally 
representative survey agreed with the statement: “scientists changed their results to make 
global warming appear worse than it is” (Leiserowitz et al., 2009, p. 6).  The charge of 
conspiracy had a lasting negative effect.  Independent investigations were virtually ignored by 
the news media and the United States public, and, consequently, the Climategate conspiracy 
undercut public “trust in climate science” (Ward, 2011, para. 7).  Surveys taken throughout 
the year following the release found that “Climategate had a significant impact on belief and 
concern of climate change in the US,” and as many as “1 in 4 Americans” were persuaded by 
the skeptical media coverage of the incident (Johnson, 2010, para. 6).  It is striking that the 
charge of conspiracy stuck, even after the scientists were cleared of any suspicion of scientific 
misconduct.    
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In this essay, I argue that the lasting effect of Climategate on public opinion was 
primarily related to the charge of conspiracy by news commentators and conservative pundits.  
The resonance of the charge was amplified by rampant anti-elitism; the charge’s consistency 
with existing ideology; the perception of an accurate charge; and, the failure of scientists to 
effectively respond to the charge of conspiracy.  Given that the emails were selectively 
released and reported with the goal of undercutting the neutrality of the scientific method, 
scientific investigations proving innocence failed to counteract, and in fact, fell prey to the 
charge of conspiracy.  In developing this case, I shed light on the power of conspiracy as a 
form of rhetoric, the interaction between rhetoric and science, and the importance of a well-
crafted response to accusations of conspiracy. 
The essay follows in three sections.  First, I discuss the rhetorical power of the 
accusation of conspiracy.  In particular, I look at historically recurring charges of conspiracy 
in several fields.  Here, I extend contemporary theories of conspiracy, arguing that the 
scholarly focus on paranoid style and facticity of the charge (the claim that the accusation 
does not represent the facts of the case) is insufficient to explain the resonance of a charge of 
conspiracy.  Second, I argue that the charge of conspiracy is particularly powerful when a 
specific set of factors is present: anti-elitism, ideology consistent with the charge, a perception 
of accuracy because of a well-crafted narrative and a poor rhetorical response by those 
charged.  I map these four factors onto a variety of contemporary conspiracy theories related 
to the killing of Osama Bin Laden, the death of Princess Diana, the citizenship of President 
Obama and the moon landing.  Next, I apply these factors to the Climategate incident.  In 
particular, I analyze the text of the emails most commonly reported in the blogosphere and by 
the news media.  I show how specific emails were used to manufacture a charge of conspiracy 
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in climate science.  Finally, I argue that this case study reveals an inherent weakness of 
scientific argument when a conspiracy charge is made.  It is difficult to respond to accusations 
of conspiracy within the conventions of science because of the impossibility of proving a 
negative.  Thus, in order to effectively respond to such an accusation, scientists must expand 
their vocabulary and leave the scientific field, something that did not occur in this case.  
Climategate thus serves as an important example of “how not to respond to a crisis” (Pearce, 
2009, para. 1). 
The Power of Conspiracy 
Scholars have studied conspiracy theories in a number of disciplines.  In particular, 
Richard Hofstadter played a prominent role in theoretical development about the concept.  
Hofstadter (1996) traced charges of conspiracy from the fear of Illuminism in the late 18th 
century through McCarthyism of the mid-20th century.  With each example, he noted that 
enemy creation, apocalypticism and imaginative leaps defined conspiracy theories (p. 37).  He 
labeled the typical rhetoric found in conspiracy theories as the paranoid style.  Those 
employing the paranoid style were most often “overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, 
grandiose and apocalyptic” (p. 4).  They felt as if a “conspiratorial world” was “directed 
against a nation, culture” and “way of life” for millions of people (p. 4).  For Hofstadter, the 
term “paranoid style” was intentionally “pejorative” and had “a greater affinity for bad causes 
than good” (p. 5).  Although Hofstadter admitted that the paranoid style might be 
“ineradicable” (p. 6), elimination was clearly his goal. 
Unfortunately, this influential essay “fixed scholarly attention” on “marginal men and 
women whose personality disorders caused them to project their problems, status grievances, 
and wounds into public affairs” (Goldberg, 2001, p. xi).  For example, Pipes (1999) treated 
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the paranoid style as a “way of seeing life itself” and a “hidden-handed mentality” (p. 22).  
Similarly, Johnson (1983) argued that the charge of conspiracy is mostly derivative of a 
“twisted” “paranoia” (p. 52).  Wood (1982) noted that Hofstadter’s emphasis on 
psychological traits caused “most historians” to assume that such fears were “mainly rooted in 
nonrational sources” (p. 403).  Although Hofstadter’s work is insightful, his reliance on the 
term “paranoid” is unfortunate.  Contrary to scholarship that conceives of conspiracy theories 
as irrational, most conspiracy theories are based on more than a pathological fear.  
Conspiracy theories aren’t crazy--sometimes they are correct (Austin, 1995; Goertzel, 
1994; Keeley, 1999; Smith, 1997, p. 275).  For example, it “is a matter of historical record 
that the Reagan administration illegally funded the Nicaraguan Contras,” that “foreign covert 
actions” employed manipulation of revolutionary movements and assassination strategies, and 
that the Jim Crow era “required covert, conspiratorial acts” (Fenster, 2008, p. 10).  Even 
Hofstadter  (1996) noted the “frequent historical recurrence” (p. 7) of the paranoid style 
throughout political history in the United States.  Given the historical precedent for collusion 
and conspiracy, it is not surprising that conspiracy accusations sometimes resonate.  In fact, 
they can be found across a wide variety of popular genres in contemporary United States--
literature, cinema, journalism and politics.  In each of these genres, the charge of conspiracy is 
emotionally appealing because it motivates a “gravitational pull into a world of suspicion” 
(Fenster, 2008, p. viii).  Because of the historical frequency of conspiracies, the current need 
is not to label the rhetoric as paranoid, but to understand its power. 
Moreover, Hofstadter was primarily focused on locating the form of paranoid style.  
He carefully traced historical accounts of charges of conspiracy, but did little to explain why 
some conspiracy theories resonated while others did not.  Taking a similarly formal approach, 
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Fenster (2008) presented a compelling case that influential conspiracy theories “share certain 
[formal] qualities:” (p. 9) an alleged truth hidden by existing order; a heroic investigative 
reporter; and, although the underlying truth remains hidden, anyone with enough fortitude can 
find the evidence.  Looking only at form, however, might lead one to conclude that the charge 
of conspiracy alone has power to transform public opinion.  A focus on form alone is clearly 
not adequate since many charges possessing the form of a typical conspiracy have failed to 
resonate.  For example, the Clinton Body conspiracy accused President Clinton of murdering 
“colleagues, advisors and citizens” (Mikkelson & Mikkelson, 2007, para. 1) who were set to 
testify against him.  Despite possessing all of the attributes of the paranoid style and the 
conspiratorial form, the charge did not stick.  In fact, there are “thousands of conspiracies” 
(Schaeffer, 2007, p. 109) that exhibit these formal characteristics circulating in public 
discourse, yet very few are widely believed.  Therefore, a formulaic approach to conspiracy 
theory, arguing that the rhetorical form of a charge of conspiracy will likely produce a 
specific audience response based on that factor alone, is insufficient.  Instead, when analyzing 
a charge of conspiracy, rhetorical scholars may find greater insight in “identifying factors that 
jointly [italics added] shape these discourses” (Benoit, 1999, p. 265). 
Attempting to account for more than form to explain resonance, scholars have focused 
on the accuracy of the charge of conspiracy.  For example, Roeper (2008) critically analyzed a 
series of conspiracies, intending to “mock, lampoon and debunk” (p. xii) these phenomena.  
The overriding assumption in Roeper’s (2008) approach was that “the conspiracies aren’t 
real” (p. x); thus, merely highlighting their inaccuracies should be sufficient to undercut their 
resonance.  Employing a similar strategy of debunking the rationale of 9/11 Truthers, Griffin 
(2007) focused almost entirely on the inaccuracy of the accusations that the government 
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colluded with the attackers (p. 309).  For these scholars, explanations of resonance “start and 
end with the facts” (Dunbar & Reagan, 2006, p. xiv). 
Merely focusing on accuracy, however, does not adequately explain why some 
conspiracies have great resonance and others do not.  For example, Wood, Douglas and 
Sutton (2012) determined that conspiracy believers often draw their conclusions based on the 
central belief that “authorities and officials engage in mass deception of the public to achieve 
their malevolent goals” (p. 6).   In fact, many conspiracy believers are willing to disregard 
evidence that contradicts their beliefs or believe two contradictory positions.  For example, 
“believing that Osama bin Laden is still alive is apparently no obstacle to believing that he has 
been dead for years” (p. 6).  Given these examples, it is clear that analyzing merely the form 
of the charge and its accuracy is insufficient.  
The deficiencies of the above approaches are obvious.  First, there is too great of a 
focus on the form of the charge.  The various case studies fail to explain why some conspiracy 
charges resonate, and others that are similar in form do not.  Second, there is too great of a 
focus on the accuracy of the charge.  Historically, non-factual charges have often had great 
power.  For example, conspiracies relating to UFO abductions, TWA flight 800, the Atlanta 
Olympic bombings and the arrest of Timothy McVeigh ignored substantial contrary evidence 
and violated basic conceptions of reality and common sense, but were believed by a large 
group (Dean, 1998, p. 8).  As discussed below, conspiracies concerning the deaths of Osama 
Bin Laden and Princess Diana resonated despite the lack of accurate evidence to support the 
charge.  Therefore, a theory that avoids a simple focus on merely form or facticity, but, rather, 
integrates a concern with form and other situational characteristics to explain resonance is 
necessary in order to explain the power of conspiracies.  
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 A number of scholars have developed a more nuanced explanation of resonance based 
on a consideration of audience and situation, as well as form and facticity.  For example, 
social psychologists point to a large number of possible causes for widespread belief in 
conspiracy: individuals are unable to use reason to understand complex situations; individuals 
seek confirmation with existing beliefs and reject information that contradicts already strongly 
held beliefs; individuals are easily persuaded by rumors and speculation; and, political group 
membership can skew beliefs in an extreme direction consistent with many conspiracy 
theories (Fenster, 2008, p. 18).  Similarly, rhetorical scholars have focused on a variety of 
characteristics that help explain the resonance of a charge of conspiracy.  Melley (2000) found 
the most pernicious conspiracy theories occurred in postwar cultures disenchanted with the 
government, and coinciding with widespread alienation (p. 185).  Gil-White (2005) 
discovered that conspiracy theories almost universally “stipulate that the ruling elite is doing 
bad things in secret” (para. 33).  Thus, the most powerful charges of conspiracy often tap into 
anti-elitism and thrive on fear.  McGee (2011) argued that the propensity for public belief in 
conspiracy theory is dramatically increased by the quick spread of information through the 
Internet and news media (p. 63).  These new media decrease the importance of facticity, 
because it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between experts and non-experts on the 
Internet (Adamic et. al., 2008, p. 2).  One result is that it is almost impossible for an average 
Internet user to determine whether a charge is true or false.  Given the rapid spread of 
information through the blogosphere and the instant access to news, a contemporary charge of 
conspiracy has the propensity to spread quickly, and take on a life of its own.  The choice by 
one writer to make an accusation of conspiracy creates a cascade effect, because “a lot of 
people will be directly influenced to use the term in precisely the same manner, and their 
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usages will influence others” (Gil-White, 2005, para. 3).  In this case, the initial framing of 
Climategate as a conspiracy, particularly by sources cited in articles in widely read 
newspapers like the New York Times, shaped the way that the broader audience perceived the 
incident, because the content of these articles was “reproduced in many other news venues” 
(para. 3).  
The primary deficiency of these rhetorical approaches is that they overlook the 
importance of the dialectic between accuser and accused for determining resonance.  For 
example, each case study examines the dissemination and uptake of the charge, but ignores 
the response of those accused of committing conspiratorial acts.  However, there are some 
cases when an effective response by the accused undercuts the resonance of the conspiracy 
charge.  In Rhetorical Criticism, Black argued (1965) that one way to build theory is to 
identify underlying strategic characteristics that link genres, such as conspiracy rhetoric and 
audience response (p. 147).  This insight suggests that previous case studies can be used to 
identify audience characteristics found in resonant conspiracy rhetoric.  I have used such an 
approach to identify five strategic and functional characteristics defining resonant 
conspiracies.  At first glance, it may seem as if social scientific methods offer the best 
approach for developing such a model.  However, it is difficult with a purely social scientific 
approach to look at the underlying characteristics that link symbols and audience in a 
pragmatic fashion.  In the case of conspiracy theory, where there is no recurrent situation, 
scholars must look at the complex relationship between audiences, symbols and 
environments.  The goal is not to produce a theory, in the falsifiable sense; rather, it is to 
produce propositional anecdotal claims based on the problems, needs and constraints of 
conspiracy accusations (Simons, 1978, p. 26). 
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The existing literature suggests that several key factors should be considered in 
crafting a theory explaining the resonance of a charge of conspiracy.  Specifically, an 
accusation of conspiracy is more likely to resonate if 
(1) It fits with the form of conspiracy 
(2) It taps into existing anti-elitism 
(3) It is consistent with an existing ideology 
(4) It is perceived as accurate and is based on a well-crafted narrative 
(5) There is a poor rhetorical response from those implicated by the charge 
This model is distinct from contemporary theories about conspiracy in two ways.  First, its 
focus on the content of the accusation breaks from the Hofstadter tradition that was primarily 
concerned with formal characteristics of a conspiracy charge.  Second, it emphasizes the 
multivariable and contextual nature of the resonance of conspiracy charges.  Finally, it 
underscores the importance of the argumentative dialectic between accuser and accused. 
In the next section I develop this model, focusing on the 4 non-formal factors as a 
starting point for outlining an emergent theory that explains why some conspiracy charges are 
likely to resonate while others are not.  
Factors Present in Resonant Conspiracies 
The pervasiveness of this Climategate charge was not a random occurrence; rather, the 
confluence of a constellation of factors added resonance to the charge.  Climategate had all of 
the formal characteristics defining conspiracy, but also the situational characteristics that 
completed the constellation.  In particular, it concerned an alleged truth hidden by elites, 
presented a narrative of an investigative reporter being punished by elites; and, suggested that 
any normal person with enough fortitude could uncover and interpret the evidence (Fenster, 
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2008, p. 9).  However, unique interaction of anti-elitism, existing ideology, a well-crafted 
charge and a poor rhetorical response by those accused gave the charge of conspiracy in the 
case of Climategate particular resonance.   
Anti-elitism 
First, the accusation directly assaulted the elite establishment of climate science.  The 
“day-to-day attacks on scientific integrity” (Young, 2011, p. 11) undercut the perceived 
neutrality of the scientific method and turned critical skepticism into the perception of 
outright fraud on the part of Climate Research Unit scientists.  By framing climate science as 
“unassailable dogma” (Nerlich, 2010, p. 15), skeptics argued that elite scientists were not 
simply “ignoring scientific evidence” (Nerlich, 2010, p. 16), but also fraudulently 
manufacturing data to support ACC theories.  “Intentionally illogical” (Young, 2011, p. 11) 
arguments against the ACC hypothesis (cold nights, large amounts of snowfall, etc.) that 
would have otherwise been viewed as mere personal commentary now were reported to call 
the whole scientific project into question.  Climate deniers used the event as a justification to 
criticize and bypass peer review, while still attracting substantial media attention (Trenberth, 
2011, p. 2).  Representations of a corrupt cabal of climate scientists manipulating data to 
justify the ACC hypothesis consistently recurred.  In the following months, the “links that 
[were] forged between climate change…and anti-elitism” were so outrageous that they 
“push[ed] the boundaries of acceptable journalism” (Young, 2011, p. 14).  
Fenster (2008) presented a compelling case that influential conspiracy theories “share 
certain qualities” (p. 9), especially drawing on anti-elitist sentiments.  Clarke (2002) agreed, 
noting, “conspiracy theorizing has long been favored by Populists, who are almost invariably 
anti-elitist” (p. 131).  In concurrence, Vankin and Whalen (2004) chronicled the 80 Greatest 
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Conspiracies of All Time, and found that, in nearly every instance, the most resonant 
conspiracy theories were based on suspicions about elites (p. 353).   
 A number of explanations for the power of anti-elitism have been developed.  
Goldberg (2001) found that conspiracies draw power by “reinforcing traditional American 
values” (p. 20) that are intimately skeptical of elite power.  Wood, Douglas and Sutton (2012) 
claimed that anti-elitism acts as a “monological belief system” (p. 1) – a worldview so strong 
that it shapes other unrelated beliefs.  For example, someone who believes in the 9/11 Truth 
conspiracy is also more likely to believe that elites covered-up the cause of Princess Diana’s 
death because of a “view of authority as fundamentally deceptive” (p. 2).  In some instances, 
this anti-elitism is so strong that it causes believers to agree with mutually contradictory 
conspiracy theories.  One survey found that if a participant believed in the conspiracy theory 
that Princess Diana faked her death, the same participant was also likely to believe in the 
conspiracy theory that Princess Diana was killed by rogue British Intelligence – even though 
belief in both of these conspiracies is contradictory (p. 3).  The same study found that if a 
participant believed in the conspiracy theory that Osama Bin Laden is still alive, the same 
participant was also likely to believe in the conspiracy theory that Osama Bind Laden had 
been dead for years (p. 3).  The common thread supporting all of these “mutually 
incompatible” beliefs is “deception by officialdom” (p. 3).  Corroborating these findings, 
Berlet (2009) identified a common thread among resonant conspiracy theories: an 
“individualistic populist anti-elitism which facilitates” (para. 40) the movement of conspiracy 
theories into the mainstream.  Clearly, suspicion of elites adds to the resonance of many 
conspiracy theories.  However, anti-elitism alone is not a sufficient condition for a powerful 
conspiracy theory. 
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 Clearly, many anti-elitist conspiracy narratives fail to resonate.  Moreover, some 
powerful conspiracies do not posit elites as corrupt or deceptive.  For example, many anti-
Semitic conspiracy theories are “notable and historically important” exceptions to the 
assumption that conspiracy theories are all based on “deceptive officialdom” (Wood, Douglas 
and Sutton, 2012, p. 6).  Historically, theories of Jewish conspiracy have not focused on an 
elite or powerful group hiding information from the average citizen; instead, they have 
detailed attempts by a minority group to seize power from existing elites (p. 6).  Given these 
counterexamples, it is important to consider additional factors that influence the resonance of 
a conspiracy charge. 
Existing Ideology 
Second, Climategate had the most significant effect on people who were already 
ideologically disposed to question the accuracy of climate science (Johnson, 2010, para. 7).  
The conspiracy charge was consistent with anti-science, anti-environment and conservative 
ideologies.  Climategate took off precisely because of longstanding ideological differences 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2009, p. 10). Even prior to Climategate, issues surrounding global 
warming were intensely ideological (McWright & Dunlap, 2000, p. 499).  The release of the 
emails, and the subsequent charge of conspiracy added fuel to the fire.  
A conspiracy charge will be more likely to resonate if it is consistent with existing 
ideology.  Melley (2008) hinted at this when he pointed to anti-Marxism in the United States 
as a possible explanation for the resonance of Chinese brainwashing conspiracies in the 
1950’s (p. 148).  During this period, the cultural landscape of the United States was laden 
with anti-Chinese sentiment.  Thus, the charge that the Chinese government was brainwashing 
civilians to support communism widely resonated because it was consistent with the 
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preconceived notion of Chinese as evil, corrupt and deceptive (Melley, 2008, p. 162).  Pfau 
(2005) documented how “civic republican ideology” (p. 160) strongly supported the power of 
the individual to counter government structures, and thus shaped conspiracy discourse in the 
19th Century.  In each of these instances, conspiracies that were consistent with existing 
ideology were more likely to be believed than those that weren’t. 
There are several explanations for the resonance of a conspiracy charge that is 
consistent with existing beliefs.  First, individuals expose themselves to information that “they 
tend to already agree with” (Fog, 1999, para. 4).  Second, when individuals are faced with 
evidence that contradicts their beliefs, they often “rationalize their preformed opinions” (Fog, 
1999, para. 4) in such a way that contrary evidence can be easily discarded.  Just as anti-
Chinese ideology helped support the salience of the brainwashing conspiracy theories of the 
1950’s, anti-science ideology makes the charge of conspiracy on behalf of climate scientists 
resonate much more powerfully (Gleick, 2011, para. 3,4).  Political, national, cultural 
religious and economic ideologies all serve as powerful filters that limit the ability of 
individuals to process contradictory evidence and reach accurate conclusions based on the 
arguments presented.    
Well-Crafted Narrative 
Third, the conspiracy accusation was well crafted.  At first glance, the emails seemed 
very damaging.  The content of the emails seemed consistent with the charge of conspiracy 
(Nature, 2010b, para. 6).  Claims of tricking and hiding were easily assumed to mean 
unscientific manipulation, while in fact this vocabulary was simply describing data 
manipulation consistent with the scientific process.  The claims were particularly damaging to 
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perceptions of a non-scientific audience, unfamiliar with the exchanges typical in peer-
reviewed science (para. 5).  
 Although ideology has a strong influence on the resonance of a conspiracy charge, a 
well-crafted narrative that portrays the charge as accurate is an important factor as well.  In 
order to resonate, conspiracy theories must have a “kernel of fact” (Fenster, 2008, p. 33) that 
is often exaggerated to create a narrative of widespread collusion and conspiracy.  For 
example, the fluttering of the flag on the moon was, for some, enough evidence to convince 
them that the moon landing never occurred (Wisnewski, 2007, p. 276).  Based on this 
anecdote, conspiracy theorists crafted a narrative that portrayed the entire event as falsified.  
Other times, the lack of evidence is sufficient to create a believable narrative of conspiracy.  
For example, prior to the release of the long form birth certificate, one quarter of U.S. 
population had doubts about President Obama being “natural born” (Gallup, 2011, para. 4).  
In this instance, the absence of evidence was a primary factor motivating belief in the Birther 
conspiracy.   
Rhetorical Response from Accused 
Finally, the rhetorical response from climate scientists had a substantial effect on how 
the release and characterization of the emails was perceived by the public.  The “sluggish” 
(Nature, 2010b, para. 3) response from researchers at East Anglia, as well as climate scientists 
more generally, failed to immediately contest the framing of the emails as conspiratorial.  By 
the time the scientific community responded, the situation had been defined in the minds of 
many.  Within a year, no longer was just the Climate Research Unit at East Anglia under 
attack, but the public was growing increasingly skeptical of the entire scientific process (para. 
1).  Once scientists did respond, they generally re-stated the accuracy of the data, in some 
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instances explaining the scientific jargon that was misquoted by the news media.  For 
example, the University of East Anglia’s (2010) official response emphasized that the 
temperature trends predicted by the CRU team “remained largely consistent” (para. 9) with 
data found by predictions made by other scientists.  Similarly, the response noted that 
“temperature reconstruction from Tree Ring Analysis” (University of East Anglia, 2010, para. 
10.1) and “Land Station Temperatures” (University of East Anglia, 2010, para. 10.2) were 
accurate.  However, it wasn’t “enough to explain the facts of climate change very, very 
clearly” (Nature, 2010a, para. 1), because those facts were perceived to be undercut by the 
conspiracy.  
The resonance of a conspiracy ebbs and flows, and is greatly influenced not just by the 
charge of conspiracy, but also by the response that counters the claim.  The Birther conspiracy 
is an important example.  After a long period of “vocal criticism of Obama” for “withholding 
the document” (Morales, 2011, para. 3), Obama released his long-form birth certificate on 
April 27, 2011.  Not only was the picture of the long-form certificate an effective rebuttal to 
the Birther conspiracy, but Obama crafted a rhetorically effective response by portraying the 
conspiracy narrative as an outgrowth of extreme partisanship: 
We’re not going to be able to do it if we spend time vilifying each other.  We’re not 
going to be able to do it if we just make stuff up and pretend that facts are not 
facts.  We’re not going to be able to solve our problems if we get distracted by 
sideshows and carnival barkers. (Obama, 2011, para. 8) 
A Gallup (2011) poll taken just eight days later found that “Obama’s release of his long-form 
birth certificate…significantly reduced skepticism about his place of birth” (para. 5).  This 
drastic change of opinion occurred across all political groups, regardless of pre-existing 
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ideology.  In this instance, the charge lost resonance because the response effectively 
persuaded believers that the conspiracy was inaccurate. 
 Each of the aforementioned factors--anti-elitism, consistency with existing ideology, 
perceived accuracy of the narrative, and a poor rhetorical response from the accused--
influence the resonance of a charge of conspiracy.  However, all factors need not be present 
for a conspiracy theory to resonate to some degree.  The five factors function alongside the 
paranoid style as what Campbell and Jamieson (1978) called a “constellation” of 
characteristics defining a genre.  As the Bin Laden and Princess Diana conspiracies illustrate, 
some believers accept mutually contradictory positions if they have an extremely strong 
distrust of those in power.  Therefore, anti-elitism is especially important.  The stronger the 
anti-elitism, the more likely the narrative will be perceived as accurate.  If the charge is 
consistent with existing ideology, then a believer may be more likely to view the response 
from the accused as a poor response, even if it is factually accurate.  Similarly, the weaker the 
rhetorical response, the more likely the charge will be perceived as accurate.  Moreover, this 
set of factors has a cumulative effect.  If all factors are present, the charge of conspiracy can 
be especially powerful.  Importantly, this model does not treat resonance of a particular 
charge as static.  Rather, the resonance is largely contingent on the dialectic between accuser 
and accused.  Although all of the factors need not be combined with the paranoid style in any 
case, the presence of all or most of them substantially increases the likelihood that the 
conspiracy charge will resonate.  The goal is not merely classificatory; rather, “discourse 
formulations or constellations of strategies…provide us some security that an utterance will 
end in a predictable way” (Schryer, 2002, p. 95).  In making this claim, this essay moves one 
 38 
step closer to an understanding of conspiracy as a genre of rhetoric, not merely a rhetorical 
form. 
The Leaks and Response 
The Climategate scandal offers a particularly telling example of the rhetorical 
influence of the charge of conspiracy, because the accusation tapped into anti-elitism, was 
consistent with a strong ideology of skepticism towards climate science, was a well-crafted 
story and was met with a poor response from climate scientists.  In this section, I first discuss 
the release of the Climate Research Unit emails.  Second, I analyze the response in the news 
media and the blogosphere, emphasizing which emails consistently show up throughout 
different articles as so-called proof of widespread conspiracy and collusion.  Finally, I trace 
the response of the climate science community to show why it was ineffective.  
On November 19th, 2009, an anonymous hacker released over 1,000 emails exchanged 
between international climate scientists onto a server in Tomsk, Russia.  Further analysis 
determined that these emails were selectively chosen and disseminated to give the 
“impression of impropriety” (Hickman, 2009, para. 3), conspiracy and collusion among 
climate scientists.  Shortly after the post, the emails that negatively portrayed climate 
scientists became widely publicized, but the messages and works that established the integrity 
of the scientists were not reported (Revkin, 2009a, para. 9).  On November 20th, only one day 
after the release, Andrew Bolt (2009), a conservative columnist at Melbourne’s Herald Sun 
and Sydney’s Daily Telegraph and author of the most widely-read political blog in Australia, 
published a selection of the emails that suggested “conspiracy, collusion in exaggerating 
warming data, possibly illegal destruction of embarrassing information, organised resistance 
to disclosure, manipulation of data, private admission of flaws” and “much more” (para. 2).  
 39 
This article highlighted a select few of the large set of emails, which then became the most 
commonly cited by further reports by blogs and the news media.   
For example, one email that was repeatedly cited in the news was sent by Phil Jones, a 
professor of Climatology.  He noted a “trick of adding in the real temps” to “hide the decline” 
in temperatures (Bolt, 2009, para. 1).  Another, sent by Kevin Trenbeth, the head of the 
Climate Analysis Section at the USA National Center for Atmospheric Research, asked: 
[W]here the heck is global warming ? We are asking that here in Boulder where we 
have broken records the past two days for the coldest days on record. We had 4 inches 
of snow...The low was about 18F and also a record low, well below the previous 
record low. (Bolt, 2009, para. 10) 
Noting evidence of “conspiracy” and a “huge scandal,” Bolt cited the following comment by 
Tom Wigley, a climate scientist at the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (a 
nonprofit consortium of universities with graduate degrees in atmospheric sciences): “we 
probably need to say more about this. Land warming since 1980 has been twice the ocean 
warming — and skeptics might claim that this proves that urban warming is real and 
important” (Bolt, 2009, para. 13).  In a subsequent email, Wigley hoped to “reduce the ocean 
blip” (para. 22)--a statement interpreted as a manipulation of climate data to meet ideological 
ends. 
 The charge of conspiracy extended farther than just manipulation of data within this 
single research unit.  Bolt (2009) argued that an email by Jones implicated the entire peer-
review process: 
The other paper by MM is just garbage – as you knew. De Freitas again. Pielke is also 
losing all credibility as well by replying to the mad Finn as well – frequently as I see 
 40 
it. I can’t see either of these papers being in the next IPCC report. Kevin and I will 
keep them out somehow – even if we have to redefine what the peer-review literature 
is! (para. 24) 
After further summarizing emails, Bolt (2009) concluded that these emails show clear 
evidence of the “largest” (para. 20), “most extraordinary” (para. 20) and “most disgraceful” 
(para. 20) “conspiracy” (para. 2) (a term used seven times throughout the article) in the 
history of modern science.   
 Since this article was one of the earliest and most widely read, Bolt’s arguments 
significantly shaped the following public discussion.  The snippets publicized and 
summarized by Bolt “went viral” (Trenbeth, 2011, p. 1) and became the “jewel in the crown 
for conspiracy theorists” (Pearce, 2009, para. 8), given that they were rhetorically powerful, 
ideologically driven, and largely devoid of context.   
This ideologically driven expose gained public attention.  On November 28th, Frank 
Furedi (2009) continued the charge of conspiracy theory in an article published in The 
Australian:  
Climate-change alarmists…live on conspiracy theories. They tell stories of hidden 
forces that are sinisterly subverting the real science. They use the language of the 
Inquisition to stigmatise their opponents, labelling [sic] them deniers, suggesting they 
are lying about something they actually know to be true. Climate-change alarmists 
always allude to the story behind the story and to the hidden agenda of allegedly oil-
funded deniers rather than face up to substantive arguments about the politics of 
climate change. (para. 5) 
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A November 28th, 2009(b) article by Andrew Revkin in the New York Times noted “evidence 
of conspiracy to stifle dissenting views and withhold data from public scrutiny” (p. 8).  The 
same day, an article in the New Scientist claimed that the “emails expose a conspiracy at work 
to make human-induced global warming a fact” (p. 5).  An Investor’s Business Daily (2009) 
article titled “Climate Con Job” claimed that the scientists appear “guilty of fraud” (p. A10) 
and that these emails show “attempts to conspire” (p. A10). 
 Within one month, a narrative of a “global conspiracy” (Radford, 2009, para. 1) based 
on fabricating the science supporting the ACC hypothesis had gained power.  Emails that 
implicated a handful of climate scientists at the Climate Research Unit had been framed and 
re-defined to prove a vast and wide-reaching climate conspiracy.  This conspiracy now 
threatened the public’s perception of climate science in totality.  Even Google was charged 
with conspiring to hide the buzz in the news and blogosphere surrounding the leaked emails 
(Delingpole, 2009a, para. 1).  Although previous scientific disagreements over the ACC 
hypothesis had received some public attention, Climategate was unique in its lasting and 
pervasive impact on public opinion.  The immediate effect of the media coverage left over 
half of polled viewers less trustworthy of climate scientists (Leiserowitz et al., 2009, p. 6).  
Leiserowitz (2012) found that 13% of on-the-fence Americans reduced trust in climate 
science, despite the fact that scientists were cleared of wrongdoing (as cited in Bagley, 2012, 
para. 9-10). 
Equally as important as what was said by climate scientists, is what was not said in 
response.  During the week following the release of the hacked emails, defenses of the 
Climate Research Unit research practices were few and far between.  Although 
RealClimate.org (2009) published a criticism of the blogopshere for choosing “out-of-context 
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phrases” (para. 7), little was done to dismiss or answer the charge of conspiracy.  Moreover, 
liberal and environmental websites had little success in spreading their messages outside of 
their reader base, the group of the public that was already least likely, because of ideological 
pre-dispositions, to be persuaded by charges of conspiracy on behalf of scientists (Pearce, 
2009, para. 5).  Consequently, the media ran with the charge of conspiracy theory, and the 
frame created in the immediate aftermath of the release was overwhelmingly skeptical of the 
entire project of climate science. 
The lack of media coverage can be partially blamed on the non-response from the 
Climate Research Unit and their scientists.  Indeed, the silence from the University of East 
Anglia was deafening.  In the nearly three weeks following the release of the emails there was 
a “failure of the University of East Anglia to respond substantially to the avalanche of 
invective from climate skeptics” (Pearce, 2009, para. 15).  Possibly because of the non-
falsifiability of the charge, they found that the language of science was incapable of 
contesting the charge of conspiracy theory with statements of proof.  Historically, scientists 
have been reticent to translate scientific findings into lay discourse, instead choosing the 
comfort of the laboratory over entering a public discourse sharply divided by anti-
intellectualism and partisanship (Madsen, 2007, p. 166).  Although there are notable 
counterexamples (e.g., the debates concerning the link between CFC consumption and ozone 
depletion in the 1970s and 1980s), scientists have found their discourse does not suit the 
public sphere.  To make matters worse, “even environmental campaigners kept quiet – 
ostensibly because it was up to scientists to defend their own” (Pearce, 2009, para. 21).  
However, it was not just the East Anglia scientists whose reputations were at risk; the charge 
of conspiracy threatened to undercut the scientific consensus.  “Noticeably absent” from the 
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response was a defense of the “scientific method (including reproducibility), research 
integrity and ethics, open minds and critical thinking” intrinsic to scientific endeavors (Hui, 
2009, para. 5).  This silence created a “PR disaster” (Pearce, 2009, para. 15) that “undermined 
the reputation” (Radowitz, 2010, para. 1) of both the institution and denied science more 
broadly. 
Although the scientists continued their silence, assuming that the facts could stand up 
for themselves, the media director at Greenpeace UK stated that the “damage [was] being 
done in newsrooms” (Pearce, 2009, para. 31).  Even when the scientific jargon was explained 
and defended, missing from these defenses was an explicit answer to the charge of 
conspiracy.  The facts of the emails mattered, but the PR debate was decided.  A spokesperson 
for a leading environmental organization, wishing to remain anonymous, stated that “the e-
mails represented a seminal moment in the climate debate of the last five years, and it was a 
moment that broke decisively against us. I think the CRU leak is nothing less than 
catastrophic” (Pearce, 2009, para. 40).  Although science qua science may be sufficient for 
environmental scientists, environmentalists were frantically concerned about the effect that 
the news reports of conspiracy would have on the upcoming Copenhagen negotiations and 
subsequent congressional legislation needed to limit emissions in the United States (Roug & 
Grieve, 2009, para. 1). 
Ultimately, the widespread perception that the Climate Research Unit engaged in 
conspiratorial practices played “a role in the debate over global warming legislation, both in 
Congress and in California” (Baker, 2010, para. 8).  Given that elected officials create 
environmental policy, public disbelief in climate science makes substantial regulation 
extremely unlikely.  Myron Ebell, the director of energy and global warming policy for the 
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Competitive Enterprise Institute, posited that “the scandal” “made the opponents of energy-
rationing legislation stronger and more confident,” which undoubtedly had a negative effect 
on those hoping to achieve progressive environmental gains (para. 9). 
This is not to imply that even a perfect response from the scientific community would 
have eliminated the resonance of the conspiracy charge among the broader public.  Jamieson 
and Capella (2010) compellingly argued that conservative media insulate audiences from the 
evidence in ways that make “Democratic views seem alien and unpalatable” (p. xi).  Thus, 
conservative media outlets may have ignored even the strongest rebuttals defending ACC 
theories.  Moreover, Climategate was influenced by a larger historical-political context that 
was already calling climate science into question.  During the previous three decades, industry 
and the conservative political movement had joined forces to sponsor “think tanks” (Buell, 
2003, p. 299) that helped “midwife the creation of antienvironmental counterscience” (Buell, 
2003, p. 300).  Although Climategate was unique because of the narrative of conspiracy, it 
was consistent with the trend of skepticism of ACC theories in popular consciousness.   
Climategate is a strong example supporting the view that an interaction of a few key 
factors makes a conspiracy charge more likely to resonate.  This example should direct 
scholars away from solely looking at facticity or formal characteristics when analyzing 
conspiracy theories.  Instead, a broader critical approach that accounts for anti-elitism, 
existing ideology, the perceived accuracy of the narrative and the rhetorical response in 
defense of the accused should be pursued.  In the final section, I discuss the theoretical 
implications of these findings.  
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Conclusion 
Climategate represented a uniquely difficult challenge for climate scientists.  Although 
previous disagreement in the field had focused on scientific uncertainties, anti-global 
warming commentators used the release of the emails to make a much stronger charge: an 
accusation of conspiracy and collusion.  Several scientific investigations found no 
wrongdoing by the climate scientists.  However, because the Climategate accusation called 
into question the viability of the entire scientific method, a response of scientific certainty was 
insufficient to reverse public opinion.  Consequently, the charge of conspiracy stuck, and 
continued to influence public opinion even after exoneration.  Following the scandal, a large 
portion of the public altered their perspectives, viewing both climate science and climate 
scientists as less credible than before.  Well over one year following the Climategate 
conspiracy accusation, Ray and Pugliese (2011) found that nearly half of polled U.S. adults 
continued to attribute “global warming to natural causes” (para. 2).  Beyond illuminating this 
sequence of events, this case study has substantial theoretical implications for understanding 
the relationship between conspiracy theories and the public sphere, as well as practical 
implications for developing a rhetorical defense of climate science. 
 This essay suggests two conclusions concerning the relationship between conspiracy 
theory and the public sphere.  First, Climategate reveals several core threats to the public 
sphere and democratic governance.  Since Hofstadter, accusations of conspiracy have moved 
from the margins to the center of political discourse.  Because conspiracy accusations are a 
regular component of public debate, it is unhelpful for rhetorical scholars to discard them as 
irrational or paranoid.   
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This conspiracy theory was particularly resonant because it had a potent mix of 
complex scientific information, conservative ideology, powerful interest groups that take a 
propagandistic approach to science, and anti-intellectualism.  However, Climategate is just 
one example of the challenges facing advocates of rational deliberation in contemporary 
political discourse.  Too often, especially given the rising influence of the Internet, the 
ideological nature of political discourse in the United States and enormous industrial 
influence of some media outlets, reasonable arguments fail to persuade.  Because of the 
complex nature of scientific arguments, critics may influence public opinion by merely 
demonizing scientists instead of making rational arguments.  Instead of inserting a level of 
healthy skepticism into a policy debate, contemporary conspiracy theories are often 
manufactured by anti-intellectuals to ignore well-established facts.  These problems are 
magnified when ideological issues like climate change, health care and tax policy are debated 
publicly and filtered through media groups that have more fidelity to their political ideology 
than accuracy.   
Despite these constraints on rational political discourse, scientists should not abandon 
the use of public argument to achieve policy change.  Quite the contrary, it is precisely 
because of these constraints that climate scientists must publicize their specialized knowledge 
to counteract the uninformed dogmatism that carries such influence in the climate debate.  By 
finding a way to break up the constellation, they may undercut the resonance of the 
conspiracy narrative.  Second, Climategate offers compelling evidence that the resonance of a 
charge of conspiracy is tied to more than simply its relationship to facticity; rather, it is linked 
to a broader constellation of factors.  As well as being perceived as accurate, successful 
charges of conspiracy often tap into anti-elitism, are consistent with an existing ideology, are 
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based on a well-crafted narrative that is perceived as accurate and are countered with an 
ineffective rhetorical response.  Therefore, it is necessary to utilize more than just debunking 
strategies when countering an accusation of conspiracy.  Groups charged with protecting the 
lives of citizens, and the environment of our planet, must be armed with not only fact, but 
with the rhetorical tools to explain and defend these facts. 
In addition to highlighting the tension between conspiracy accusations and rational 
deliberation, this essay suggests a possible template for developing a rhetorical defense of 
climate science.  Climate science itself is under attack, but scientists have been trained to not 
lend “false seriousness to far-fetched claims of research skullduggery and corruption” 
(Nature, 2010b, para. 3).  This is unfortunate since the strategy of silence allows one side to 
frame the debate.  An “intervention” is necessary to “redirect the lines of authority” 
influencing climate change communication in the public sphere (Cox, 2010, p. 130). 
Solutions to global warming, “being mostly preventive innovations” present a 
particularly difficult “communication challenge” (Thakadu, Irani and Telg, 2011, p. 84).  In 
response, scientists should craft an alternative narrative, or “new social vision” (Brulle, 2010, 
p. 93), to break up the constellation of generic traits defining ACC as a conspiracy.  For 
example, engaged scientists can help overcome the assumption that the scientific community 
is elitist by translating esoteric academic discourse into lay terminology.  Moreover, scientists 
can work to transform skeptical ideology by using “vivid, understandable, believable, 
interesting, and personally meaningful” (Moser & Dilling, 2004, p. 41) persuasive messages.  
In specific instances of conspiracy accusations, scientists can undercut the perceived accuracy 
of the charge with a well-crafted rhetorical response in defense of those implicated by the 
charge. 
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Preparation is the key; rhetorically trained scientists will be essential in combating 
future potentially lethal conspiracy theories.  Scientific discourse, which relies on falsifiable 
proof to argue, may be incapable of disproving the charge of conspiracy absent a more 
rhetorically centered approach.  Therefore, a response to the charge of conspiracy based on a 
fusion of scientific and rhetorical theories may be much more effective than a focus on 
scientific accuracy alone.  In other words, scientists need to be better rhetoricians.   
Scientists must be willing to not just let the facts stand for themselves.  ACC theories 
must be defended rhetorical and criticisms must be combatted.  Producing an inducement to 
action among the public will require more than just engagement on the part of scientists, but 
will demand a rigorous examination of which rhetorical tactics are the most effective in 
persuading the public.  In fact, “more effective communication of climate change’s 
urgency…can help bring about…public understanding of, and civic engagement with, the 
issue” (Moser & Dilling, 2004, p. 34).  Unfortunately, the scientific community has avoided 
persuasive rhetoric in favor of descriptive and neutral language because scientific training 
emphasizes sticking strictly to the facts.  An effective response must be immediate, because 
the charge may develop a resonance absent a response; and, focused not merely on facticity, 
but also on the underlying conspiracy narrative.  These requirements for an effective response 
have become even more important in the Internet age because of the speed with which 
accusations can spread, and the decreased importance of who makes the charge.  Although not 
every accusation of conspiracy will induce such a substantial public reaction, scientists should 
approach future situations with a radically different response than was used in this case.  
Climate scientists must understand that although facticity does influence the resonance of 
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conspiracy theories, proving the accuracy of science is necessary but insufficient to influence 
public opinion.  
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Chapter 3 – Feigning Environmentalism: Anti-Environmental Organizations, Strategic 
Naming and Definitional Argument 
Introduction 
Following Silent Spring, Rachel Carson’s 1962 treatise against the use of harmful 
pollutants, the US public developed stronger support for general environmental values, trust 
in environmental science and support for environmental regulation (Lutts, 1985, p. 211).  
These attitudes facilitated the growth of grassroots environmental organizations, the 
development of not-in-my-backyard [NIMBY] protests, anti-globalization sentiment and a 
wilderness movement devoted to protection and conservation of natural resources (Dunlap & 
Mertig, 1992, p. xi).  However, this pro-environmental majority faced a powerful opposition.  
Anti-environmental1 think tanks, with strong industrial ties, were created to diffuse 
burgeoning demands for regulations and reverse the “support for environmental protection” 
(Jacques, Dunlap & Freeman, 2008, p. 351). 
Faced with these pro-environmental attitudes, anti-environmental groups believed that 
they could not visibly attack the environmental movement per se, but still needed to develop 
persuasive strategies to prevent environmental regulations.  One such strategy was to pretend 
to support the environment by naming themselves with terms that are commonly associated 
with environmental causes.  A second strategy was to define their message as mainstream and 
driven by scientific consensus.  By defining limited government intervention and de-
regulation as mainstream and re-defining pro-environmental policies as unscientific and anti-
growth, anti-environmentalists muddied the divide between progressive environmentalism 
and conservative opposition.  These mutually supportive strategies enjoyed great success--as 
scientific consensus supporting anthropogenic climate change [ACC] theories became 
                                                
1 The term “anti-environmental” is chosen to acknowledge the environmental implications of the beliefs held by 
these organizations.  It is not meant to imply a hatred for the environment. 
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stronger, the public’s belief that climate science was uncertain and fractured increased as well.  
Moreover, as the case for environmental regulations became stronger, public support for 
stringent environmental regulations declined. 
In this essay, I argue that one explanation for declining support for ACC theories and 
progressive environmental regulation is that industrial interests used persuasive strategies of 
naming and argument by definition to co-opt the mainstream environmental message, 
breeding perceptions of inconsistency, skepticism and contrarianism.  More specifically, anti-
environmental think tanks used names (e.g., The Heartland Institute, Citizens for the 
Environment, Global Climate Coalition, National Wetlands Coalition, Greening Earth 
Society, etc.) that created the perception of environmental friendliness while subtly 
manipulating public and political opinion to endorse anti-environmental messages.  Moreover, 
these anti-environmental think tanks redefined mainstream environmentalism to be consistent 
with their goals.  These strategies of naming and definition allowed anti-environmentalists to 
question climate science, portray fringe environmental theories as mainstream, undermine 
widely supported scientific theories and degrade support for progressive environmental 
regulations. 
I develop this argument in three sections.  First, I discuss rhetorical theories of how 
naming and definition influence audiences.  Second, I examine the naming strategies of 
industrially funded anti-environmental think tanks.  I attempt to evaluate the validity of the 
definition by exposing the motives influencing the definition and linking the definition to 
anti-environmental publications and reports.  In particular, I use the Heartland Institute as a 
representative anecdote for analyzing the strategies of subtle co-optation used by broader 
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opponents of environmental regulation.  Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of 
this rhetorical strategy. 
 
Naming and Definition – What’s at Stake? 
 Central to understanding the effectiveness of persuasive strategies used by anti-
environmental organizations is a broader analysis of theories of naming and definition.  
Although there is substantial overlap in these two bodies of literature, I use them to make two 
distinct arguments.  First, the act of organizational naming can be extremely powerful.  I 
argue that this single act does not merely create a neutral label, but plays an integral part in 
shaping and broadening the meaning of subsequent anti-environmental messages.  Second, 
argument by definition amplifies the power of naming and directs the audience to believe that 
anti-environmental organizations actually support environmental sustainability.  Definitional 
strategies create frames that foreground specific messages, while intentionally backgrounding 
others.  For anti-environmental organizations, understanding the combination of these two 
strategies is uniquely revealing. 
 Naming plays an epistemologically important societal function.  The act of naming is 
both a representation of attitude and an attempt to change “the attitudes of others” (Burke, 
1937, p. 4).  Thus, a name is not a neutral or objective simplification of “reality” (p. 4), nor is 
it merely a categorization.  Rather, it suggests what the named is “for or against” (Burke, 
1937, p. 4).  It is a necessary condition for “relational thinking” (Rueckert, 1994, p. 12)--
differentiating and placing.  Cameron (1999) agreed, “names are a culture’s way of fixing 
what will actually count as reality in a universe of overwhelming, chaotic sensations, all 
pregnant with a multitude of possible meanings” (p. 10).  Although the “magical decree is 
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implicit in all language,” the “strategic name” exhibits particularly powerful persuasive 
capacity (Burke, 1973, p. 4).  Moreover, the act of naming is often a “political exercise” 
(Martin, 1991, p. 83) with implications for public policy that are worthy of both practical and 
ethical considerations.  For corporations, naming is a “highly strategic undertaking to drive 
the…name as a weapon in the marketplace” (Javed, 1997, para. 10). 
 Although it has long been accepted that the act of naming serves a strategic purpose, 
names are often times assumed to be benign.  For example, Sharer (2001) began her 
investigation of organizational names from the presumption that they were “proper names” 
that were “synecdochic structures” that stood “in for the larger arguments informing the 
collective identification of the group” (p. 234).  Seen from this perspective, an 
environmentally friendly name would label an organization that supported a pro-
environmental agenda.  In agreement, Stewart, Smith and Denton (1984) and Mottl (1980) 
argued that names are used to represent the goals of organizations.  However, these 
assumptions ignore that the act of naming can be a deceptive practice as well.  Fearing this 
deception, Burke (1973) noted that the job of the rhetorical critic is to discuss and test whether 
the “naming” is “the closest possible approximation” to the object being named (p. 4).  
Therefore, the rhetorical critic must examine ideological differences between name and 
discourse. 
It should be clear that the act of naming has substantial influence on the image of a 
particular organization.  However, this act is just one part of a broader persuasive strategy 
used by anti-environmental organizations.  In addition to using names that hid their anti-
environmental message, several organizations defined themselves as mainstream, and 
redefined existing mainstream environmentalism to be alarmist and based on fringe scientific 
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beliefs.  The theoretical support for the influence of argument by definition is discussed 
below. 
Burke (1935) introduced the concept of argument by definition by criticizing the 
supposed distinction between rhetoric, which was seen as “synonymous with falsity,” and 
definition, which was conventionally viewed as “strict,” “ideal” and more representative of 
the truth (p. 55).  To Burke, this distinction was futile; instead, the attempt to proclaim 
“scientific” (p. 58) definition as objective language was the source of much discontent.  Using 
this foundation, theories of argument by definition have significantly developed in the last 
two decades.  
Argumentation and Advocacy’s special edition (1999) on “Definitional Argument” 
provided substantial theoretical revision and progress to an already rich tradition.  Titsworth 
(1999) found that Clinton’s definition of “disability” (p. 171) in the Individuals with 
Disabilities in Education Act exemplified how ideology can influence definition even when 
such naming is seemingly benign.  Broda-Bahm (1999) argued that defining environmental 
problems as security concerns is not a neutral or objective truth claim, but rather manipulates 
and directs the audience to a specific mindset.  Placing primary influence on the role of the 
definer, Zarefsky (2006) centered the debate on persuasive intent by stating that by using 
definition, rhetoricians are really providing an “implicit argument” (p. 404) through “strategic 
maneuvering” (p. 409).  
These studies, generally, focused on definitions as frames for arguments.  For 
example, Titsworth (1999) stated that definition is a “starting point for arguments” (p. 171), 
and Mcgee (1999) agreed, noting that definitions are “the points at which many arguments 
begin”  (p. 141).  Zarefsky (2006) pointed to specific instances in which persuasive 
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definitions were created: social insurance as “Social Security,” the blockade of Cuba as 
“quarantine,” Reagan’s choice to name the MX missile the “Peace-keeper,” etc. (p. 404).  
Schiappa (2003) noted the “domestication” (p. 132) of objectionable terms like “nuclear 
weapons, strategy and war” (p. 135) through metaphorical definition, as particularly capable 
of manipulating an audience. 
Given the propensity for sophistry in argument through definition, two correctives 
have been proposed that endeavor to reveal and elucidate such tactics.  First, Zarefsky (2006) 
proposed that rhetorical scholars should attempt to evaluate the validity of arguments made in 
definitions.  Thus, in order to determine whether a definition produces “fallacious” (Zarefsky, 
2006, p. 415) argument, a scholar must look past the definition itself, to the arguments made 
or frames supported by that definition.  In this way, rhetorical scholars integrate both 
descriptive and normative tools into definitional theory, and empower the public to perceive 
the “strategic maneuvering” (Zarefsky, p. 409) present in all definitional strategies.  Second, 
Walton (2001) argued that rhetorical scholars should link definitional strategies to motive, and 
center analysis on whether that motive is ethical (p. 123, 126).   In practice, these two 
correctives are extremely similar.  For example, a definition that is intentionally deceptive 
under Walton’s model would also be flagged under Zarefsky’s approach as being invalid, 
insofar as the definition does not align accurately with the resultant frames or argumentative 
strategies.  In this essay, I use a combination of these two methods, focusing both on the 
motive determining the naming of anti-environmental organizations, and on the validity of the 
arguments made in their publications and reports. 
The growth of industrially funded anti-environmental organizations was “central to the 
reversal of US support for environmental protection” (Jacques, Dunlap & Freeman, 2008, p. 
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351).  Strategic naming and argument by definition greatly increased the influence of anti-
environmental messages used by industrially funded organizations.  Importantly, these two 
strategies worked effectively in combination.  For anti-environmental organizations, the initial 
act of naming co-opted the environmental message.  Subsequent arguments by definition, 
particularly defining industrial demands as “mainstream” environmentalism, reinforced the 
co-optation strategy and eliminated the distinction between progressive environmentalism and 
environmentally harmful industry.  Even when espousing anti-environmental messages, this 
act of definition directed the attention away from their unpopular arguments.  
In the next section, I focus on the specific strategies of the anti-environmental 
organizations, analyzing closely the naming strategies and definitional arguments made by 
The Heartland Institute.  Finally, applying an interwoven theory of naming and definition 
scholarship, I discuss the implications of these strategies. 
Rhetorical Strategies of Anti-Environmental Organizations 
Following Silent Spring, a “significant shift occurred in the American perception of 
nature and the environment: ecological health became directly linked to human health, and a 
broad public sentiment arose that government” should “actively enforce environmental 
regulations” (Levy, 2010, p. 1).  In the face of the support for environmental protection, 
industrial interests were forced to respond: 
Corporate America formed unprecedented alliances and set up industry groups and 
disguised front groups to regain its lost legitimacy and to ensure that its viewpoint 
dominated discussions of and action about environmental issues…Corporate strategies 
for regaining lost ground…included a host of subtler, indirect media tactics to 
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influence public opinion, tactics which received the name ‘greenwashing.’ (Buell, 
2003, p. 297). 
Industry and the conservative political movement joined forces to sponsor “think tanks” 
(Buell, 2003, p. 299) that helped “midwife the creation of antienvironmental counterscience” 
(Buell, 2003, p. 300).  These “fake grassroots movements” (Johnson, 2009, para. 1) were 
developed to manufacture mail campaigns and fake crowd protests to oppose environmental 
regulations (Johnson, 2009, para. 7).   
Upon inception, these anti-environmental think tanks were faced with an important 
naming decision: on one hand they needed to distinguish themselves from the progressive 
environmental movement, but on the other hand they could not explicitly attack 
environmental values, because that would cut too hard against the grain of public sentiment.  
Thus, many chose to adopt the language of the environmental movement in their names, 
hoping to simultaneously subvert the environmental cause and to not be identified as overtly 
anti-environment (Zald & Useem, 1987, p. 259).  
Several industrial organizations strategically named, or renamed, their think tanks.  
The American Petroleum Institute, the lobbying arm of many large fossil fuel companies, 
organized rallies under the name “Energy Citizens” to oppose progressive climate regulation.  
It “claimed to be made up of tens of thousands of ‘grassroots activists’” (Jerving, 2012, para. 
14) and defined itself as a movement of the “general public” (Jerving, 2012, para. 16).  
However, this “faux-grassroots” group, despite its name, “curiously lacked many citizens” 
and consistently lobbied against progressive environmental regulations (Hacker & Pierson, 
2010, p. 144). 
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The Citizens for the Environment (also referred to as Concerned Citizens for the 
Environment) was created, not by an indigenous grassroots uprising, but with “lavish 
corporate funding” (Press, 2012, p. 187) from Koch Industries (Diamond, 1996, p. 168).  It 
was developed to actively oppose the federal Clean Air Act and regulations at the state level 
as well.  To do so, it published research advocating free-market environmentalism, 
considering acid rain a myth and supporting the “total deregulation of business” (Weinberger, 
2005, p. 114).  Despite its name, an investigation by the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette found that it 
had “no citizen membership of its own” (as cited in Press, 2012, p. 187).   
In another act of “corporate camouflage” (Hightower, 1996, para. 1), “oil drillers, 
developers and other corporations that want[ed] to drain America’s wetlands” (Hightower, 
1996, para. 2) created The National Wetlands Coalition.  This Wise Use organization 
“appropriated green discourse” to “fight the Endangered Species Act--unquestionably one of 
the greatest legislative victories of the environmental movement” (Peeples, 2005, p. 2).  The 
National Wetlands Coalition “mimicked” the “mainstream” environmental organizations to 
hide that it was a client of anti-wetlands corporations (Bantjes, 2007, p. 260).  
Specifically developed to oppose climate regulations, The Global Climate Coalition 
was “financed by fees from large corporations and trade groups representing the oil, coal and 
auto industries” (Revkin, 2009a, para. 5) to breed perceptions of uncertainty about climate 
science.  For “more than a decade” (Revkin, 2009a, para. 1), the Global Climate Coalition 
“conducted a multimillion-dollar advertising campaign challenging” (Revkin, 2009a, para. 6) 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Similarly, The Western Fuels Association underwrote The Greening 
Earth Society to promote the idea that there was significant scientific doubt about the link 
between carbon pollution and climate change. 
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Examples of this strategy abound: The Environmental Conservation Organization, The 
Wilderness Impact Research Foundation, The Alliance for Environment and Resources, The 
Alliance for a Responsible CFC Policy, etc.--all environmental sounding groups that in fact 
served industrial interests. Conservative anti-environmentalism is filled with organizations 
funded by anti-environmental interests that deceptively name themselves as green sounding.  
This naming strategy allowed industry to “attribute their own lobbying successes to the 
‘grass-roots’ groups,” providing them with an opportunity to falsely claim that their anti-
environmental messages were supported by the broader public (Helvarg, 1995, para. 9).  
However, “pull back the drapes on this movement” and you will find “backers from the 
corporate sector and the political right,” hoping to question environmental science, limit 
governmental environmental regulation and shed skepticism on even the existence of any 
environmental problems (para. 2). 
This approach of strategic naming was supplemented with a redefinition of 
environmentalism and acceptable environmental science.  After naming themselves with 
environmentally friendly terms, anti-environmental organizations often took subsequent steps 
to co-opt the environmental message.  In particular, they “packaged and repackaged 
[themselves] in different forms for different audiences and plugged into a complex 
infrastructure developed for effective public presentation” (Buell, 2003, p. 300).  By defining 
themselves as mainstream and based on sound environmental science, anti-environmental 
organizations “obscur[ed] several crucial differences” (p. 300) between themselves and 
legitimate climate science.  By adding “the appearance of objectivity” (p. 302) anti-
environmental think tanks provided the necessary ammunition to refute scientific consensus 
on a range of environmental concerns. 
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In the remainder of this essay, I analyze The Heartland Institute as a representative 
anecdote for strategic naming decisions and arguments by definition employed by this group 
of anti-environmental organizations.  I focus on The Heartland Institute because it offers a 
window to “the political upheaval taking place in the United States” (Tollefson, 2011, p. 440) 
and helps to explain how global warming skeptics are winning over the public.  First, I trace 
the history and composition of The Heartland Institute, centering on its choice to define itself 
using the trope of the heartland.  Second, I look at its argumentative strategies, determining its 
influence on public opinion and environmental policy.  In this way, I link definition with 
argument – endeavoring to determine the validity of the propositions forwarded by the 
environmental countermovement. 
The Heartland Institute as Representative Anecdote 
The Heartland Institute was founded and has been operating continuously since 1984 
(Heartland, n.d.b, para. 1).  Since 1984, The Heartland Institute has served as a conservative 
education organization, publishing on a wide variety of topics: tobacco, health care, education 
and the environment.  During the 1990s, it was the central source of information for Phillip 
Morris’ pro-tobacco campaign (Vance, 2009).  It currently maintains over twenty websites, 
sends members to testify before Congress, hosts conferences and produces six monthly 
publications.  Although the Heartland Institute has historically written on a plethora of social 
and political issues, much of its scholarship in the early 21st century has focused on 
environmental de-regulation and questioning the science behind ACC theories.  It has 
produced millions of documents questioning climate science and has widely disseminated 
them to people of political importance across the United States (Tollefson, 2011, p. 441).   
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Despite repeated attempts at personal correspondence with its Communications 
Director, it has not disclosed the factors that went into its naming decision.  However, context 
provides some clues.  The Institute was founded during the end of Reagan’s first term, as 
there was a burgeoning “backlash from the general public” to Reagan’s rollback of 
environmental protections (Jacques, Dunlap & Freeman, 2008, p. 353).  At this time, 
“conservative activists learned it was unwise to attack environmental protection directly” 
given that Americans were “supportive of environmental protection and [saw] it as a 
governmental responsibility” (McCright & Dunlap, 2000, p. 108).  Thus, anti-environmental 
groups developing during this period were constrained by public sentiment, and often chose to 
subtly name themselves so as not to be perceived as openly anti-environmental.  The choice 
of the term “Heartland” fits as a response to these limitations. 
The term “Heartland” originates from European texts produced in the early 1900s, and 
represents the geographical space between watersheds (Rundstrom, 2006, p. 71).  Once in 
wide use in the United States, the term began to carry the connotation of pristine landscape, 
“the location of enduring American traits” (Rundstrom, 2006, p. 72), the breadbasket of the 
United States.  The term “Heartland” is both a geographical space at the center of the United 
States, and a “psychological” space where the “bullion of the American dream lies” (Jackson, 
2009, p. 38).  The term evokes imagery of untouched and pristine environmental landscapes 
that are central to the region or nation, thus deserving of protection.   
Importantly, the term heartland is closely linked to rural America.  The “pastoral 
ideal” has historically been used as a “powerful metaphor” in both literary and public spheres 
(Marx, 1964, p. 4).  It has retained “significant force” (p. 4) because of its appeal to native 
imagination, sentimental values and natural environmentalism: 
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Movement toward such a symbolic landscape also may be understood as a movement 
away from an ‘artificial’ world…this impulse gives rise to a symbolic motion away 
from centers of civilization toward their opposite, nature, away from sophistication 
toward simplicity, or, to introduce the cardinal metaphor of the literary mode, away 
from the city toward the country. (p. 9-10) 
The term “heartland” fits with this desire for the natural, pristine and uniquely American 
environment.  A passive observer would likely assume that an organization named as in 
support of the “heartland” would support the protection of the environment.  However, for the 
Institute, the choice to incorporate the term “Heartland” hid its anti-environmentalism and 
allowed it to camouflage itself with the discourse of the environmental movement.  In doing 
so, it avoided public backlash, while achieving status as a reputable and non-biased source of 
environmental information.   
Although the naming allowed The Heartland Institute to remain perceived as 
environmentally supportive, subsequent definitional arguments made this strategy extremely 
effective.  In what follows, I analyze newsletters and policy documents from the Heartland 
website to determine the strategies the Institute used to define itself.  In particular, I find three 
definitional arguments that were used by The Heartland Institute to add legitimacy to its 
environmental name: (1) self-definition as a grassroots movement, (2) definition of its 
scientific findings as mainstream and consistent with a broader consensus, (3) re-definition of 
legitimate environmental organizations as manufactured and in the scientific minority. 
 First, The Heartland Institute defined itself as a grassroots movement.  Bast (2011b), 
the President of the Institute, argued that The Heartland Institute played “an essential role in 
the national (and increasingly in the international) movement” (p. 2) for limited government 
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intervention and de-regulation.  The Institute defined itself as, “building a social movement in 
favor of building a realistic perspective on climate change” (Bast, 2011b, p. 11).  This 
movement has a widely influential reach.  Nearly three thousand state and local officials 
“consider Environment & Climate News [the Institute’s monthly environmental publication] a 
useful source of information” (Bast, 2011b, p. 4).  In 2010, Heartland’s reports on climate and 
environmental regulation reached a “print audience of 41.3 million readers” (Bast, 2011b, p. 
11). The Heartlander (2002), The Heartland Institute’s newspaper, praised a plethora of 
victories by “grassroots activists” (para. 14) over “anti-private property environmental 
groups” (para. 14).   
In one news report, Russin (2010) noted Heartland’s “grassroots opposition to laws” 
(para. 10) to combat global warming, based on “commonsense perspectives” (para. 11) that 
“the winter we have had” (para. 11) proves the alarmist nature of ACC science.  Taylor 
(2012), the managing editor of Environment & Climate News, cited “grassroots” (para. 1) 
concerns over wind power development.  Samuel (1995), a senior fellow at The Heartland 
Institute, described the environmental goals of the Institute as deriving from an “alliance of 
farmers, ranchers, individual landowners, and companies collectively known as ‘the property 
rights movement’” (p. 1).  Why is this “movement” (p. 1) noteworthy, asks Samuel (1995)?  
Because its formulation represented “American liberty” -- “a group of citizens joining 
together to fix what they view as an intrusion on a Constitutionally [sic] guaranteed right” 
(Samuel, 1995, p. 1). 
 This strategy of self-defining as a grassroots movement was integral to countering 
accusations of industrial influence.  When such criticisms arose, The Heartland Institute was 
able to point to “widespread localized backlash against the impact of environmental 
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regulation” as the impetus for its “grassroots movement” (Samuel, 1995, p. 6).  Thus, the 
Institute made it much more difficult for politicians to ignore its concerns, because there was 
a manufactured public supposedly driving their demands.  However, its development was not 
driven by grassroots activism.  Although Heartland no longer makes its funding sources 
publicly available, it received direct funding from Exxon Mobile every year between 1998 
and 2006, totaling over half a million dollars.  Such a substantial of influx of corporate 
funding was an “inherent contradiction” to its claim of “grassroots support” (Press, 2012, p. 
187).  Importantly, their use of the term “grassroots” and “grassroots movement” “disguises 
the very real differences” between The Heartland Institute and organizations rooted and 
organized from people within a specific community (Taylor, 2004, p. 67). 
The second strategy used by The Heartland Institute was to define its scientific 
findings as mainstream and consistent with a broader consensus.  In one policy document, 
Bast (2011a) argued that “mainstream science” shifted away from alarmism because of 
“cherry-picking data, oversights, and errors of the IPCC” (para. 17).  In the “Reply to Critics” 
section of its website, The Heartland Institute (n.d.b) defined itself as “firmly within the 
‘mainstream’ of expert opinion on global warming” (Question 10).  In particular, it noted that 
its spokespersons were “credible and respected in the national and international debate” (The 
Heartland Institute, n.d.b, Question 10).  It posited internationally recognized scientific 
climate projections as mere “politics,” while depicting its viewpoints as “reality” (Oplas, 
2009, p. 1).   
To add credibility to this approach, it has widely cited data produced by three ACC 
skeptics – Tim Ball, Keith Idso and Fred Singer.  There is ample evidence for skepticism of 
these so-called climate scientists.  Despite the “doctor” preceding each of their names, none 
 65 
are academically trained in the field of climatology.  In fact, The Heartland Institute’s 
research on climate change does not rely on findings from the field of climatology; instead, it 
cites extreme minority opinions to support its scientific publications.  In this way, it 
hyperbolizes the disagreement among actual climate scientists to undercut the justifications 
for progressive environmental regulation.   
Ball (2009), who holds a doctorate in historical geography, argued on the Heartland 
website that “the argument that global warming is due to humans, known as anthropogenic 
global warming theory (AGW) is a deliberate fraud” (para. 1).  In concurrent skepticism, Idso 
(1999), who holds a doctorate in botany, maintained that: “carbon dioxide is not a pollutant.  
It is a colorless, odorless trace gas that actually sustains life on this planet” (para. 1).  He also 
pointed to scientific “confusion about the biological benefits of elevated CO2,” and criticized 
the hyperbolic “doomsday scenarios” of global warming scientists (Idso, 1999, para. 12).  
Singer (2008), who holds a doctorate in physics, agreed, finding “overwhelming” evidence 
that human emissions are an “insignificant” factor in global warming trends, greatly 
outweighed by “natural climate influences” (para. 2). 
Ball, Idso and Singer avoid (or are denied) peer-review in the field of climatology, and 
have had much of their research funded by partisan interest groups like Exxon Mobile 
(Montgomery, 2006; Union of Concerned Scientists, 2007; Gelbspan, 2011).  Andrew 
Weaver, “Canada’s preeminent climate science professor” (Elshof, 2010, p. 89) argued that 
Ball “says stuff that is just plan wrong.  But when you are talking to crowds, when you are 
talking on TV, there is no challenge, there is no peer-review…what Ball is doing is not about 
science…it is about politics” (Montgomery, 2006, p. 31).  Idso’s theory that increased carbon 
emissions will have a net-positive effect on the environment is widely discredited (Monbiot, 
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2007, p. 7).  Singer publicly denied “receiving funding from energy industry sources” (de 
Granados, 2007, para. 12), but recanted after investigative journalists uncovered that Exxon 
was one of the sponsors of his climate scholarship.  Top climate scientists have described 
Heartland’s scholarship as picking “a big fat bowl of cherries,” implying that writers hand-
pick its data to support its argument, while ignoring evidence to the contrary – a claim 
“happily acknowledged” by Joe Bast, the founder of the Institute, as accurate and consistent 
with individualistic ideology purported by libertarianism (Tollefson, 2011, p. 441).  In this 
way, The Heartland Institute magnifies the extremely limited scientific disagreement over the 
exact results of climactic changes to portray the whole global warming hypothesis as hanging 
by a thread.   
Using a similar strategy of portraying its minority opinions as widely supported, The 
Heartland Institute (2011) pointed to a long list of “endorsements” (p. 3) to enhance 
credibility.  The “About” page on its website stated that these supporters were “some of the 
top scholars, thinkers and politicians in the world” (Heartland, n.d.b, para. 1).  This 12-page 
list of names included several Republican congresspeople, conservative economists and 
leaders of notoriously conservative think tanks (e.g., CATO, The Heritage Foundation, 
Americans for Tax Reform, Pacific Research Institute and the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute).  For Heartland, the longer the list of individuals, the harder it is to for critics to 
portray them as an ideologically extreme think tank.  Noticeably lacking from this list was 
any climate scientist, or any statements supporting the credibility of its hand picked scientists’ 
environmental scholarship.  However, by defining themselves as mainstream, The Heartland 
Institute created the perception that its environmental findings were reasonable, thoughtful 
and scientifically accurate. 
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The final definitional argument used by The Heartland Institute redefined opposing 
scientific opinions as manufactured, and in the scientific minority.  Facing criticisms of undue 
industrial influence over Heartland’s publications, DeWeese (2000) turned the tables, arguing 
that “the green propaganda machine” is manufactured by “big business” (p. 1).  An 
“investigation of financial reports of the leading environmental organizations” showed a 
“tangled web connecting environmental groups with big businesses” (DeWeese, 2000, p. 1).  
In another Heartland document, Ferguson (2009) posited that attacks on Exxon-Mobil for 
paying 23 million dollars to climate skeptics were a “distracting sideshow” from the 
“powerful alliance of self-serving interests” supporting climate “alarmism” (p. 1).  Advancing 
this criticism further, Ferguson (2009) claimed: 
By pouring so much money into pushing a single, scientifically-baseless agenda, the 
Government has created not an unbiased investigation but a self-fulfilling 
prophecy…Sound science cannot easily survive the vice-like grip of politics and 
finance. (p. 1) 
Nova (2009) agreed, arguing that the scientific beliefs of The Heartland Institute are based on 
“a dedicated but largely uncoordinated grassroots movement of scientists” who are merely 
“unpaid volunteers” competing “with a well funded highly organized climate monopoly” 
(para. 2).  Similarly, Taylor (2011) argued that Heartland’s climate findings are based on 
“hard scientific facts, not” “scare-mongering” found at other research sites (para. 7).  In 
agreement, Samuel (1995) determined greens, more than anti-greens, were receiving 
substantial industrial backing (p. 6).  Seen from this perspective, the most common argument 
against greenwashers, that they were too heavily influenced by industry, was equally true of 
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the environmental organizations forwarding the criticism.  This was also addressed on its 
website. 
In the “Reply to Critics” section of its website, it pointed to the “alleged” consensus 
favoring “alarmist visions of future global warming” as less supported than its more skeptical 
view (The Heartland Institute, n.d.b, Question 10).  For example, Heartland attacked 
Greenpeace by exaggerating its environmental stances, and portraying the organization’s 
goals and tactics as inconsistent with public sentiment.  Here, it stated that Greenpeace is a 
“radical environmental group” that seeks to “ban all…cars and trucks in the U.S.” (The 
Heartland Institute, n.d.b, para. 28).  Moreover, it argued that Greenpeace was “fueling 
alarmism about global warming by exaggerating the human role and the consequences of 
warming” (para. 28).  Avery (2008), writing for Heartland, stated that there is a “long line of 
claims by the organization [Greenpeace] that have proven unwise and incorrect “ (para. 1).   
Using a similar strategy, The Heartlander (2001) portrayed the environmental 
movement as lacking consensus by citing former Greenpeace activist Bjorn Lomborg as an 
example of a “left-wing guy” (para. 21) who disagreed with the global warming hypothesis.  
Castles (2008) stated that the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) overstated warming trends “by a large measure” (para. 2) and was not a product of 
science, but mere “conjecture” (para. 16).  In the same report, Castles (2008) stated that the 
IPCC ignored scientific consensus by stating the opposite, and did little to prove itself valid in 
the face of criticism.  This strategy of defining conventional environmental beliefs as outside 
the mainstream is central to re-defining the environmental message, and capturing public 
opinion in support of conservative and industrial goals.   
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These three definitional arguments: (1) self-definition as a grassroots movement, (2) 
definition of its scientific findings as mainstream and consistent with a broader consensus, (3) 
re-definition of environmental organizations as manufactured and in the scientific minority 
were integral to manipulating public opinion to subvert mainstream environmental goals.  The 
first two approaches worked to deflect criticism of The Heartland Institute as a manufactured 
industrial front.  Moreover, these definitions helped undercut the argument that climate 
contrarianism was a fringe theory.  The final strategy redefined mainstream environmentalism 
as anti-regulation and skeptical of ACC global warming science.  In combination, these 
definitional arguments muddied the distinction between progressive environmentalism and 
conservative opposition.  In what follows, I discuss the implications of strategic naming and 
definitional arguments in the context of conservative anti-environmental organizations. 
Conclusion 
 Faced with strong public support for environmental protection, The Heartland Institute 
was forced to modify its anti-environmental messages to hide its true intent to avoid backlash.  
Its current influence--illuminated by its numerous publications, time spent testifying before 
Congress and wide popular support--speaks to the success of this persuasive strategy.  
Although The Heartland Institute is just one of many organizations that employed similar 
naming and definition strategies, they serve as a representative anecdote for anti-
environmental organizations seeking to blend in with mainstream environmentalism.   
By strategically naming and defining themselves as pro-environment, these 
organizations achieved great influence.  Each act of naming fixed attention towards 
environmentally friendly terms, hiding these organizations’ blatant inconsistencies with the 
mainstream environmental movement.  Subsequent definitional strategies provided even 
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greater credence to the environmentally friendly names.  By defining themselves as grassroots 
movements, consistent with mainstream environmentalism and redefining legitimate 
environmental organizations as manufactured, these organizations blurred the distinction 
between environmental and anti-environmental attitudes.  What would have otherwise been 
detected as pseudoscientific and industrially influenced propaganda, so-called scientific 
findings denying environmental problems, questioning global warming and portraying 
scientific consensus as alarmist, were taken seriously.   
This strategy succeeded.  One study found that progressive think tanks were cited less 
than 15 percent as frequently in the broadcast media as centrist or conservative think tanks 
(Buell, 2003, p. 302).  These manufactured think tanks “extended their influence” even 
further; they did not “just educate politicians but also suppl[ied] conservative Republican 
administrations with many of their administrative, judicial and executive-branch appointees” 
(Buell, 2003, p. 302).  Importantly, “even when politicians knew that a grassroots coalition 
had been created artificially from the top down” (Buell, 2003, p. 304), it often times remained 
extremely influential.  Beyond the implications for public policy, naming strategies of the 
anti-environmental organizations are “really something to worry about” (Walton, 2001, p. 
129) given the propensity for public deception and coercion. 
 Public belief in global warming science, instead of centering on scientific data and 
predictions, is being driven by competing interest groups that do not have the public’s 
interests at heart (Walton, 2001, p. 121).  In that debate, “green-sounding names” are used to 
manipulate public opinion to make “anti-environmental messages” more salient (Helvarg, 
1995, para. 1).  However, “most people would be stunned to discover that their money was 
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going to support…these backlash groups” that “hide behind green masks” (Helvarg, 1995, 
para. 1).   
Therefore, it is important for rhetorical scholars to emphasize the power of naming 
and argument by definition.  In some instances, naming is the act that, through terminology, 
makes clear the goals and ideals of a specific organization.  However, as shown in this case 
study, naming, and subsequent definition, can also be a manipulative strategy that co-opts the 
opposition’s terminology in order to create confusion in, or outright deception of, the 
audience.  Naming and definition theory provide a strong explanation for why fringe 
environmental theories are perceived as mainstream, and for why the environmental 
movement is viewed as split on theories of global warming, a debate that is widely considered 
over among the expert community.  
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Chapter 4 – Salience Over Sustainability: Environmental Rhetoric of President Barack 
Obama 
Introduction 
On November 4, 2008, Barack Obama was elected on a mandate of change.  On issues 
of both domestic and foreign policy, Obama represented a significant break from the previous 
eight years of the George W. Bush presidency.  This change was well received by 
environmental advocates and non-governmental organizations devoted to environmental 
sustainability.  The day following the election, the Sierra Club issued a statement proclaiming 
that the environmental future of the country is in “very capable hands” (as cited in 
Environmental News Service [ENS], 2008, para. 2).  The same day, the president of 
Environmental Defense Fund echoed this sentiment in a public statement that “this election 
offers us the greatest opportunity we have ever had to change course on global warming” (as 
cited in ENS, 2008, para. 6).  Similarly, the President of the Defenders of Wildlife Action 
publicly announced, “for the first time in nearly a decade, we can look to the future with a 
sense of hope that the enormous environmental challenges we face will begin to be 
addressed” (Burkhalter, 2008, para. 14).  One month after the election, environmentalists 
excitedly professed, “change really is here” (Jiwatram, 2008, para. 1). 
 Despite this excitement among environmentalists, the public at large did not share this 
view of environmental policy as a top priority.  In a post-election 2008 poll, Washington Post-
ABC pollsters asked 1,003 respondents: “What would you say is the one most important 
problem you would like to see Obama and the Congress deal with next year” (para. 7)?  Less 
than one percent responded “environment” (para. 7) and even fewer responded “global 
warming” (para. 7). An overwhelming majority wanted economic prosperity, a policy shift in 
the war in Iraq, unemployment legislation or a new health care policy (para. 7).  In the face of 
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this division between the public and environmentalists, and against the backdrop of a failed 
G8 climate change summit, Obama made a strategic political decision to emphasize economic 
and national security justifications for environmental policies.  To this end, Obama 
participated in at least two strategy sessions with “a cross section of experts” (Mufson & 
Eilperin, 2009, para. 2) to determine the best way to define his environmental policy.  Obama 
asked his advisors to best determine “how he could sell a low-carbon future to the American 
public” (para. 4), because he wanted his environmental policy to “pop more” (para. 5) for the 
public.  These strategy sessions encouraged Obama to turn from moral and environmental 
suasion grounded in environmental science to pragmatic arguments concerning national and 
economic security.  Obama’s strategy of using non-environmental appeals remained 
consistent because of the plethora of constraints encountered by Obama throughout his first 
term (e.g. Climategate, the emergence of the Tea Party, economic woes and international 
climate negotiations).  In fact, the dual forces of domestic economic problems and widespread 
skepticism of climate science strengthened Obama’s resolve to avoid scientific arguments, in 
favor of noting the economic benefits of his environmental policies.  By 2011, it was clear 
that Obama’s strategies had not succeeded.  Not only did his rhetoric not “pop more,” but 
environmental issues had also receded from public consciousness. 
In this essay, I argue that by advocating environmental policy with primarily economic 
and national security justifications, Obama sidelined environmental values and concerns.  
Consequently, Obama’s arguments did little to motivate public concern for the environment 
proper; rather, so-called environmental policy was judged (accepted and discarded) primarily 
on economic and national security grounds.  Although Obama’s foregrounding of non-
environmental arguments may have been politically necessary at the time, the backgrounding 
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of environmental concerns, including arguments based in climate science, limited long-term 
environmental support.  I develop this argument in three sections.  First, I discuss relevant 
rhetorical theories that underscore the backgrounding argument.  Theories of definition 
support the conclusion that even seemingly insignificant acts of defining have substantial 
effect on argument.   Second, I analyze a set of forty speeches from the first year and a half of 
the Obama administration.  Finally, I show how Obama’s economic and national security 
arguments limited his environmental policies, and discuss the implications of privileging 
salience over sustainability in presidential environmental rhetoric. 
Analysis of Obama’s Environmental Approach 
In order to understand the implications of Obama’s rhetorical choice to justify his 
environmental policy with non-environmental arguments, theories of definition provide 
insight.  Specifically, understanding the process of definition as both a foregrounding of an 
argument, and a backgrounding of alternative explanation is uniquely discerning.  
Theories of argument by definition have significantly developed in the last two 
decades.  Argumentation and Advocacy’s special edition (1999) on “Definitional Argument” 
provided substantial theoretical revision and progress to an already rich tradition.  Titsworth 
(1999) found that Clinton’s definition of “disability” (p. 171) in the Individuals with 
Disabilities in Education Act exemplified how ideology can influence definition even when 
such naming is seemingly benign.  Broda-Bahm (1999) argued that defining environmental 
problems as security concerns is not a neutral or objective truth claim, but rather manipulates 
and directs the audience to a specific mindset.  Placing primary influence on the role of the 
definer, Zarefsky (2006) centered the debate on persuasive intent by stating that through 
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definition, rhetoricians are really providing an “implicit argument”(p. 404) with “strategic 
maneuvering” (409).  
These studies, generally, focus on definition as foregrounding a specific argument.  
For example, Titsworth (1999) stated that definition is a “starting point for arguments” (p. 
171), and McGee (1999) agreed, noting that definitions are “the points at which many 
arguments begin”  (p. 141).  Zarefsky (2006) pointed to specific instances in which persuasive 
definitions were created: social insurance as “Social Security” (p. 404), the blockade of Cuba 
as “quarantine” (p. 404), Reagan’s choice to name the MX missile the “Peace-keeper” (p. 
404), etc.  Schiappa (2003) noted the “domestication” (p. 132) of objectionable terms like 
“nuclear weapons, strategy and war” (p. 135) through metaphorical definition, as particularly 
capable of manipulating an audience. 
Each of these examples elucidates how a rhetorician uses a specific definition, or 
naming strategy, to foreground an argument or ideology.  In this regard, rhetorical scholars 
have explained the process by which a definition shapes the interpretation of a situation.  
However, rhetorical scholars, thus far, have deemphasized what is not said and what is left 
behind – the backgrounding of alternative definitions.  By highlighting a particular definition, 
or argument, a rhetor shields distinct interpretations from the public’s consciousness.  
Although many have written about the role of definition, they have largely focused on the 
foregrounding of definitions.  The obvious corollary is that when one definition is 
foregrounded, others are backgrounded.  Titsworth (1999) was hinting at this point when he 
used the Burkean concept of Scene (background) to explain the disciplinary nature of 
disability discourse.  In this essay, Titsworth argued that the background can drastically shape 
the way a definition functions, but did not explicitly recognize the rhetor’s role in shaping that 
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background.  Similarly, Walton (2001) pointed in this direction in his discussion of the 
dialectic between definition and counter-definition in argumentative strategies (p. 131).   
Here, Walton argued that the background and foreground are in constant flux as competing 
parties define and redefine arguments in the public consciousness (p. 117).  This essay draws 
from the theoretical foundation started by Titsworth, Walton and others to build a more 
nuanced interpretation of definition that focuses primarily on backgrounded values and 
arguments – what is forgotten or discarded in the process of definitional argument.  
 Definitions impose frames that organize reality in such a way that alternative 
depictions of a situation are either deemphasized or forgotten.  Thus, valuable insight can be 
derived from asking not only “what is foregrounded?” but also “what is deemphasized?”  
Given the explicit choice made by the Obama campaign to foreground economic and national 
security arguments, and background environmental justifications, this case study is valuable 
for answering both questions. 
There are two ways in which the backgrounding of a definition influences the 
evolution of environmental arguments.  First, it privileges an alternative thematic 
construction.  In this case, the primary message is shifted from environmental sustainability to 
producing jobs and reducing dependence on oil.  Thus, the backgrounded definition of 
environmental policy to prevent environmental harm becomes unimportant.  Second, the 
foregrounded definition emphasizes an alternative criterion for assessment.  Debates about 
environmental policy are no longer to be decided on environmental grounds, but economic 
and national security counter-arguments are given added salience because of the values 
supported by the foregrounded definition.  When a different approach is taken, and 
environmental values are foregrounded, economic and national security values are defined as 
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secondary, or tertiary concerns.  In this alternative approach, counterarguments concerning 
economics and national security are given less salience and credibility because the 
environmental benefit is the primary argument used to define policy.  
For Obama, facing an environmentally unexcited public, there were strong pressures 
to background environmental justifications in favor of more salient approaches.  While his 
environmental campaign rhetoric was defined by moral suasion (e.g., appeals to 
environmental values and biodiversity), the evolution of the rhetorical situation caused 
Obama to foreground non-environmental issues when arguing for environmental policy.  
Definitions of his environmental policy evolved from environmental justifications, to a “green 
jobs” argument for the stimulus, to an “energy independence” argument in the post-BP oil 
spill climate.  Similar to previous examples of definition, each of Obama’s new definitions 
commanded “wide adherence and hegemonically exclude[d] alternative frames of reference” 
(Zarefsky, 1997, p. 6) because of the salient nature of economic and national security 
arguments.  At the same time, the audience’s perception of the economic and national security 
issues as the primary focus of Obama’s environmental policy limited its environmental 
concerns. 
By re-defining his environmental policy in non-environmental terms, Obama allowed 
other justifications to become “dominant frame[s]” (Conca, 2001, p. 67).  This rhetorical 
construction made “visible” (Zarefsky, 1997, p. 2) the economic and national security 
arguments that were previously “invisible” (p. 2), a result that backgrounded 
environmentalism.  Thus, the audience dissociated environmentalism from environmental 
policy because the definition of the situation left little concern for environmental valuations 
per se (Zarefsky, 1997, p. 8).  Because economics and national security became the 
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definitions that “dominate [the] debate” (Miller & Riechert, 2003, p. 113) environmental 
arguments were either backgrounded, or were forced to “withdraw from the policy debate” (p. 
113).  As Miller & Riechert predicted, when environmental justifications were given less 
“credence in the media and public discourse” (p. 113), economic and national security 
benefits became the “prevailing definition of the situation” (p. 113).  Obama’s repeated 
reliance on appeals to economic and national security created a salient frame, one that 
overshadowed and backgrounded his brief mentions of the environmental benefits of his 
policies.  In this way, debates about environmental policy focused on economic and national 
security values, which failed to promote concern for the environmental impact of the 
administration’s policies.   
Two likely criticisms of this thesis are important.  First, several policy scholars (e.g., 
Fletcher, 2009, p. 811; Lehrer & Becker, 2010, p. 651; Best, 1999, p. 159; de Vreese, 2004, p. 
36; Shen, 2009, p. 374) believe that foregrounding economics and national security is a 
promising path to pro-environmental policies due to the wide appeal of these positive frames.  
In this view, politicians that would othwerise “not typically prioritise” (Fletcher, 2009, p. 811) 
environmental issues start to “take climate change seriously” (p. 811).  This criticism is 
addressed in the final section of the essay. 
Second, some in the environmental far-left (e.g., Thiele, 1995, p. 195; Luke, 1995, p. 
62; McWhorter, 1992, p. 6; Darier, 1999, p. 7) question the ability of any pragmatic, 
anthropocentric or statist argument to succeed in promoting a truly healthy environment.  
Instead, they argue that a more radical change in the relationship between humanity and 
nature is necessary.  Seen this way, Obama’s approach was doomed from the start.  While 
rebutting this argument is beyond the scope of this essay, and has been sufficiently covered 
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elsewhere (e.g., Lewis, 1992, p. 17; Bradley, 2009, p. 103; Hirokawa, 2002, p. 279), it is 
important to note that this concern does not call into question the theoretical accuracy of the 
backgrounding theory of definition.  Even if Obama’s pragmatic, anthropocentric and statist 
environmental agenda would have been in some way environmentally debilitating, the 
backgrounding theory of definition explains why he was unable to change the status quo, and 
why his rhetorical strategy failed to motivate the public to support said agenda. 
In what follows I examine Obama’s presidential environmental rhetoric.  Specifically, 
I analyze a large set of Obama’s speeches that contained environmental policy proposals or 
references to the environment in general.  I then use the theory of definitional backgrounding 
laid out above to determine the likely implications of Obama’s rhetorical strategy.  
Obama’s Environmental Rhetoric 
The first eighteen months of Obama’s presidency contain well over five hundred 
public addresses.  In order to identify the core strategies Obama used in supporting his 
environmental policy, it is helpful to draw from a Washington Post database that categorizes 
Obama’s addresses based on issues of concern.  For example, there are separate sections 
devoted to education, health care, homeland security, social issues, energy and environment, 
etc.  Some speeches, such as the State of the Union addresses, can be found in nearly all 
categories.  For this study, I limited the texts analyzed to domestic speeches concerning the 
environment, because I am primarily concerned with the strategies Obama used to support 
environmentalism among the United States public.   
In order to connect Obama’s environmental advocacy with public, or congressional 
response, it is first necessary to identify primary arguments and themes that Obama used to 
support his arguments.  I chose the first forty speeches in the “energy and environment” 
 80 
category.  In doing so, I recognize that this sample is not wholly representative, but it is large 
enough to get a sense of the major themes and emphases of President Obama’s environmental 
discourse.  I used this sample to identify Obama’s rhetorical strategies and justifications for 
his environmental agenda.  In order to determine Obama’s primary arguments, I used an 
open-ended search for environmental vocabulary and arguments within these texts.  I located 
the components of Obama’s speeches where he advocates changes in environmental policy or 
describes the inadequacies of the status quo approach to the environment.  To do this, I used 
key term searches for pivotal terms: environment, global warming, climate change, species, 
biodiversity, energy and oil.  I then mapped the themes and topoi that emerged from the text 
and attempted to discern Obama’s strategy.  This method helped to illuminate the most 
consistently used arguments.  
Upon examination, the two major themes advocated at the campaign strategy meeting 
emerged from Obama’s arguments: economics and national security.  When arguing for 
economic benefits, Obama posited his environmental policy as necessary for the United States 
to (1) remain competitive in the global race for technology and (2) promote job creation.  Just 
weeks after taking the oath of office and in the middle of an early presidency arguably 
outmatched by only Roosevelt in pace and energy, Obama (2009b) addressed the Department 
of Energy and made the case for both economic prosperity and competitiveness.  He did so by 
arguing that new environmental policy could reverse the failure “to compete in the global 
economy” (para. 30) and stimulate growth “at a time when the economy urgently needs 
action” (para. 30).  These themes – economic growth and international competitiveness – 
permeated Obama’s public address throughout the next eighteen months.   
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Comparing United States policy to international energy development, Obama touted 
the ability of U.S. ingenuity to lead the race towards technological leadership.  Ironically, just 
days prior to the 2009 cooperative G-20 summit, Obama framed environmental policy as a 
zero-sum race, stating that that innovation is “how we'll build the clean energy economy that's 
the key to our competitiveness in the 21st century” (Obama, 2009c, para. 4).  Instead of 
allowing “Germany,” “Spain” or “Japan” to “lead in these industries of the future,” Obama 
proposed that the United States must attain primacy in the energy arena (para. 5).  To add 
political salience, Obama noted immediate economic and competitiveness benefits, but failed 
to emphasize the environmental benefits of the policies.  
 An analogous prioritization of economics over environmental justifications is found in 
Obama’s arguments for green jobs.  For example, three weeks before signing the Health Care 
Reconciliation Act into law, Obama (2010b) touted the economic benefit of the stimulus 
package by arguing, “to spur hiring and sustain growth we’ve placed a big emphasis on 
energy” (para. 10).  A major component of Obama’s (2010b) rhetorical support for the 
stimulus package focused on the “700,000 jobs” (para. 10) created for building “advanced 
batteries for hybrid cars, and modernizing our electric grid, and doubling our capacity to 
generate clean energy” (para. 10).  Noticeably missing from this statement was any argument 
about protecting the environment.  The reason to support clean energy development was 
defined as job growth and prosperity, benefits unassociated with any environmental impact.   
In the midst of climate hearings in the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee, Obama (2009e) echoed this economic sentiment to Florida solar energy 
manufacturers:  
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The creation of such an [clean energy] economy is going to require nothing less than 
the sustained effort of an entire nation; an all-hands-on-deck approach, similar to the 
mobilization that preceded World War II or the Apollo Project. (para. 46) 
In this speech, Obama (2009e) also cited “biofuels” as the platform for “profitable” green 
energy (para. 47).  Obama repeated the call for biofuels four months later, in an April address 
in Macon, Missouri.  Using similar economic strategies, Obama (2010f) argued that biofuel 
investments had the potential to “help us reach the goal” he set to “more than triple America’s 
biofuels production” and “create or save up to 700,000 jobs across America” (para. 18).  
However, Obama’s strategy of emphasizing job creation and economic growth was not solely 
predicated on biofuel expansion.  This theme of the job-creating potential of the stimulus was 
repeated throughout over twenty of the forty texts analyzed.  In these addresses, wind, solar 
and nuclear power were also cited as necessary to improve the economy (Obama, 2009e, para. 
46).  Rarely discussed, however, were the environmental benefits of these technologies. 
Environmental justifications are limited, but can be found scattered throughout 
Obama’s texts.  For example, in a speech in support of expanded offshore oil drilling, one 
month before the BP spill, Obama (2010c) argued that comprehensive climate legislation 
“will foster new industries and millions of new jobs protecting our planet” (para. 18).  
Similarly, Obama (2010a) argued that a transition to clean coal would allow the United States 
to use its “most bountiful natural resource” without “polluting our planet” (para. 6).  
However, Obama clearly treated support for economics and job creation as the primary 
justification.  Stating, “the reason we’re here [italics added] is because it also means igniting 
a new, clean-energy economy that generates good jobs right here in the United States” 
(Obama, 2010e, para. 8), Obama (2009d, 2010d, 2010h) placed a priority on job creation and 
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economic prosperity.  Notice, Obama does not say “one of the reasons we are here”; rather, he 
backgrounded environmental values by creating an explicit and sole association with 
economics. 
This prioritization of economics as the leading justification is prevalent in Obama’s 
remarks on offshore drilling.  Obama (2010c) stated: 
The bottom line [italics added] is this: given our energy needs, in order to sustain 
economic growth, produce jobs, and keep our businesses competitive, we’re going to 
need to harness traditional sources of fuel even as we ramp up production of new 
sources of renewable, homegrown energy. (para. 7) 
The “bottom line” is a reference to the last line of an audit that lists profit or loss.  It 
epitomizes the decisive point or most important place to look; in this case, that most important 
places were prosperity, job growth and competitiveness.   
While economics dominated as the primary concern, national security benefits were 
certainly the secondary justification.  The argument for environmental policy based on 
national security emerged from consistent references to national security crises that could be 
addressed by environmental policy.  Two subcomponents of the national security strategy are 
clear.  First, Obama (2009a), in his first six days in office, foregrounded justifications for 
environmental policy by noting security threats in the form of dangers from “terrorism” (para. 
12), “nuclear proliferation” (para. 12) and national “security” (para. 13).  Second, Obama, 
immediately following the BP oil spill, used metaphorical references to national security by 
arguing that environmental threats required a “battle plan” (2010i, para. 7) that would require 
the United States to “fight each and every day” (2010j, para. 10). 
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 In his first presidential address related to the environment, Obama (2009a) pointed to 
legislative delay over environmental policy as the reason that the United States was “held 
hostage to . . . hostile regimes” (para. 40).  He argued that ending oil dependence was a 
necessary step to “deny leverage to dictators and dollars to terrorists” (2009a, para. 36).  In 
support of the green energy components of his first stimulus package, Obama (2009a) claimed 
that oil dependence was “one of the most serious threats that our nation has faced,” (para. 12) 
because it bankrolled “dictators” (para. 11), countries promoting “nuclear proliferation” (para. 
11) and “terrorism” (para. 11).  The United States’ involvement in two wars in the Middle 
East added salience to Obama’s plea to limit support of dictators and enact legislation that 
made the war on terrorism more winnable.  Throughout the next eighteen months, Obama 
emphasized dependence on foreign oil as a danger to national security forty-five times, in 
over thirty public addresses. 
 Importantly, Obama used national security as a justification for environmental policy 
that could be supported even absent belief in the science supporting the global warming 
hypothesis.  For example, one day after publicly acknowledging the unlikelihood of achieving 
a climate bill in the Senate, he stated: “even if you don't believe in the severity of climate 
change, as I do, you still should want to pursue this agenda. It’s good for our national 
security” (Obama, 2010a, para. 3).  In this way, Obama backgrounded global warming 
science as a justification for policy change.  Because Obama’s policy proposals could be 
supported on non-environmental grounds, the environmental impact lost value in the policy 
debate.  Perhaps the most important example of this strategic pattern can be found in Obama’s 
addresses concerning the BP Oil Spill.  In these addresses, Obama supported a quick and 
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effective reaction to the spill; however, he argued for this response by primarily using 
references, both literal and metaphorical, to national security. 
All of these rhetorical strategies were evident in what was Obama’s most important 
environmental address of his first two years.  On June 15, 2010, Obama delivered an address 
concerning the BP Oil Spill--his first address from the Oval Office.  This address was 
intended to convince the public that the Obama administration understood the magnitude of 
the threat and was responding in an appropriate manner.  In this address, Obama (2010i) used 
a military metaphor to analogize the government response to the war on terrorism: 
As we speak, our nation faces a multitude of challenges. At home, our top priority is to 
recover and rebuild from a recession that has touched the lives of nearly every 
American. Abroad, our brave men and women in uniform are taking the fight to al 
Qaeda wherever it exists. And tonight, I’ve returned from a trip to the Gulf Coast to 
speak with you about the battle we’re waging against an oil spill that is assaulting our 
shores and our citizens. (para. 1) 
Obama (2010i) promised that the government was already “fighting” (para. 5) the “epidemic” 
(para. 5) of oil dependence, and argued that the administration would continue to “fight this 
spill with everything we’ve got for as long as it takes” (para. 6).  The address laid out the 
“battle plan” (para. 7) for going forward against the spread of oil.  Obama (2010i) emphasized 
the military response to the crisis by stating that “over 17,000 National Guard members” 
(para. 8) were “ready to help stop the oil from coming ashore” (para. 8). 
 Throughout the next month, Obama used similar battle references when discussing the 
BP crisis (2010j, 2010k, 2010l).  In the days following the BP Oval Office address, Obama 
(2010j) stated that he wanted “all Americans to know that [he] will continue to fight each and 
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every day until the oil is contained” (para. 10).  Obama (2010k) used the “context of the oil 
spill” to argue that oil independence was necessary for the United States to achieve “national 
security,” but did not mention the environmental ramifications of oil dependence (para. 8). 
There are certainly differences among Obama’s environmental arguments; however, 
two consistent themes emerge.  First, the dominant argumentative justification for 
governmental environmental policy was that it would have a positive effect on the economy.  
In particular, two strands of economic benefits were emphasized: competitiveness and job 
creation.  Second, national security benefits were prioritized as complimentary to economic 
benefits.  Within the argument for national security, Obama utilized two approaches: literal 
descriptions of military security and militarized metaphors representing environmental policy. 
Equally as important as what Obama said, is what he did not say. In the eighteen 
months, forty speeches and over 63,000 words of Obama’s presidential environmental 
rhetoric analyzed here, Obama never once used the phrase “global warming” to a domestic 
audience.  Obama did reference climate change a limited number of times; however, this 
phrase has been shown to be less effective at creating public enthusiasm than “global 
warming” (Whitmarsh, 2009, p. 416) because it is “more readily associated with natural 
causes” (p. 416) and thus evokes significantly less concern.  Six days into his presidency he 
argued that “rigid ideology has overruled sound science” (Obama, 2009a, para. 14), but at no 
point did he foreground his environmental arguments with a defense of the science supporting 
the global warming hypothesis.  
Similarly, Obama chose not to emphasize the risk to the environment, biodiversity or 
species posed by environmental crises.  Instead, economic and national security benefits were 
portrayed as independent benefits, not associated with the environmental impact of his 
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policies.  In doing so, Obama backgrounded environmental values to more salient definitions 
of economics and national security. 
In the eighteen months of environmental public address, the five most commonly used 
terms were jobs, energy, economy, oil and business.  This graphical representation (word 
cloud) represents the number of times each word pictured was said during the sampled period.  
In this figure, words used more often, often non-environmental, are larger, while words that 
are used less frequently are smaller. 
 
The terms “jobs,” “economy” and “businesses” were each used well over three-times as 
frequently as “environment” or “climate.”  Importantly, the use of the term “environment” 
only became prevalent during the last two months of the set analyzed, largely in response to 
the BP crisis.  Removing these two months from the cloud analysis shows that the economic 
terms (jobs, economy and businesses) were used over ten-times as frequently as 
environmental terms (environment and climate) in Obama’s non-BP environmental addresses.  
Because Obama’s choice to use economic and national security concerns as primary 
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justifications for environmental policy was a politically pragmatic strategy developed to make 
environmental policy “pop more” (Mufson & Eiplerin, 2009, para. 5), its short-term 
advantage came at a cost, an argument I develop in the next section. 
Implications 
While there certainly are limits on the power of the presidential bully pulpit, it is 
difficult to deny the importance of a president’s rhetorical support for a policy (Edwards, 
2006, p. 6).  Lawrence (2004) found that test subjects who were exposed to a presidential 
“speech were approximately 4.6 times more likely to identify an issue mentioned in the 
speech as the most important problem than respondents who did not watch the speech” (p. 
15).  And, while a presidential mandate may not be necessary to achieve legislative policy (for 
example, on widely popular issues), “when [the president] decides to become involved, his 
influence can be decisive indeed” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 241).  Given this unique 
influence, a close examination of the possible advantages and disadvantages of Obama’s 
definitions can prove useful. 
Economic Justifications 
There are two reasons why some believe that foregrounding an economic definition 
could be useful for Obama.  First, economic prosperity and job creation are extremely salient 
issues.  Therefore, appealing to the public’s primary concerns with economic justifications 
could produce an increase in public support and provide a sense of immediate relevance to the 
audience (de Vreese, 2004, p. 36).  Economic justifications are particularly salient because 
they tie macrosocial issues (economic growth) to microindividual actions (support for 
environmental policy) (Shen, 2009, 374).  This is especially true in times of limited growth 
and unemployment.  Given that some traditional environmental arguments portray 
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environmental policy as mutually exclusive with economic growth, Obama’s rhetorical 
choices, it was argued, could have shown how environmental policy can successfully promote 
prosperity and job creation, while simultaneously protecting the environment.   
Second, the economic justification emphasizes the importance of technological 
innovation as a necessary tool for limiting environmental degradation.  Green energy is at the 
forefront of environmental solutions, and new technology provides some hope for 
environmental sustainability (Carcasson, 2004, p. 276).  The choice to define environmental 
regulation as an avenue of promoting technological innovation could arguably serve to offset 
opponents’ arguments concerning economic cost.  This strategy may be effective when 
combined with patriotic appeals defining innovation as a way for the United States to get 
ahead.  In this way, Obama’s use of the innovation justification mirrors the rhetoric of 
Johnson and Kennedy, who similarly used the trope of U.S. exceptionalism to stimulate 
environmentalism.  Such approaches appealed to the myth of America as a “chosen people” 
(p. 280) who may also profit by disseminating this technology on a global level.  
With these benefits in mind, it is clear that “the economic frame . . . is not likely to be 
sufficient in the long run and on a large enough scale” (Carcasson, 2004, p. 277) because it 
foregrounds economic definitions, and backgrounds environmental values.  There are three 
possible drawbacks to foregrounding economics as the primary justification for environmental 
policy.  First, Obama’s use of economic justifications did not successfully motivate (even 
short-term) public environmentalism.  The historical tradition of foregrounding non-
environmental justifications, while backgrounding environmentalism, has molded a public 
sentiment that is unwilling to sacrifice unrestrained and unregulated growth for 
environmentalism.  For example, for the first time in the 25-year period that Gallup has polled 
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the issue, “a majority of Americans say economic growth should be given the priority, even if 
the environment suffers” (Newport, 2009, para. 1).   
 This decline in public support for growth-limiting environmental policy mirrors an 
overall decline in public environmentalism.  For the first sixteen months of the Obama 
presidency, the public saw no urgent environmental exigence--not even global warming, 
despite scientific consensus on the threat it poses to humanity (Dyer, 2008, p. 6).  Despite this 
scientific consensus and Obama’s framing of the environment in terms of national security 
and economics, a 2009 Pew poll found a sharp decline of over 15 percent from 2008 to late 
2009 of individuals who believed there was solid evidence the earth is warming (Newport, 
2010).  For those who supported the global warming hypothesis, there was a nine percent drop 
during Obama’s first year as president in those who believed it was a serious problem 
(Newport, 2010, table 1).  As of March 2010, Gallup found that “the percentage of Americans 
who now say reports of global warming are generally exaggerated is by a significant margin 
the highest such reading in the 13-year history of asking the question” (Newport, 2010, para. 
3).  One explanation for this declining support was the failure to place the environment in the 
foreground of any policy discussion.  The decline in public support for strict environmental 
policy, in turn, makes congressional action less likely, because absent public support, 
overcoming special interest groups and big business opposition is much more difficult.  For 
Obama, a change in public opinion in favor of environmental policy was crucial.  
The second possible disadvantage of foregrounding economics is that any 
environmental policy that limits growth, or can be negatively portrayed as limiting growth, 
will fail.  Economic prioritization creates a policy environment in which positive incentives 
and voluntary measures become the only possible approaches, because regulations may 
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impose “unnecessary” costs on businesses.  Environmental and rhetorical scholars have 
described this definition as the “we can have it all theme” (Cannon & Riehl, 2004, p. 222) that 
“works to meld environmental quality with economic prosperity” (p. 226).  Historically, this 
strategy has been a politically “attractive theme,” because it has allowed environmental 
advocates to “declare a win-win on environmental issues” (p. 228).  This definition 
foregrounds the argument that environmental policy will induce no economic cost.  However, 
this politically expedient definition is problematic, because new regulations inevitably impose 
some cost.  Moreover, this definition backgrounds the core arguments for environmental 
improvement.  
Obama’s rhetorical plea for “green jobs” is an example of the failure of 
environmentalism supported primarily by arguments for economic prosperity.  Green jobs 
were originally depicted as having “no downside” (Morriss et al., 2009, p. 4) because they 
would help the environment and the economy.  However, foregrounding economic arguments 
meant that, over time, the green part of green jobs lost importance. For example, the Labor 
Department developed an extremely broad definition of “green jobs” that allowed virtually 
any job to be defined as environmentally beneficial (Morriss et al., 2009, p. 18).  Because of 
this broad definition, stimulus money designated to legitimately green jobs was diverted to 
environmentally harmful companies (York, 2010, para. 1).  Given the prioritization of 
economic values, this result is unsurprising. 
 Third, Obama’s choice to emphasize economic competitiveness foregrounded a 
definition that was easily co-opted by anti-environmentalist factions.  Less than a decade ago, 
George W. Bush used the exact same economic justification as Obama to oppose signing the 
Kyoto Protocol, arguing that it would unfairly hinder the competitiveness of businesses inside 
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of the United States.  Under the foregrounded economic definition, any regulation that could 
hinder United States’ industrial competitiveness should be discarded.  Because economic 
performance is often subjective and uncertain, “a politician would always be able to find some 
distressing sign of economic trouble to justify reducing environmental activism” (Carcasson, 
2004, p. 276).  
National Security Justifications 
Using national security justifications for environmental reform similarly adds political 
salience, but at a cost.  The main benefit of foregrounding this definition is that the cultural 
resonance of national security arguments is much greater than environmental justifications 
alone (Lehrer & Becker, 2010, p. 651).  Because no one can “come out against national 
security” (Lehrer, 2010, p. 155), opponents of environmental policy can be portrayed as 
treasonous and dangerous.  
However, there are two risks associated with foregrounding national security 
justifications.  First, the national security justification dissociates the value of the environment 
from discussions about environmental policy.  Similar to the drawbacks of foregrounding 
economics, the rhetorical decision to emphasize national security benefits backgrounded the 
environmental impact of his environmental policy.  Corn-based ethanol is a tangible example 
of the risks associated with this approach.   
 The ethanol boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s was a political boon for both 
President Clinton and President George W. Bush.  Ethanol had the advantages of being 
produced in the politically important agricultural Midwest and was rhetorically framed to 
appeal to the public’s national security concerns.  Clinton supported both the tax credit and 
the federal excise tax exemption at the pump and argued that “ethanol production” was 
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necessary to reduce “American reliance on foreign oil” (as cited in Hagel, 2002, p. 4428).  
George W. Bush, while generally holding dissimilar environmental views, also avidly 
supported corn-based ethanol, stating that biofuels were “gentle on the environment, and they 
are made in America so they cannot be threatened by any foreign power” (p. 4428).  With the 
Renewables Fuels Mandates of 2005 and 2007, government support jumpstarted 124 new 
ethanol plants, with “most located in corn-growing states” (Graham, 2010, p. 151). 
 This support continued into the Obama administration and, in October of 2009, 
Obama (2009e) stated the importance of developing biofuels for both economic and national 
security gains.  Four months later, Obama lobbied for an increase in the Congressional 
mandate for corn-based ethanol by over two billion gallons per year (Fahey, 2010, para. 3).  
While this mandate also included new incentives for second-generation cellulosic ethanol, the 
new incentives for corn made it extremely difficult for other renewable sources to compete.  
The net effect on the environment was negative.  Comprehensive environmental studies 
indicate that corn-based ethanol has harmed United States farmland sustainability, increased 
emissions that contribute to climate change, and actually increased the United States’ oil 
dependence (Scharlemann & Laurance, 2008, p. 43).  A group of agricultural scientists 
reported that government subsides for corn-based ethanol encourage farming practices that 
degrade the soil at an unrecoverable rate, and do not decrease fossil fuel use because of the 
petrochemical inputs required to create and transport corn-based ethanol (Patzek et al., n.d., p. 
1).  In order to displace domestic oil consumption, corn-based ethanol would require “5 
times” (p. 2) the amount of land available for agriculture in the United States.   
Why did public and political support continue for an energy source that, as early as 
1997, was understood to have largely negative effects on both oil consumption and the 
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environment?  Corn-based ethanol gained mythic force largely because foregrounded 
arguments for national security overshadowed backgrounded environmental arguments.  
Similarly, arguments in support of biofuels mandates often appealed to economic concerns 
because they would help farmers in politically important states.  Despite the fact that there 
were “real and concrete” (Lehrer, 2010, p. 151) differences among environmentalists over the 
effectiveness of corn-based ethanol, the “shared national security discourses” and economic 
arguments “helped create a sense of commonality among their perspectives” and placed actual 
environmental impact of the policies firmly in the background (p. 151).  
Patriotic discourses, both economic and security-based, “were in fact a more powerful 
driver of biofuels’ influence on farm and energy policies than the substantive benefits of the 
biofuels themselves” (Lehrer, 2010, p. 151-152).  Thus, the debate about environmental 
policy shifted to a debate about national security and energy, which allowed powerful interest 
groups whose interests were non-environmental, or even anti-environmental, to control the 
discourse of the debate.  Absent a debate where environmental sustainability is a core 
concern, environmental policy risks cooptation that may worsen the state of the environment.  
In this way, ethanol acts as a representative example for possible future policy failure in the 
environmental arena. 
Given these risks, a reframing of environmental policy holds significant potential for 
supporting environmentalism in the 21st century.  The study of the foregrounding and 
backgrounding of definitions provides theorists and practitioners with an important avenue to 
enhance civic engagement on environmental issues.  Understanding the complex dynamics of 
definitional argument may make evident new argumentative approaches.  One approach that 
may re-invigorate public environmentalism is to foreground environmental values as the 
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primary justification for environmental policy.  However, even this strategy may not succeed.  
Because of the complexity of the rhetorical situation faced by environmentalists, any 
alternative definition undoubtedly introduces a new set of rhetorical constraints.  The choice 
to foreground environmental values may be incompatible with conservative ideology, or may 
background other salient arguments for environmental policy.  The conclusions drawn from 
this case study show the importance of evaluating and assessing the plethora of variables 
found in any rhetorical situation.  Thus, those hoping to enhance civic engagement through 
environmental communication must account for the inherent tension between rhetorical 
salience and sustainability. 
A second approach may foreground scientific consensus concerning anthropogenic 
climate change as the primary argument for environmental sustainability.  To date, most pro-
environmental presidents have largely avoided the scientific debate about global warming, 
and in doing so they have ceded the discussion to the countermovement’s misrepresentations 
of climate science as confused and unproved.  Moreover, no president has yet made scientific 
justifications for environmental policy a priority in public discourse.  For example, there are 
only two references to climate science in the first eighteen months of Obama’s administration, 
and in both cases the President failed to represent the scientific consensus in support of 
human-induced climate change (Obama, 2010a).  Scientific arguments have not failed; 
instead, environmentalist presidents have chosen not to participate in the scientific debate at 
all.  However, this passivity on the part of the President should not discourage those hoping to 
enhance civic engagement on environmental issues from using climate science to support 
their arguments. 
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The fact that climatologists have reached consensus regarding the global warming 
hypothesis should make environmental advocate’s rhetorical job much easier.  This consensus 
is quite real.  One study found that of 928 randomly selected peer-reviewed articles in 
scientific journals, “none of the papers disagreed with the consensus position” (Oreskes, 2004, 
p. 1686) that global warming is real, human induced and an environmental concern.  A 2010 
report from the Environmental Protection Agency looked at twenty-two indicators of climate 
change (e.g., emissions, atmospheric energy, precipitation, cyclone intensity, etc.) and found 
“indisputable evidence” (p. 1) to support the basic tenets of the global warming hypothesis.  
Thus, the subjectivities and uncertainties that anti-environmental scholars have previously 
cited are largely absent in real debate about how to best confront global warming. 
Despite the certain difficulties in explaining the complicated concepts of global 
warming science, avoiding this debate hampered President Obama’s environmental agenda.  
Conservative think tanks, pundits and politicians have attacked the best tool that 
environmental advocates have at their disposal: near scientific certainty concerning the 
anthropogenic nature of global warming.  Science supporting the global warming hypothesis 
should be at the forefront of the rhetorical campaign in support of environmentalism because 
the evidence supporting the science is overwhelming. 
Conclusion 
 
 Presidential environmental rhetoric functions to define environmental policy.  This 
defining process creates inherent associations and dissociations, which work to screen out 
alternate definitions and representations of reality.  Obama’s choice to prioritize economic 
and national security justifications for his environmental policy undercut efforts to build 
 97 
public support for strong environmental policy by placing environmental priorities in the 
background of public concern.   
The argument is not that Obama failed as an environmental president.  Obama 
replaced a president who actively questioned climate science and censored data from NASA 
and the NOAA that supported the anthropogenic global warming hypothesis (Daynes & 
Sussman, 2010, p. 206- 207).  It is possible that the lack of public enthusiasm during the early 
years of the Obama administration was simply a hangover from Bush-era anti-science 
messages.  Therefore, it could be argued that Obama advanced progressive environmentalism 
by using economics and security as wedge issues to activate an environmental discussion.  
However, there is little evidence to support even short-term gains for the environment.  
Obama was given an historic opportunity to drastically reshape public understanding 
of climate science and boost environmentalism, yet chose to background these issues by 
appealing to ideologies of economic growth and national security.  Although foregrounding 
one definition is not necessarily mutually exclusive with alternative definitions (in fact, the 
foreground of both national security and economic arguments proves that multiple 
foregrounded definitions can co-exist), in this instance, economic growth and national 
security became dominant frames that crowded out environmental concerns.  In this way, 
environmental arguments, when made, lost “presence” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 
p. 116) and the economic and security benefits were “overestimated” (p. 117).  Thus, when 
developing rhetorical strategies intended to instill environmental values, rhetoricians should 
be careful to foreground environmental values as their primary argument, and avoid 
alternative definitions that may suppress the presence of environmental concerns (p. 118). 
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Assuredly, other political issues--health care, the economy, immigration, Afghanistan, 
etc.--made a substantial investment in political capital much more difficult, but his own 
rhetorical choices did not help.  His use of economic and national security arguments for 
environmental policy were unsuccessful.  Numerous constraints shaped these rhetorical 
choices.  For example, the re-emergence of climate skeptics, the growth of the Tea Party, 
economic woes, international climate negotiations and the BP Oil Spill all influenced an 
already complex rhetorical situation.  However, this case study should provide hesitation for 
those hoping to incite civic environmental engagement through a strategy that backgrounds 
environmental arguments. 
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Chapter 5 – Scientific Counterpublics: In Defense of the Environmental Scientist as 
Public Intellectual 
Introduction 
 The environmental and human health effects of stratospheric ozone depletion emerged 
as an issue of public concern in the United States in the early 1970s.  Not surprisingly, “the 
initial public debate was polarized between those who predicted catastrophe and those who 
thought” that scientific predictions of the threat to human health were “absurd” (Morrisette, 
1989, p. 803).  A wide and diverse range of parties influenced the debate concerning both the 
link between chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and ozone depletion, and the arguments for 
regulation.  Manufacturers of CFCs “opposed any effort to regulate” (p. 803) and argued that 
there was insufficient evidence to be certain that humans were negatively influencing the 
stratosphere.  In opposition, a large majority of the public was concerned with the effects of a 
growing ozone hole; and, even before regulations were in place, “the sale of aerosol products 
fell sharply” (p. 804).  Politicians were torn between powerful constituencies – a general 
population fearful of the harmful effects of CFC pollution and an extremely influential group 
of businesses standing in opposition to costly regulations.   
A corps of scientists, let by Frank Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina, believed that 
strict regulations of harmful substances were necessary to reverse the growth of the hole in the 
ozone.  These scientists, then at the University of California Irvine, determined that CFC 
emissions broke down stratospheric ozone and led to an increase in dangerous radiation.  
Rowland and Molina dedicated themselves to making these concerns public by founding a 
Task Force on Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere to “develop a coordinated plan of 
action for federal agencies” (p. 804).  
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In December 1978, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency banned the 
nonessential use of CFCs under the authority of the Toxic Substances Control Act.  
Amazingly, in fewer than five years, a major environmental problem was discovered and 
debated, regulations were designed and federal action was taken--despite the best efforts of 
influential business interests.  Just ten years later, the Montreal Protocol, an international 
treaty designed to limit ozone depletion, was implemented.  Compared to other environmental 
problems, the speed and scope of the response to ozone depletion was remarkable.   
In this essay, I argue that environmental scientists who made their findings public 
played a critical role in convincing the government to regulate CFCs despite a widespread 
campaign by CFC manufacturers.  In particular, these scientists functioned as counterpublic 
intellectuals: by standing in opposition to a public of well funded and powerful industrial 
lobbyists; by constituting a public discourse through task forces and government testimony; 
and, by rhetorically participating in multiple (scientific and lay) publics.   
I develop this argument in three sections.  First, I discuss relevant scholarship that 
traces the historical development and constitution of counterpublics.  This scholarship, in 
large part, has focused on minority populations marginalized based on race, class, gender or 
sexuality.  However, I push the outer edges of the counterpublic construct and find that 
marginalized opinions in the polity share important similarities that may advance the 
theoretical accuracy of counterpublic scholarship.  Second, I analyze the role of atmospheric 
and environmental scientists in the ozone debates of the 1970s and 1980s.  Their enormous 
influence demonstrates the critical importance of the environmental intellectual for 
convincing the public and politicians that environmental regulations are necessary when faced 
with grave environmental harm.  Finally, I argue that the role of public intellectual played by 
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scientists in winning over public opinion may serve as an important example in contemporary 
debates over global warming and climate policy. 
Locating Counterpublicity 
 In this section, I, first, examine the evolution of counterpublic scholarship.  Although 
each scholar treats the concept somewhat differently, there are important shared 
commonalities that make clear the shape and function of a counterpublic.  Second, I argue that 
this definition of counterpublic, with few exceptions, has guided scholars towards groups of 
people that are historically oppressed based on race, class, gender or sexuality.  Importantly, 
this focus has generated a rich theoretical tradition that can now be expanded and applied to 
other identity categories that may not be so visibly subaltern.  Finally, I contend that climate 
intellectuals who opposed powerful business interests, opened discursive space by penetrating 
new rhetorical outlets and participated in multiple publics simultaneously, served a critical 
counterpublic function. 
 Contemporary public sphere theory can be traced to the influential works of Jurgen 
Habermas.  For Habermas (1989), the public sphere was a single realm founded on the 
“principle of universal access” (p. 85) that limited the power of the state through formation of 
public opinion.  Each individual, given certain educational and financial status, was given the 
privilege to make his or her private interests public through “rational-critical debate” (p. 142, 
p. 178).  Importantly, Habermas did not concern himself with identity differences of members 
within the public sphere, and instead assumed that “general interest” (p. 87) applied 
universally and equally throughout “bourgeois society” (p. 79).  Because of these criteria, 
Habermas’s interpretation of the public sphere left little room for competing publics. 
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In response to Habermas’s monolithic definition of public, a wide variety of 
competing interpretations have developed.  One decade following the German publication of 
Structural Transformation, Negt and Kluge (1993) popularized the term “proletarian public 
sphere” as a place where workers resist “their bourgeois opponent” through development of 
competing public opinions (p. 93).  Negt and Kluge imagined multiple competing publics 
based on class difference--an important transition in the development of counterpublic theory.  
They characterize the proletarian public as counter to bourgeois interests, emphasizing 
“autonomous communication of the proletariat,” “an expression of the self-organization and 
unfolding interests of the workers,” and a “self-defence organization of the working class” 
(Fuchs, 2011, p. 296).  The members of the proletarian public produced counter-ideas, 
counter-products and counter-media (Fuchs, 2011, p. 296-297).  
Fraser (1990) similarly criticized Habermas for failing to examine “other, nonliberal, 
nonbourgeois, competing public spheres” (p. 75).  She found multiple “counter” (p. 75) civil 
societies based on exclusions intrinsic to Habermas’s conception of publicity.  In particular, 
she challenged the “bourgeois, masculinist” (p. 76) conception of Habermas’s public sphere--
both because of its false claim to universal access and its exclusive reliance on rational-
critical discourse.  Her criticism of the singular, universally accessible, rational public sphere 
centered on “the fact that it [was] exclusionary toward subordinated social groups such as 
women, workers, people of color, and gays and lesbians” (Zuidervaart, 2011, p. 102).  
Fraser’s attention to historically oppressed peoples was foundational to the rich development 
of a liberatory counterpublic theory. 
For example, Dawson (1994) identified a subaltern “Black counterpublic” (p. 197) in 
historical communities attempting to achieve Black advancement.  Levitt (2001) extended 
 103 
Fraser’s analysis to migratory communities (p. 197).   Stephenson (2000) analyzed 
“contestatory indigenous movements” (p. 2) in Bolivia through the lens of Fraser’s 
counterpublic.  Porrovecchio (2007) studied testimonies from participants in the WTO 
protests in Seattle in 1999.  Consistent with much of counterpublic scholarship, each of these 
scholars analyzed a “subaltern” (Sassoon, 1982, p. 16)--a term used to describe a population 
that does not possess hegemonic status--population as counterpublic.  Asen (2009) extended 
this critical tradition by excluding the ideological conservative William E. Simon from status 
as counterpublic, instead arguing that textual markers of conservativism have empirically 
been more closely tied to oppressive publics (p. 265).  In doing so, he argued that 
counterpublic scholarship is most useful “when contributing to a critical-theory project (Asen, 
2009, p. 265).  
Breaking from Habermas, these advocates of counterpublics emphasized the existence 
of multiple competing publics; the need to move beyond rational-critical debate as the sole 
discourse of public participants; and, the importance of analyzing historically disadvantaged 
populations when developing counterpublic theory.  This rich tradition that has 
overwhelmingly emphasized historically oppressed populations as constituting counterpublics 
can now be applied to similar populations that may not face oppression based on race, class, 
gender or sexuality.   
This extension and application has already begun.  Hess (2011) broke from this 
tradition in his description of scientific minority opinions as “scientific counterpublics” (p. 5).  
In doing so, he broadened the definition of “subaltern” (Hess, 2011, p. 3) to include minority 
opinions in any social field.  “Rather than assuming that the counterpublic is limited to a 
social category marked by race, class, gender, or sexuality as an historically dominated or 
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oppressed social category” (Hess, 2011, p. 3), Hess found that oppositional counterpublics 
may also arise in the “problematization of scientific authority” (Hess, 2011, p. 4).  A scientific 
counterpublic, for Hess, arose when a group of scientists who were “located in subordinate 
positions in their respective research fields” (p. 4) made their findings public to a broader 
audience.  Warner (2002) agreed, “it is not clear that all counterpublics are composed of 
people otherwise dominated as subaltern…some…operate as counterpublics, even though 
many who participate in them are ‘subalterns’ in no other sense” (p. 57). 
Extending Hess’ interpretation of scientific counterpublics, I argue that environmental 
scientists who participated in the ozone debates the 1970s and 1980s constituted an influential 
counterpublic.  Instead of simply being counterpublic because of a specific set of 
demographic markers, they performed the “key communication dimensions” (Brouwer, 2006, 
p. 195) of counterpublicity by: 
(1) Expressing opposition to a powerful public--in this instance, influential business 
interests disseminating anti-science propaganda 
(2) Opening discursive space by making their comments public through task forces 
and government testimony 
(3) Rhetorically participating in multiple publics simultaneously--the scientific public 
demanded by their profession, and the lay public demanded by their participation 
in activities of the public sphere. 
The term “powerful public” in Brouwer’s definition requires a critical judgment concerning 
legitimacy.  My goal is not to deny that the aerosol industry also made claims to 
counterpublicity.  However, given their commitment to “laissez-faire economic thought,” 
reliance on “conservative think tanks” and “strong financial and political connections,” there 
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is ample evidence that their claims were primarily made to support their economic agenda 
(Asen, 2009, p. 266).  Because this public debate pitted powerful industry with strong ties to 
the media versus a group of scientists who were rhetorically constructed as representing the 
minority opinion, analyzing scientific public intellectuals as counterpublic provides important 
practical and theoretical insight.   
Practically, counterpublic scholarship may help explain how scientists overcame a 
dominant industrial public in the ozone debates of the 1970s and 1980s.  Thus, the model of 
counterpublicity may be applied to other opinions that are viewed as minority by a dominant 
public--for example, in debates over climate.   Theoretically, this essay extends contemporary 
counterpublic scholarship in two ways.  First, it moves beyond the focus on minorities 
traditionally marked as subaltern.  Many of these individuals were White, well-educated, 
economically privileged and tenured faculty at major universities.  However, “we cannot 
simply dismiss” them “because of their privileged socio-economic standing” (Asen, 2009, p. 
265).  Rather, their choice to perform the key dimensions of counterpublicity sheds light on 
how the rich development of counterpublic scholarship that focuses on subaltern populations 
may be applied in new and intriguing arenas.  Second, it breaks from Warner’s (2002) 
contention that public intellectuals, particularly those representing universities, sacrifice their 
claim to counterpublicity by directing their attention towards policy change (p. 124, 147).  
Instead, I find that it is precisely because of their desire to change government policy that this 
group of climate scientists performed counterpublicity. 
Ozone Debates and Policy Formulation 
 In this section, I analyze the debates over stratospheric ozone depletion in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  First, I discuss the campaign by influential business interests that attempted to call 
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into question the link between CFCs and ozone depletion and denounce the call for federal 
regulations.  I claim that because of their public, economic and political influence, these 
businesses functioned as a dominant public.  Second, I discuss the rhetorical response by 
environmental scientists.  In particular, I analyze how these scientists functioned as 
counterpublic intellectuals.  Finally, I argue that this counterpublic served a vital function that 
shaped public opinion to favor strict federal regulations and galvanized international support 
for the Montreal Protocol.   
 A brief introduction to the science linking CFCs and ozone destruction is helpful for 
understanding the rhetorical campaign by business interests that opposed limits on CFC 
consumption.  In late 1973, Rowland and Molina, found a possible connection between CFCs 
and ozone depletion, despite the lack of visible evidence of actual stratospheric depletion 
(Mullin, 2002, p. 208).  In laboratory tests, these chemists found that chlorine upset the 
atmospheric balance by creating “free radicals” (p. 208) that destroyed ozone.   
Despite these important findings, the historical development of CFC-ozone science 
was far from public.  The two scientists were torn between their scientific commitments and 
their desire to make their findings public: “recognizing the grave significance of their results, 
Molina and Rowland waited for the paper to appear before discussing it publicly” (Parson, 
2003, p. 31).  Even after Rowland and Molina published their initial hypothesis tying CFC 
emissions to ozone destruction in Nature, “there was no response from the scientific world” 
(Royal Society of Chemistry, No Date, p. 2).  This was troublesome because, as Rowland 
(1995) noted, once they “realized that this was not just a scientific question…but a potentially 
grave environmental problem” (para. 21) the need to be heard at higher levels of the 
government became evident.  Rowland and Molina targeted a “strong, hard-working group of 
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postdoctoral and graduate student research associates” to advance their research and build a 
base of “specialists” (para. 22) that could expose the CFC-ozone link.  Fearing that their 
findings would go unheard, they made their theory “public” (p. 2) at the American Chemical 
Society meeting in September 1974.  From this research at UC-Irvine, an international 
discourse about the link between CFCs and ozone started to circulate.  By 1976, the link 
between CFCs and ozone depletion was confirmed elsewhere.  A “major study” (Mullin, 
2002, p. 209) done by the National Academy of Sciences found that 6-7 percent of the ozone 
would soon deplete without further regulation.  These two independent findings helped this 
theory find “wide support” (Masters, 2004, p. 1) in the scientific community.   
Rowland, in particular, took an “unusually public stance” (Rowland, 1995, p. 21l) for 
scientists at the time: attending and speaking at legislative hearings, being the subject of 
extensive media coverage and undergoing a “much heavier travel schedule” (Telegraph, 2012, 
para. 4) than his previously private scientific life demanded.  After countless trips from Irvine 
to Washington D.C., he became a true “citizen-scientist, in that it seemed to come quite 
naturally to him to report on the results of his work out in the public sphere” (Shahan, 2012, 
para. 6).   
However, Rowland “found himself targeted by a $28-billion-a-year industry” that 
“spared no effort to rubbish his hypothesis” (para. 5).  Rowland was met by a skeptical public 
at press conferences, and “found himself peppered with hostile questions by industry 
representatives” in public settings (para. 5).  The industry campaign questioned his sanity, and 
even tied his campaign against CFCs to the Ministry of Disinformation of the KGB (para. 5).  
Other scientists, hoping to avoid public criticism, were intentionally silent.  Members of the 
CFC research team at NASA’s Goddard laboratory “hoped to chart out a small inconspicuous 
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research project” (Haas, 1992, p. 192) and, according to physicist Richard Stolarski, find a 
“quiet” area of study where “nobody would bother” them (as cited Haas, 1992, p. 192).  
However, Rowland and Molina, by standing in opposition to the dominant public of the CFC 
industry, created the foundation for a counterpublic of environmental public intellectuals. 
Based on Rowland’s findings being made public, transnational environmental 
scientists formed an epistemic community that stood in opposition to industrial interests in 
maintaining widespread use of CFCs (Haas, 1992, p. 189).  Individual members that “worked 
in universities and government laboratories which were affiliated with the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA)” (p. 192) were now making their voices heard. This group of 
scientists had shared understandings, they were committed to reflexive scientific accuracy, 
agreed that the accumulation of contaminants in the ozone posed significant environmental 
risks and were in frequent contact (p. 189-190).  As well as standing in opposition to a larger 
dominant public, these scientists opened discursive space and participated in multiple publics 
simultaneously.  This counterpublic of environmental scientists made their findings public 
through a “variety of channels” (Haas, 1992, p. 194).  In particular, environmental scientists 
became counterpublic intellectuals by participating in conferences and task forces, providing 
policy advice to government officials and approaching major media outlets. 
In the decade following the public release of Rowland and Molina’s findings, the 
federal government created the interagency Task Force on Inadvertent Modification of the 
Stratosphere, chaired by Dr. Guyford Stever (Ph.D., physics) and Dr. Russell Peterson (Ph.D., 
chemistry and environmental advisor to President Ford).  The task force found that the release 
of CFCs posed a substantial risk to the ozone, and that ozone depletion would cause increases 
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in skin cancer globally (Peterson, 1999, p. 243).  Peterson presented the findings at a press 
conference, and his statements about the worldwide nature of the problem, and the need for 
individual action were “quoted widely” (p. 243).  These public statements were not filled with 
scientific jargon; instead, Peterson presented CFC-ozone science in a fashion that was 
accessible to the wider public.  For example, Peterson stated, “it is difficult to perceive that 
when you are spraying an antiperspirant under your arm in the privacy of your bathroom, you 
are endangering the health of everyone in the world” (p. 243).  His call for action was clear, 
concise and precise:  
Industry should start voluntarily phasing-out such CFCs in favor of environmentally 
acceptable substitutes…consumers should stop using all aerosol 
sprays…manufacturers should stop selling them voluntarily. (p. 245) 
Peterson participated simultaneously in multiple publics.  Although he spent his work-days 
laboring over complex chemical equations, he was also tasked with publicly representing 
scientific findings in a manner that was accessible to policy-makers and the general public.  In 
doing so, Peterson found himself in the “front” of the “environmental revolution,” a position 
that required him to “forgo the comfort” of the secluded laboratory (p. 251).  
A large group of environmental scientists chose to join this community by taking a 
similarly public position.  The epistemic community “drafted documents and reports” and 
“organized scientific panels” while simultaneously pressuring policy-makers to apply these 
scientific findings to policies (Haas, 1992, p. 194).  In Congressional testimony about the 
Montreal Protocol, Michael McElroy (Ph.D., applied mathematics) and Rowland argued for a 
substantial reduction CFC use.  The Boston Globe (1987) covered this testimony, and 
published particularly accessible quotations.  For example, McElroy argued, “there is no 
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longer reason to doubt that industrial gases containing chlorine are responsible in large 
measure for dramatic, large-scale change in the stratosphere” (p. 3).  In agreement, the article 
cited Rowland’s claim that “we have to reduce emissions drastically and soon” (p. 3).  By 
publishing researching findings in accessible language, testifying at Congressional hearings, 
circulating findings at large international conferences and publishing bulletins, ozone 
scientists found “national and international media coverage” (p. 194-195).  Scientists, in a 
sense, were speaking two languages.  They were asked to simplify their scientific discourse 
and sacrifice their scientific identity when faced with a lay public.  However, this sacrifice 
was necessary to achieve public influence. 
Environmental scientists, by forming an epistemic community in opposition to 
industrial power, opening discursive space by making their findings public and participating 
in multiple publics simultaneously, were instrumental in convincing policy-makers and the 
public that strict reductions in CFC emissions were an immediate necessity.  Scientists who 
“articulated what scientific developments implied for policy” were a “potent political 
resource” for motivating domestic regulation and encouraging international cooperation for 
the Montreal Protocol (Haas, 1992, p. 196).  Dr. Richard Benedick argued that CFC 
regulation “couldn’t have occurred without” modern scientific methods, models and 
projections being applied to policy (as cited in Haas, 1992, p. 196).  Environmental scientists 
played a significant role in predicting the effect of CFC emissions on stratospheric ozone 
levels, convincing the public that environmental harms outweighed economic costs, 
developing regulations and enforcement of global controls applied by the Montreal Protocol.  
Without their involvement, regulations would have taken longer to enact and would have been 
much weaker; and, in the absence of this group of professionals with the ability to “interpret” 
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scientific evidence into lay terms, “there would have been little incentive” for strict 
enforcement of CFC regulations (p. 222).  Although their academic background may not have 
qualified environmental scientists to participate in the battles of changing public opinion and 
drafting environmental policy, many chose to leave the laboratory and join the public 
discourse.  
Despite their significant successes, this community of scientists fought significant 
opposition.  During this period, “the connection between CFCs and ozone depletion was 
based on theory and computer models rather than on observation and empirical data” (Mullin, 
2002, p. 209).  Despite a consensus on the basic linkage between CFCs and stratospheric 
ozone depletion, scientists were not unanimous, and several dismissed these findings as mere 
“speculation” (Mullin, 2002, p. 209).  These two weaknesses (the use of computer models 
instead of empirical evidence and the fact that some scientists disagreed with the hypothesis) 
were magnified and hyperbolized by conservative government officials and industrial 
interests who were confronted with a financial loss to portray ozone science as extremely 
uncertain, and regulations as wholly unnecessary. 
 In the years following the initial reports, the science supporting the CFC-ozone 
hypothesis was publicly met with extreme skepticism. John Ehrlichmann, Nixon’s chief of 
staff, rhetorically constructed Rowland and Molina’s scientific findings as inconsistent with 
the rest of the scientific community.  In particular, he argued that the White House was under 
no obligation to take the findings seriously, because even the scientists were in widespread 
disagreement (Mullin, 2002, p. 210).  Industrial backlash fed this opposition as well.   
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) was the “worldwide leading 
producer and marketer” of CFCs, “controlling over 45% of the CFC market” (Risciotti, 1989, 
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p. 42).  DuPont faced the loss of a substantial market share, and thus publicly opposed 
domestic environmental regulations and the Montreal Protocol.  DuPont engaged the 
scientific debate, claiming that “no ozone depletion has been detected despite the most 
sophisticated analysis…all ozone depletion figures to date are computer projections based on 
a series of uncertain assumptions” (Rowlands, 1995, p. 50).  This strategy was well-funded 
contrarianism; Dupont “spent millions of dollars running full-page newspaper advertisements 
defending CFCs in 1975, claiming there was no proof that CFCs were harming the ozone 
layer” (Masters, 2004, p. 2).  Dupont joined the larger aerosol industry, and: 
Launched a PR blitz, issuing a press release stating that the ozone destruction by CFCs 
was a theory, and not fact.  This press release, and many other ‘news stories’ favorable 
to industry, were generated by the aerosol industry and printed by the New York 
Times, Wall Street Journal, Fortune, and the London Observer. (Masters, 2004, p. 2) 
DuPont’s (1975) full-page New York Times advertisement stated, “You want the ozone 
question answered one way or another.  So does DuPont…Before a valuable industry is 
hypothesized out of existence, more facts are needed.”  This statement not only posited 
DuPont and the larger population on the same side of the debate, but also co-opted the term 
hypothesis that had been consistently repeated by advocates of regulation. 
In a similar Chicago Tribune advertisement, DuPont’s chairman Irving Shapiro (1975) 
deplored the “‘ban now-find out later’ approach” as a “disturbing trend” (p. C9).  He argued, 
“there is no experimental evidence to support the contention that FREON and other similar 
compounds have caused a depletion of the ozone layer (Shapiro, 1975, p. C9).  Emphasizing 
the uncertainty of the scientific conclusions, he stated, “assumptions are challenged on both 
sides.  And nothing is settled.  Nor will there be any hard answers until some hard facts are 
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produced” (Shapiro, 1975, p. C9).  In this advertisement, Shapiro called into question what 
should count as legitimate science, evidence and facts.  Although he did not cite Rowland and 
Molina, he noted that those in support of the CFC-ozone linkage were merely “theorists” 
while there were “scientists” and “researchers” supporting DuPont’s arguments (Shapiro, 
1975, p. C9).  In the trade magazine Chemical Week, Shapiro stated that the theory linking 
ozone depletion to CFCs was “a science fiction tale…a load of rubbish…utter nonsense” (as 
cited in Masters, 2004, p. 2).  
DuPont testified to congress at least 8 times in congressional debates over domestic 
regulation and the Montreal Protocol (Glyphis, 1995, para. 6).  One senior DuPont official 
argued before a U.S. Senate panel that the “chlorine-ozone hypothesis is…purely speculative 
with no concrete evidence…to support it” (as cited in Benedick, 1998, p. 12).  The demand 
for “concrete” evidence was one that could not be easily met, because Rowland and Molina’s 
hypothesis was based on lab experiments.  Moreover, DuPont founded the Alliance for 
Responsible CFC Policy (quite the benign sounding name) “to discredit the ozone theory” and 
issued propaganda hoping to “discredit the leading researchers, Rowland and Molina” 
(Mullin, 2002, p. 212).  In doing so, DuPont blurred the line between legitimate advocacy and 
outright disinformation.  In addition, CFC producers and manufacturers hired “the world’s 
largest public relations firm” to sponsor a “month-long U.S. speaking tour in 1975” for a 
prominent British scientist, Richard Scorer (Masters, 2004, p. 3).  Despite never publishing 
any peer-reviewed works on the subject, Scorer attacked the credibility of scientists 
supporting the CFC-ozone destruction theory, and denounced Rowland and Molina as 
doomsayers (Masters, 2004, p. 3).   
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As late as 1994, industrially funded advocates were still arguing for a repeal of CFC 
regulations.  Also laying claim to counterpublicity by portraying himself as “one voice in a 
growing chorus of protest against” the ban on production of CFC’s, Robert Dornan (1994) 
testified to Congress, introducing CFC regulations as “the most scientifically baseless, 
politically oppressive, morally bankrupt [and] economically destructive, environmental farce” 
(para. 1).  Dorman (1994) compared the claims of environmental harm by environmental 
scientists as analogous to “the 15th-century Europeans” who “were told of sea monsters at the 
edge of a flat earth” (para. 17). 
Influential “economic interests” were a “critical ingredient” in the backlash to ozone 
science (Fisher, 1997, p. 77).  Largely due to the substantial influence of businesses, the 
public discourse shifted from environmental concern over CFCs to fear of economic loss if 
regulations were to be implemented.  Pennwalt Corporation, the third largest manufacturer of 
CFCs in the U.S., predicted that CFC regulations would produce “economic chaos” (Vanner, 
2006, p. 8).   Dupont warned of industrial failure, and the Association of European Chemical 
Companies foresaw an international economic decline if strict CFC regulations were to be put 
in place (Masters, 2004, p. 2).  One U.S. representative to the Montreal Protocol stated that 
ozone depletion was “not an environmental issue,” but rather “an economic issue” (as cited in 
Passacantando and Carothers, 1995, p. 7).  Economic rebuttals from economists and policy-
makers based on the availability of cheap substitutes were disregarded because of the risk that 
acting first would put the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage to European CFC producers.  
Historically consistent with other domestic debates over other environmental regulations, as 
fear of economic collapse became the dominant narrative, the environmental impact of CFCs 
was backgrounded and forgotten.  
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Industrial lobbyists, because of their economic and political influence, became a 
dominant public in the ozone debates.  Multinational corporations that were wedded to the 
production and manufacturing of CFCs hyperbolized scientific disagreement, funded a 
disinformation campaign and inaccurately represented economic costs of regulation.  In doing 
so, a dominant discourse was created that treated scientific opinions concerning ozone science 
as marginalized minorities.  In order to win this debate, environmental scientists had to form a 
public that was counter to these well-funded skeptics by expressing opposition publicly, 
opening discursive space through different avenues of public media and rhetorically 
participating in multiple publics. 
The CFC-ozone debate presented a unique challenge to scientists, policy-makers and 
diplomats.  The nature of the problem required overcoming industrial backlash to regulation 
and forging a global consensus that would prevent safe-havens of CFC production and use.  
Throughout the course of the debate, “governments allowed commercial self-interests to 
influence their interpretations of the science” and “political leaders were prepared to 
accept…environmental risk rather than impose...costs” (Benedick, 2000, p. 19).  Given these 
hurdles, neither domestic regulations nor the Montreal Protocol were inevitable (p. 19).  A 
community of environmental scientists, circulating a counterpublic discourse in opposition to 
influential business interests, “prevailed over” disinformation, anti-science propaganda and 
hyperbolized claims of economic costs, and “were pre-requisites to a political solution” and 
(p. 20).  The Montreal Protocol may be the “forerunner” of an important “partnership between 
scientists and policy makers” as daunting environmental challenges of the 21st century unfold 
(p. 25).  In particular, the role of environmental scientists in the CFC-ozone debates provides 
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an important model for changing public opinion and motivating policy changes to prevent the 
worst effects of global warming. 
Environmental Scientists as Counterpublic Intellectuals 
In this section I, first, briefly review the contemporary theoretical debate over the role 
of the public intellectual.  Second, I argue that the ozone debates in the 1970s and 1980s 
closely resemble the global warming debates in the early 21st century.  Building on these 
similarities, I, finally, contend that despite the criticisms of public intellectuals, environmental 
scientists fulfill a unique function that is irreplaceable in public debates over global warming.  
I argue that in the context of global warming debates, environmental scientists must counter 
industrial influence by taking on the role of the public intellectual.  Here, I preview the 
arguments scientists must make to overcome public disbelief in the anthropogenic global 
warming hypothesis.   
The role of the public intellectual is to tie scholarly research to policy by making their 
findings accessible to the larger public.  In defense of the public intellectual, Mills (1959) 
argued: 
It is the political task of the social scientist—as of any liberal educator—continually to 
translate personal troubles into public issues, and public issues into the terms of their 
human meaning for a variety of individuals. It is his task to display in his work – and, 
as an educator, in his life as well—this kind of sociological imagination. (p. 187) 
For Mills, it was the duty of the scientist to participate in multiple publics--engaging peers 
through scientific discourse and the public through a translation of scientific discourse into a 
more accessible vocabulary.  A diverse group of contemporary figures have promoted 
academics stepping out of the ivory tower to participate as public intellectual.   
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Richard Rorty, taking after Dewey, attacked ivory tower philosophy for its 
“remoteness and its increasing professionalization” (Guignon and Hiley, 2003, p. 1), arguing 
instead for a pragmatist axiology in which theory was guided primarily by practice.  Giroux 
(2012) found that “gated intellectual” (para. 5) communities too often refused to admit social 
responsibility intrinsic to academic work, and thus committed a terrible disservice to those 
who need them the most.  He argued that, instead of these ivory tower conservatives, 
“engaged public intellectuals” were “especially needed at a time when it [was] necessary to 
resist the hollowing out of the social state, the rise of a governing-through-crime complex and 
the growing gap between the rich and the poor” (para. 10).  The alternative to academic 
engagement, Giroux argued, was a public discourse infiltrated by “right-wing extremists” 
(para. 1) that threatened to undercut “democratic public life” (para. 1).  Both Rorty and 
Giroux provide a strong justification for the role of public intellectuals as counterpublic.  
Absent the public defense of pragmatic and well-informed solutions, scientists cede the public 
sphere to corporate interests that care more about their pocketbook than the well being of the 
polity.  Despite these robust defenses, public intellectualism is not without its critics. 
Edwards Park asked for scholars to remain separate from the public discourse by 
conducting “scholastic disputes in a scholastic way” and worried that “we do wrong to our 
minds when we carry out scientific difficulties down to the arena of popular dissension” (as 
cited in Bender, 1997, p. 12).  Posner (2001) found that public intellectuals, although often 
entertaining, reflect “only a superficial engagement with the facts” (p. 2).  The problem, 
according to Posner, is that many public intellectuals write about a broad array of subjects that 
are not closely related to their academic field.  However, it does not follow based on these 
criticisms that the whole species of public intellectualism warrants rejection.  Rather, these 
 118 
criticisms incite caution; clearly, the public should not blindly accept information simply 
because it is presented by academics in the public sphere.   
Warner (2002) presented a much more nuanced criticism of public intellectualism.  
Contrary to the thesis of this essay, he argued that intellectuals lose their counterpublic nature 
once they adapt their discourse to facilitate circulation (p. 157-158).  There certainly is a “risk 
of publicness” (p. 151) faced by traditional academics entering the public sphere.  What 
Warner ignores, however, is the similarities between some public intellectuals and the 
counterpublics that he exalts.  To decry the role of the public intellectual in toto may risk 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  Specifically, these attacks have overlooked the 
empirical success of environmental scientists countering industrial opposition to progressive 
climate policy.   
Although many have decried the public intellectual, the CFC-ozone debates show that 
counterpublic intellectuals can be a positive force.  This success need not be an isolated feat.  
In fact, there is great similarity between ozone debates in the 1970s and 1980s and the global 
warming debates in the 21st century.  Examining three key similarities may prove fruitful for 
understanding what discursive strategies may help advance progressive climate regulations. 
First, both ozone destruction and global warming are global, human-induced, multi-
decadal environmental concerns (Matthews & McKenzie, 2006, p. 1).  Although this may 
seem obvious, it is important to note, given the historical inability for environmental issues to 
resonate strongly with the public (Newport, 2009, para. 1).  Feygina et al. (2010), a team of 
psychologists, use the System Justification Theory to contend that humans are 
psychologically driven to “deny environmental problems and resist meaningful attempts” (p. 
328) to reform the status quo.  According to this study, people who are asked to change their 
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consumption habits are predisposed to “defend and bolster” (p. 328) the existing, polluting, 
system.  However, these psychological tendencies are not determinative; and, devising 
“persuasive communication” can reverse this motivation and “channel it in a pro-
environmental direction”  (p. 336).  Given the successful regulation of CFC pollutants, 
communication strategies used in the ozone debates may be applicable in contemporary 
global warming discussions.  In particular, public dissemination of scientific information, 
persuading the nature of the catastrophic nature of the risk and gaining industrial allies for 
policy change are three approaches that bred success in achieving support for the Montreal 
Protocol (Morrisette, 1989, p. 816). 
Second, each has a scientific consensus linking anthropogenic emissions to 
environmental degradation.  Scientific developments were a “key factor in reaching 
agreement” (Morrisette, 1989, p. 816) over policies to limit CFC emissions.  For example,  
There was considerable disagreement among scientists over the problem of 
stratospheric ozone depletion in the 1970s, improvements in the collection and 
assessment of data and in models in the past decade have led to the development of a 
stronger scientific base on which to argue for and develop control strategies. 
(Morrisette, 1989, p. 816) 
However, in each instance this strong scientific consensus is countered with a “well-funded 
campaign” (Lloyd, 2011, p. 6) of skepticism.  Comparing the difficulty faced by ozone 
scientists to contemporary global warming debates, Masters (2004) argued: 
Once again, we find a theory that has wide support in the scientific community being 
attacked by a handful of skeptics, publishing outside of the peer-reviewed scientific 
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literature, their voices greatly amplified by the public relations machines of powerful 
corporations and politicians sympathetic to them. (p. 8) 
Even scientific “consensus” does not necessitate unanimity, and, often, minority scientific 
opinions receive much more attention in the public media (Anderegg, Prall, Harold and 
Schneider, 2010, p. 12109).  Since neither ozone destruction nor climate change are easily 
linked to short-term, visible environmental changes, policy-makers are left with a cacophony 
of competing “expert” opinions to develop solutions.  However, a scientifically educated 
public that understands the large risks associated with global warming will contribute to 
“political interest in the problem and the search for a solution” (Morrisette, 1989, p. 817). 
Third, each debate is over the competing impacts of long-term environmental harm 
and short-term environmental costs.  A consistent theme used by opponents of environmental 
regulation is to argue that the long-term environmental harm is not a large enough problem to 
justify imposing economic harm.  This prioritization of economic harm has been historically 
successful.  A 2009 Gallup poll found that “a majority of Americans say economic growth 
should be given the priority, even if the environment suffers” (Newport, 2009, para. 1).  
Opponents often point to the economic cost of regulation, the need for voluntary (as opposed 
to regulatory) measures and the loss of economic competitiveness if the United States takes 
regulatory action before an international accord is agreed upon.  However, in the case of CFC 
regulation, “growing scientific evidence” “softened” industrial opposition because large 
corporations started to understand that some form of regulation was inevitable (Morrisette, 
1989, p. 818).  Because of this perceived inevitability, “the debate shifted from whether 
regulation was necessary to when and how to regulate” (Morrisette, 1989, p. 818).  Just as 
“producers and users of CFCs in the United States waged a long, hard battle against the 
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regulation of CFCs” (Morrisette, 1989, p. 818), industrial opposition to carbon regulations 
have gone to great lengths to question the science supporting ACC hypotheses.  However, 
climate scientists used public argument to counter this opposition and overcome opposition.  
For contemporary debates about global warming policy, overcoming industrial opposition 
requires the development of economic alternatives to carbon, and strengthening public and 
political support for regulation. 
Finally, both ozone destruction and global warming are problems that cannot be 
addressed by one nation alone.  Instead, each requires national and international efforts.  The 
Montreal Protocol is widely believed to be a “swift” response to ozone destruction (Masters, 
2004, p. 9).  However, it took over a decade after national regulations were put in place to 
reach international consensus on the Montreal Protocol.  Given the nature of climate tipping 
points, and the length of time that CO2 remains in the atmosphere after release, the 
international community must move more quickly to combat global warming.  
 Given these similarities between ozone debates in the 1970s and 1980s and 
contemporary global warming debates, environmental scientists can use ozone as a model for 
formulating a scientific counterpublic.  First, environmental scientists must stand in 
opposition to public discourse dominated by well-funded industrial interests, conservative 
media and exaggerated skepticism.  Just as stratospheric ozone scientists formed a community 
based on shared discourse, contemporary environmental scientists must form a transnational 
counterpublic based on faith in the scientific method, concern of environmental harm and the 
need for progressive environmental regulation.  This oppositional stance is necessary, but not 
sufficient for influencing public opinion and policy formulation--a more public representation 
is also needed. 
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 Second, environmental scientists must constitute a public discursive space (Brouwer, 
2006, p. 197).  Currently, “researchers rarely communicate directly with the public” 
(Andresen, 2009, p. 9) and may have their goals better served by constitution of a public 
discourse of (and about) science.  In doing so, they should publish in non-scientific 
disciplines, find alternative media outlets and infiltrate discursive space dominated by 
industrial interests.  If science is to overcome anti-intellectual biases among the broader 
public, “it is important that citizens get used to scientists arguing out controversial facts, 
theories, and issues” (Miller, 2001, p. 119) in public.  Instead of remaining “backstage,” 
environmental scientists must “become more visible” if the general public, and policy-makers, 
are going to take their findings more seriously (Miller, 2001, p. 119).  This move into the 
public, requiring both sacrifice and vulnerability, will require scientists to participate in 
multiple competing publics simultaneously--the scientific public where findings are produced 
and the lay public that demands a translation of scientific findings into an accessible 
vocabulary.  
 This third requirement, participation in multiple publics, asks scientists to become 
rhetoricians--using persuasive tactics to represent their findings in order to convince the 
broader public and policy-makers of the need for progressive environmental regulation.  The 
time in which science can be isolated “from society is clearly over” (Madsen, 2007, p. 170).  
Despite the historical, theoretical and practical divisions between scientific and lay discourses, 
environmental scientists must embrace the challenge posed by the inevitable intersection of 
the scientific sphere and public spheres and “establish meaningful communication across” 
these eroding “barriers” (165).  To do so, environmental scientists must step down from the 
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ivory tower of academia, out of the comfort of the laboratory and into “both worlds” (p. 166) 
of science and politics. 
 As counterpublic intellectuals, a transnational community of environmental scientists 
can fulfill a vital function for limiting the worst effects of global warming.  In particular, this 
group of scientists should publicly lobby for government regulations based on scientific 
findings; publicly defend the objectivity and neutrality of the scientific method; and publicly 
serve as leaders of the environmental movement.  Several environmental scientists are 
embracing counterpublicity by publishing findings at: Climate Central, Yale Environment 360 
and the Yale Forum on Climate Change and the Media (Fahy and Nisbet, 2011, p. 790).  For 
example, James Hansen, head of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Sciences, has 
publicly opposed industrial influence on climate science by constituting lay public spaces.  
For example, Hansen translated his climate research into congressional testimony, traveled on 
a public speaking tour in defense of climate science, authored non-scientific books and has 
been arrested for public protest of environmentally damaging practices.  He has consistently 
translated his scientific findings into a publicly accessible vocabulary, because “he wants 
people to understand the facts and the urgency of our climate problems, and demand 
immediate change” (Shetterly, 2012, para. 8). 
Conclusion 
 Understanding the role of environmental scientists in the 1970s and 1980s as 
counterpublic intellectuals has substantial theoretical and practical implications.  In this 
section I, first, argue that this interpretation of counterpublicity requires a broadening of 
contemporary definitions of counterpublicity.  If one accepts a group of wealthy, tenured 
scientists as counterpublic, this may modify the way counterpublic scholars view oppression 
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and marginalization.  Second, I contend that, contrary to several counterpublic scholars who 
decry the role of the public intellectual, environmental scientists become counterpublic when 
they perform as public intellectuals.  Finally, I conclude that an influential counterpublic 
composed of environmental scientists is necessary to combat industrial influence, shift public 
opinion and develop regulations to combat global warming. 
 Contemporary counterpublic scholarship has focused almost exclusively on minority 
populations marginalized based on race, class, gender or sexuality.  This emphasis has served 
the development of the tradition extremely well.  Scholars of the public now have the tools to 
analyze how competing publics interact, how counterpublics develop and in what ways the 
dominant public reacts (either by cooptation or opposition) to counterpublic discourses.  
However, this tradition, with few exceptions, has largely ignored other forms of 
marginalization that may demand counterpublicity.  Using Brouwer’s (2006) working 
description of the discursive features of a counterpublic--oppositional discourse, constitution 
of a discursive arena and a dialectic of retreat from and engagement with other publics (p. 
197)--I contend that scholars may benefit from broadening their interpretation of what 
constitutes a marginalized/subaltern public.  For example, ozone scientists who performed as 
public intellectuals served a counterpublic function by publicly opposing the dominant anti-
science discourse funded by CFC producers and manufacturers.  Environmental scientists like 
James Hansen fulfill a similar role in contemporary global warming debates.  
Importantly, understanding these scientists as counterpublic serves two functions.  
First, it highlights the way in which industrial influence on government policy acts as a 
dominant and marginalizing force.  Instead of understanding these forces as two equal 
publics, exposing the counterpublicity of environmental scientists acknowledges that in many 
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ways the deck is stacked against them.  Although an argument could be made that the CFC 
industry also laid discursive claim to counterpublicity, I am skeptical that treating them as 
such serves the critical project.  Instead, taking cue from Asen and Brouwer, it may be more 
beneficial to look at intersections of discourse, materiality and ideology to determine 
legitimacy.  Second, it enlarges scholarly interpretation of marginalization.  Too often, the 
focus on race, class, gender and sexuality overlooks more subtle forms of marginalization, 
like the treatment of scientific opinion in a polity.  Although not every marginalized public 
must be approached as counterpublic, Brouwer’s working definition may provide guidance 
for application of counterpublic research beyond the identities originally studied by the field. 
This essay also sheds light on the relationship between counterpublic scholarship and public 
intellectualism.  Although some scholars (Warner in particular) have decried the role of the 
public intellectual, the success environmental scientists had in convincing the public and 
policy-makers that ozone regulations were an immediate necessity should provide skepticism 
to critics of the genre of public intellectualism.  Surely, some public intellectuals have made 
inaccurate predictions, served the dominant interests of industry and/or argued well beyond 
their academic qualifications.  However, on issues that meet at the intersection of science and 
politics, scientists are invaluable force for understanding difficult concepts, changing public 
opinion and developing political solutions. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
Introduction 
Global warming is a significant environmental concern that may, in many ways, 
define the 21st century.  The science supporting the fundamental tenets of the ACC hypothesis 
is solid.  Although there is some uncertainty concerning the magnitude and timing of the 
worst climate impacts, there is a consensus among qualified climate scientists that global 
warming is happening, human induced and a threat to future generations.  Throughout the 
next century, most climate scientists project rising temperatures, decreased arable land, rising 
sea levels, loss of biodiversity and several climate threat multipliers (e.g., refugee crises, 
resource shortages, etc.).  
Despite the high magnitude of the risk and the scientific consensus supporting the 
ACC hypothesis, public support for policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions has been 
limited.  Although there are many causes for this phenomenon, public disbelief in climate 
science is a primary concern.  Because large portions of the public do not trust scientific data 
supporting climate change theories, climate science has not translated into changes in policy 
or individual consumption.  In fact, this discrepancy between scientific consensus and public 
disbelief has undercut one of the best motivators for climate regulations, a motivated 
populous:  
Whether policymakers seek to understand the science depends on whether the public 
values leaders who value science. Even if policymakers fully understood climate 
science, their ability to implement policies consistent with that knowledge, given 
societal goals, is constrained by the lack of grassroots political support. The public 
cannot be ignored. (Sterman, 2011, p. 815) 
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Several psychological, sociological and political explanations for public skepticism were 
outlined in chapter one, but the subsequent four chapters demonstrated that this is a 
fundamentally rhetorical problem.  Pointing to rhetoric as the proximate cause of public 
skepticism, Romm (2008) noted that “poll after poll shows that scientists…are failing to 
persuade large segments of society about the urgent need to act” (para. 2).  Therefore, 
rhetorical theories provide guidance for how to change public opinion and create an 
environmentally concerned public. 
The preceding chapters have outlined a diverse set of interrelated causes of 
environmental apathy among the public.  Given the importance of the issue and the significant 
barriers to progressive environmental policy, the problem may seem daunting.  However, if 
climate change is given “presence” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 116) through the 
foregrounding of environmental science, then there is a possibility for a widespread change in 
attitude, consumption patterns and policy.  Using theoretical tools developed in rhetorical 
disciplines, the “presence” of the harm of global warming can become a “psychological 
element” that “controls how the audience perceives, conceives and remembers the rhetor’s 
objects, ideas and lines of argument” (Long, 1983, p. 110).   
As well as outlining the causes of public apathy, each preceding case study offers 
clues for rhetorical correctives to help combat climate skepticism and move public opinion 
closer to scientific opinion concerning ACC theories.  The Climategate scandal, analyzed in 
chapter two, pointed to the need to develop quick responses to accusations of conspiracy, 
responses defending the scientific discipline broadly, not just refuting the facts of the charge.  
The discourse of the Heartland Institute and other conservative think tanks, analyzed in 
chapter three, shows that the anti-environmental movement is willing to use deceptive 
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strategies of definition and naming--strategies that require consensus scientists to respond 
with even stronger efforts to distinguish themselves from their anti-environmental 
counterparts.  Chapter four discussed the need for an environmental president, noting the 
inadequacy of economics and national security justifications for environmental policy.  
Chapter five pointed to the need for an epistemic community of climate scientists willing to 
defend climate science in a more public setting.  The purpose of this final chapter is to expand 
upon and clarify these clues, and to provide a set of rhetorical correctives to help reverse these 
troubling trends.   
The final chapter follows in two parts.  First, I outline rhetorical correctives by 
building upon the findings in the preceding case studies.  I recognize that none of the 
proposed solutions are silver-bullets, and each may introduce new risks.  However, if climate 
scientists are to make their mark on public opinion, the solutions proposed below are worth 
taking seriously.  Second, I conclude with the shortcomings of this series of case studies, and 
preview areas for future research. 
Rhetorical Correctives 
 If climate scientists choose to embrace a more public position with a rhetorical defense 
of their findings, they will be asked to navigate a difficult rhetorical terrain.  Two factors--an 
environmentally unexcited public and well-funded conservative organizations--make this task 
notoriously challenging.  However, the preceding case studies provide guidance for 
developing persuasive representations of complex scientific data.  In what follows, I outline a 
template for motivating the public to embrace scientific findings, based on four rhetorical 
correctives.  Specifically, scientists should: 
(1) Embrace rhetoric 
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(2) Recognize the importance of a motivated and informed citizenry 
(3) Utilize alternative media outlets 
(4) Inoculate the primary causes of public disbelief, including, the time lag of visible 
impacts, the concern that science is manipulated and conspiratorial, the 
overshadowing of global warming by economic uses and the problem of 
“uncertainty” in scientific theories. 
None of these proposed rhetorical correctives is certain to transform public opinion, and each 
may introduce new costs.  However, the cumulative implementation of these proposals may 
be the best avenue for using climate science to change public opinion and motivate policy 
responses. 
Embrace Rhetoric 
Climate scientists have a complex relationship with rhetoric.  For example, climate 
“scientists do not like to repeat themselves,” because they “like to focus on the things that 
they don’t know…so they don’t keep repeating the things that they do know” (Romm, 2008, 
para. 14).  Moreover, the climate science community has typically avoided persuasive framing 
in favor of descriptive and neutral language, because: 
Scientific training…emphasizes sticking to facts and speaking literally, as opposed to 
figuratively or metaphorically.  Scientific debates are won by those whose theory best 
explains the facts, not by those who are the most gifted speakers. (Climate Progress, 
2010, para. 16) 
The Climategate case study demonstrates how the aversion to rhetoric may backfire because 
conspiracy accusations that call into question the neutrality of science itself are not easily 
defeated by more scientific data.   
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Because of these tendencies, an artificial divide between rhetoric and science in the 
academic climate field has been established.  On one side stands purely descriptive scientific 
vocabulary (e.g., temperatures, satellite data, measurements of arctic ice thickness, etc.), and 
on the other stands the rhetorical depiction of that data to the public.  Unfortunately, most 
climate scientists have accepted this divide, choosing to remain solely in the esoteric 
academic exchange of scientific journals instead of translating scientific information into a 
publicly accessible discourse.  However, this strategy is short-sighted and ineffective for two 
reasons: (1) it allows the public debate to be controlled by skeptics and fringe scientists; (2) it 
ignores the obvious fact that one of the best tools that environmentalists have to create an 
environmentally concerned populous is strong scientific consensus supporting the ACC 
hypothesis. 
Writing well before the emergence of climate science, and popular media in its current 
form, Burke (1969) spoke prophetically about the necessity of scientists embracing rhetoric.  
Burke feared that while science characterized itself as empirically objective, the impurities of 
science (uncertainties) would be detected, portrayed and exploited.  However, because 
scientists are often concerned with “science qua science,” their response to criticism is too 
“abstracted” to rectify the tension between scientific findings and public opinion (p. 505).  
Practically, scientists view themselves as objective and rational--unconcerned with mere 
rhetoric: 
The authors of scientific reports and similar papers often think that if they merely 
report certain experiments, mention certain facts or enunciate a certain number of 
truths, that is enough of itself to arouse the interest of their hearers or readers.  This 
attitude rests on an illusion, widespread in certain rationalistic and scientific circles, 
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that facts speak for themselves and make such an indelible imprint on any human 
mind that the latter is forced to give its adherence regardless of its inclination.  
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 17). 
This artificial division of science and rhetoric treats science as a supposedly objective body of 
discourse, while rhetoric is seen as merely “the manipulation of men’s beliefs for political 
ends” (Burke, 1969, p. 41).  Because of this, the supposed purity of scientific language does 
little to influence the public because even a “‘good’ rhetoric neglected by the press obviously 
cannot be so ‘communicative’ as a poor rhetoric backed by nation-wide headlines” (Burke, 
1969, p. 25-26).  Thus, valid and significant scientific findings are most often not effectively 
disseminated to the public. 
In response to the view that scientific vocabulary alone was sufficient to influence 
public policy, Burke (1969) argued that scientists should hire “a batch of poets” (p. 15) to 
make their message appeal to the “average Middle-class audience” (p. 16).  By “poets” Burke 
is using his distinction between semantic and poetic language--semantic being purely 
descriptive and poetic incorporating the rhetorical.  Integrating the rhetorical into scientific 
discourse would allow for scientists to create a “motivational recipe” (p. 17) that could 
portray findings persuasively.  Scientists, rather than rejecting the interconnectedness of 
science and rhetoric, should instead “recognize the factor of rhetoric in their field” (p. 43).  
For scientists hoping to argue persuasively, it is not sufficient to use “strictly the scientific 
vocabularies of description;” rather, an “inducement to action” demands that scientists 
become rhetoricians (p. 42).  In doing so, scientists may more successfully “engage with the 
public and be vigilant against projecting stereotypes of their profession--such as the elitist, 
arrogant scientist” (Lloyd, para. 17, 2011).   
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Whether it requires hiring poets to speak, or hiring poets to teach, Burke’s point is 
clear: scientific vocabulary alone is unlikely to change public opinion on complex scientific 
matters.  Simply introducing more scientific information into the public sphere is not likely to 
transform public opinion or influence public policy; rather, this information must have a 
targeted goal of persuading a specific audience to accept the position held by climate 
scientists.  Instead of solely taking “refuge in peer review” and blaming climate skepticism on 
public illiteracy, climate scientists must use all media available to counter the “campaign” of 
skepticism that mirrors the “strategies honed by the tobacco industry” (Keller, 2011, p. 22).  
Researchers have an “obligation to the public” to publicly defend the findings of climate 
science and “convey the results of their expertise to those likely to be affected by the 
implications of those results” (p. 23).  Chapter four supports the hypothesis that the consensus 
opinion on climate change can be rhetorically foregrounded to create a presence that 
motivates a progressive environmental citizenry (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 
116). 
Inducing pro-ACC environmental action among the public will require more than just 
engagement on the part of scientists, but will demand a rigorous examination of which 
rhetorical tactics are the most effective in persuading the public.  Rhetorical correctives may 
come in the form of training sessions or classes and should be developed based on audience-
centered message analysis.  To this end, scientific organizations may choose to hire rhetorical 
and media scholars to provide consulting advice for how scientific information should be 
disseminated.  There is likely no single rhetorical solution; rather, an array of efforts must be 
put forth from the scientific community if activists hope to translate scientific findings in a 
manner that will align public opinion with scientific consensus on global warming. 
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Recognize the Importance of an Informed and Motivated Citizenry 
It is relatively easy for politicians to find excuses to ignore global warming.  Chapter 
three outlined how conservative think tanks have undercut public support for progressive 
environmental regulations by evoking public skepticism of climate science.  They have done 
this by calling into question the neutrality of climate science, highlighting the negative 
economic effects of environmental regulation and hyperbolizing the uncertainties of 
consensus climate science.  This trend is consistent with the findings in chapter four--
President Obama avoided public discussion of climate science, instead favoring economic and 
national security justifications for his environmental policy.  There is also historical precedent 
for this problem of climate prioritization: the policy response to the ozone crisis was similarly 
lethargic until a dedicated group of public intellectuals entered the debates to help overcome 
political inertia. 
For most politicians, there is always a more pressing and immediate concern--
unemployment, foreign policy, health care, immigration, etc.  Other issues hold the political 
advantage of having immediate and visible impacts, as well as having widespread popular 
support for policy change.  Because of this, policies to address global warming (e.g., Kyoto 
Protocol, cap-and-trade, agency rule-making, etc.) have faced either apathy or outright 
opposition.  However, an informed and motivated public may be one of the greatest tools 
climate advocates could use to pursue political solutions to global warming.  In fact, 
motivating the public may be a pre-requisite to effective regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions: 
Politicians, government officials, and the public pay attention to public opinion 
reflected in polling data. While public opinion may not ultimately settle issues, it 
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almost always factors in decision making, as accounts of the operations of the Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush administrations indicate. And if public opinion is 
especially one sided, it may actually be controlling. (Sparrow, 2008, p. 579) 
If climate activists hope to use climate science to achieve “major policy change,” then “new 
meanings and messengers for climate change are needed”--and science should become a 
central emphasis (Nisbet, 2009, p. 22).  An epistemic community of dedicated public 
intellectuals may be the best antidote to industrially funded organizations hoping to limit 
progressive environmental regulations. 
 However, motivating the public should not just be left up to climate scientists alone.  
Other influential figures should use environmental science as one of the tenets of their 
platform for environmental sustainability.  In concurrence with the conclusion in chapter four, 
Breakthrough Strategies and Solutions (2012) strongly suggested that President Obama 
should instill environmental values in the public by including action against climate change as 
a central component of his 2012 campaign (p. 3).  Moreover, there is a burgeoning eco-
pedagogy movement that argues for teachers to develop an environmental curriculum that 
foregrounds sustainability.  Kahn (2010) proposed an eco-literacy paradigm for schools in the 
global North in an attempt to reverse unsustainable consumption practices that were largely 
ignored by most curricula.  Misiaszek (2011) built upon this paradigm to develop 
“Environmental Education Programs” that incorporate social justice models into daily 
classroom activities (p. 1).  These classroom models may be particularly important for 
environmental sustainability given the long-term resonance of beliefs learned in early 
childhood (Barnett, p. 43, 1995).  Tactics developed by these environmental educators may be 
applicable to environmentalists hoping to reach a broader adult audience as well. 
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 Chapter one provided a more thorough description of the importance of public opinion 
in determining public policy, but there is another advantage to public belief in consensus 
climate science: the potential to change individual consumption patterns.  As individuals gain 
information about the relationship between energy consumption and global warming, they 
may be motivated to limit environmentally unfriendly choices.  This recognition allows 
consumers to create new pathways towards environmental sustainability; for example, 
individuals may reduce consumption by buying “high fuel-economy cars or compact 
fluorescent light bulbs” (Oppenheimer and Todrov, 2006, p. 5).  The cumulative effect of a 
more reflexive and informed citizenry has the potential to significantly limit greenhouse gas 
emissions and stave off some of the worst effects of global warming.  Therefore, even in the 
face of widespread political opposition to new climate regulations, an environmentally 
conscious populous is an important component of the strategy to limit global warming. 
Utilize Alternative Media Outlets 
Translating complex climate science through contemporary news media presents a 
host of problems.  Namely, there is limited time and space to argue, complex findings can be 
reduced to simple headlines, most news organizations portray both sides of every issue to 
provide a balanced perspective and (paradoxically, given the importance of balance for most 
commentators) some news organizations are so biased that climate science is unlikely to be 
represented accurately.  Despite these problems, the conclusion is not defeatism; rather, 
climate scientists hoping to use public media outlets to engage the public must adapt their 
approach to reach a broader audience with their message.  Three particular strategies are 
noteworthy. 
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First, climate science may be more persuasive if it is represented and learned through a 
deliberative exchange.  Climate science may gain more traction with the public if scientists 
perform as counterpublic intellectuals by taking the time to “engage in public forums such as 
blogs, question-and-answer sessions and public talks” (Lloyd, 2011, para. 16).  Instead of a 
one-way transmission of scientific information, climate scientists should engage in forums 
“where a variety of stakeholders could participate in a dialogue and exchange of views about 
science policy” (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2009, p. 1769).  The effectiveness of this strategy is well 
documented.  Internationally, “there has been a wave of consensus conferences, deliberative 
forums, and town meetings on a number of issues,” that have shaped “perceptions of scientists 
as open to feedback and respectful of public concerns, perceptions that predict eventual 
acceptance and satisfaction with a policy outcome, even if the decision is contrary to an 
individual’s original preference” (p. 1769).  Having a stake in the dialogue and viewing 
science as relevant to their concerns has created a more trusting public with regard to 
scientific concerns.  This model, applied to climate science, holds great potential.  
Second, significant scientific content must find its way onto the local news.  Although 
not as glamorous as national news, surveys show that “local television news remains among 
the dominant sources of public affairs-related information for the American public” (Nisbet & 
Scheufele, 2009, p. 1774).  Scientists may choose to make television appearances themselves, 
or provide their information to organizations that “produce climate science stories for 
syndication at local television outlets across the United States” (p. 1774).  Despite innovations 
in social media and the growing importance of the Internet for disseminating daily news, 
“local people” “still trust their local newspaper (more than they trust the national media) to 
tell them what’s really going on” (Collingham, 2012, para. 26).  Coming up with alternatives 
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to national television and newspaper media may, in the near future, be a necessity for 
overcoming the conservative bias currently influencing representations of climate change 
science within the media (Lloyd, 2011).  This particular strategy of “going local” may help 
reverse the perception of scientists as elitist and unconcerned with problems that affect the 
general public.  
Third, scientists should use web media sources that engage in interactive and iterative 
learning processes.  This approach can help replicate the process of scientific experiments for 
a lay audience and may be particularly helpful when dealing with a young audience.  When 
developing hypotheses concerning climate science, scientists generate “feedback through 
controlled experimentation, an iterative process through which intuitions are challenged, 
hypotheses tested, insights generated, new experiments run” (Sterman, 2011, p. 823).  
However, scientists often portray their “results to policymakers and the public” by a one-way 
dissemination of “reports and presentations” (p. 823).  This strategy often times creates 
resistance because the targed audience feels “excluded from the process” (p. 823) of scientific 
discovery.  Instead, scientists should use “interactive, transparent simulations of the climate” 
that “give people control over assumptions and scenarios” to “help people develop their 
understanding” of basic climate science (p. 823).  In particular, interactive websites that 
visualize the impact of climate based on user input variables provide a valuable learning 
experience and make complex models easily understandable. 
Inoculate the Primary Causes of Public Disbelief 
 Introduced by McGuire and Papageorgis (1962), inoculation theory provides valuable 
guidance for promoting attitude change and limiting the persuasive effectiveness of climate 
change skeptics (p. 24).  By exposing the audience to predictable counter-arguments and 
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rebutting those arguments proactively, one can effectively undercut the persuasiveness of the 
opposition’s message.  There are several powerful arguments that must be inoculated in order 
to reverse public apathy and motivate the public to support progressive environmental policy.  
In particular, scientists must address the time lag of visible impacts, the concern that science 
is manipulated and conspiratorial, the overshadowing of global warming by economic uses 
and the problem of “uncertainty” in scientific theories.  Chapter three points to the difficulty 
of overcoming these dispositions because of the financial strength and zealous persistence of 
conservative think tanks.  However, a renewed rhetorical campaign in defense of climate 
science may prove capable of undercutting even the strongest resistance. 
 First, it is difficult to tie consumption choices to negative ramifications because the 
largest impacts of global warming will not be visible for some time.  As discussed in chapter 
one, it is psychologically much easier to remain apathetic to a future concern than one that is 
immediately present.  Therefore, even if the public were to trust ACC theories, it is possible 
that individuals would seek to deny that the problem is large enough to warrant substantial 
environmental regulation.  In order to inoculate this concern, scientists should (1) point to the 
visible impacts of global warming that are starting to emerge (decreases in arable land, 
dramatic climactic shifts, and rising temperatures), (2) use the data found in statistical climate 
models to create visual models of future crises.  This use of visual elements has been widely 
accepted as valuable for creating presence and spurring changes in attitude (Birdsell & 
Groarke, 1996; Blair, 1996; Foss, 2004).  Visual depiction of present and future climate 
impacts can “influence our actions” by arguing “a person into a state of feeling” (Birdsell & 
Groarke, 1996, p. 9).  These visual strategies, in tandem, help make the impacts of global 
 139 
warming seem present and immediate, not distant threats to be dealt with by future decision-
makers. 
 Second, environmental advocates should inoculate the argument that climate science is 
elitist and conspiratorial, unconcerned with or irrelevant to the average citizen.  As discussed 
in chapter two, the Climategate scandal damaged the perception of climate science as neutral, 
objective and based purely on natural observation.  A pre-requisite to using scientific findings 
to guide public policy is restoring the reputation of science.  To reverse this skepticism, 
scientists should point to the peer-review process as transparent, accountable and welcoming 
of healthy skepticism.  By doing so, they may reduce the perception that the fox is guarding 
the climate science henhouse.  Although not every accusation of conspiracy will induce such a 
substantial public reaction, scientists should approach future situations with a radically 
different response than was used in this case.  In future cases, climate scientists should 
respond quickly and forcefully in defense of the broad consensus of scientists supporting 
ACC theories.  Climate scientists must understand that although facticity does influence the 
resonance of conspiracy theories, proving the accuracy of science is necessary but insufficient 
to influence public opinion.  A pre-requisite to limiting the effectiveness of these conspiracy 
accusations is a sustained and consistent defense of the scientific enterprise as neutral, 
objective and open to healthy skepticism.  If the public views the accusation of science as 
conspiratorial as inconsistent with their existing ideology, then these charges will be 
ineffective at influencing public opinion.  Science will be trusted, while conspiracy theory 
will be exposed as fraud and blatant self-interest. 
 Third, environmental advocates should inoculate the argument that global warming is 
not as important as other issues.  As discussed in chapter four, politicians tend to prioritize 
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other agenda items over policies to address global warming.  A “major factor” that has 
ensured that “climate change has remained largely hidden” from public concern is the 
overshadowing of global warming by other problems (Moser & Dilling, 2004, p. 34).  
“Creeping environmental problems” (p. 34) are rarely as sexy or immediate as other 
impending disasters like foreign policy crises or economic concerns.   For example, in the 
second presidential town hall debate, President Obama and Governor Romney were asked 
about energy policy, economics, immigration, guns and trade.  The candidates even discussed 
closely related issues such as oil and natural gas drilling, renewable energy and the trade 
dispute with China over solar panels.  But, “climate change never came up” (para. 10). 
Although the moderator, Candy Crowley, said that “she had a question ready to go ‘for all 
you climate change people,’” it turned out that “there wasn’t enough time” (Plumer, 2012, 
para. 11).  “During the three presidential debates that spanned more than four hours,” neither 
candidate mentioned “global warming or climate change”--the first time the topic has been 
left unaddressed in the presidential debates since 1984 (Brainard, 2012, para. 5).  Lowering 
the prioritization of global warming is consistent with political and popular culture: there 
always seems to be something more deserving of attention. 
 In order to counter this public apathy, scientists should frame climate change as a 
significant threat.  Chapter four criticized the economic and national security frame, but left 
open several possible alternatives that “hold the promise of resonating with a broader 
coalition of Americans and social groups” (Nisbet, 2009, para. 42).  Scientists must make 
global warming seem like a personal problem, not just a distant abstract phenomenon.  For 
example, environmental advocates should use the strong scientific evidence that pollution and 
global warming pose a significant danger to human health (para. 43).  Along these lines, the 
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argument that there is a moral or ethical obligation to limit one’s own carbon footprint may 
resonate with religious audiences and individuals already disposed towards environmental 
stewardship (para. 41).   
Environmental advocates should also use widespread media coverage of extreme 
weather events to their advantage.  As the evidence is becoming stronger, some environmental 
advocates are beginning to publicly discuss the link between global warming and extreme 
weather patterns.  For example, Jonathan Foley, director of the Institute on the Environment at 
the University of Minnesota, “directly linked” “Hurricane Sandy” and climate change: “would 
this kind of storm happen without climate change?  Yes…is the storm stronger because of 
climate change?  Yes” (Fischetti, 2012, para. 9).  Although “scientists have long taken a” 
“cautious stance” concerning direct linkages between climate change and weather, “more are 
starting to drop the caveat…because researchers have gotten very good in the past decade at 
determining what affects the variables that create big storms” (para. 3).  As weather becomes 
more devastating and unpredictable (e.g., hurricanes in New York) this argument will likely 
resonate more strongly.  
However, simplistic apocalyptic descriptions of looming climate change have the 
potential to backfire.  Fear-inducing messages are necessary, but they must be accompanied 
with “positive motivations” (Moser & Dilling, 2004, p. 39) that motivate action instead of 
anger, apathy or resignation.  Simply, one must feel as if global warming is a threat, but, also, 
that the negative effects can be avoided.  Otherwise, the natural psychological response is 
“frustration and anger” (Moser & Dilling, 2004, p. 39) and a “sense of fatalism” (Nisbet, 
2009, para. 52).  Thus, scientists should carefully craft fear appeals to include recipes for 
individual action in order to avoid these undesirable outcomes.  Moreover, there is an inherent 
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danger in using apocalyptic appeals--it is possible that the predictions violate reality.  For 
example, linking extreme weather to climate change is problematic because it means that a 
mild winter, or a peaceful hurricane season can now be used as evidence that climate change 
is faulty and that those predictions are simply “liberal alarmism” (para. 54).  Therefore, 
environmental advocates should avoid specific weather predictions in favor of a more general 
description of weather trends. 
Finally, scientists should inoculate the need for absolute certainty and perfect 
predictions by re-appropriating the term “uncertainty.”  As discussed in chapters two, three 
and five, there is a campaign of climate skepticism that is successfully using the claim that 
“science is uncertain” to decrease public support for environmental regulations.  However, as 
a fear appeal, uncertainty concerning future negative ramifications of global warming has the 
potential to be a persuasive rhetorical tool.  The indefinite nature of even the most precise 
science is being used to undercut sound ACC theories, largely because climate scientists have 
not successfully countered the argument that uncertainty is grounds for inaction.  Although 
emphasis on scientific agreement about the ACC hypothesis is helpful, it may also be useful 
to point to the risk of devastating impact from climate change, because “the fact that climate 
scientists can’t predict how bad the impacts might be” but agree that catastrophe is nearly 
certain could well motivate political “action” (Nature, 2010, para. 8).  For example, 
environmental advocates may point to the certainty that sea level will rise, but the uncertainty 
associated with how far inward from the Eastern seaboard the devastation may extend.  Or, 
environmental advocates may point to the certainty that climate change will substantially 
decrease arable land, but also to the uncertainty of how many trillions of dollars in crops will 
be lost.  
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In doing so, climate scientists can reverse the effect of one of the most common 
arguments made by skeptics--that scientists can’t predict with absolute certainty all of the 
impacts that climate change has on the environment.  Given the potential harms, climate 
scientists must argue that the appropriate response is to acknowledge the uncertainty while 
clearly stressing the certain devastating impacts of global warming upon human life on earth. 
Criticisms and Areas for Future Research 
 Each of the proposals above surely invites criticism.  In what follows, I outline and 
answer four likely criticisms of my findings.  Although each criticism contains a kernel of 
truth, and is grounds for skepticism, I believe the potential benefits of the rhetorical 
correctives outweigh the costs.  I conclude the chapter by discussing areas for future research 
and further academic development of the findings of this study. 
Criticisms 
 First, one may argue that the average citizen does not have the capacity to understand 
nuanced scientific findings and develop an informed opinion concerning climate change.  
Nisbet and Scheufele (2009) labeled this criticism as the “deficit model” (p. 1767).  They 
contended that public officials often times blame an ignorant public for policy shortcomings.  
However, they disagree with the assumptions of this model; instead, they find that “by 
emphasizing what is wrong with the public” many policymakers and some scientists 
underestimate the intelligence of the average citizen and “ignore the possibility that their 
communication efforts might be part of the problem” (p. 1767).  If taken seriously, this deficit 
model would seriously decimate any conception of a vibrant public sphere, something that is 
antithetical to many of the findings dispersed throughout the preceding chapters.  Surely, a 
more balanced middle ground is helpful: it is necessary to recognize that the public is a lay 
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audience that may not understand complex scientific data, but also to note that 
“condescending claims of ‘public ignorance’ too often serve to further alienate key 
audiences” (p. 1767).   Seen this way, this criticism simply points to the need to translate 
complex data into understandable and rhetorically persuasive vocabulary, a skill scientists are 
certainly capable of, and increasingly willing to perform. 
Second, one may argue that the problem of media “balance” undercuts the 
effectiveness of any rhetorical proposal.  Contemporary journalists “aspire to” “abide by the 
norm of balance, identifying the most dominant, widespread positions and then telling ‘both’ 
sides of the story” (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004, para. 4).  One study that looked at articles from 
The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Chicago Tribune and The Los Angeles 
Times published between 1985-1995, found that journalists tended to focus “on controversy 
and disagreement among scientists,” even when there were areas of agreement (Zehr, 2000, p. 
90).  This study discovered that journalists chose to cite skeptics “such as Richard Lindzen, 
Fred Singer, Patrick Michaels, and Robert Balling” more frequently, precisely because “they 
disagreed with much of the climate change scientific community and because their public 
statements tended to invoke controversy” (Zehr, 2000, p. 91).   
A second study analyzed “a dataset of US newspapers and television news from 1995 
to 2006” to determine the relevance that climate science was given by journalists in their 
framing of global warming articles (Boykoff, 2007, p. 477).  Boykoff (2007) found that a 
“scant discussion of the convergent scientific view” framed climate science so haphazardly 
that public “confusion” and misunderstanding ensued (p. 482).  This study’s findings illustrate 
that media coverage from 1995 to 2006 “contributed to an appearance of a storyline of 
increased uncertainty and debate over time” (Boykoff, 2007, p. 482).  The United States 
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media “depicted a departure from the convergence of views in science over time regarding 
anthropogenic climate change,” because the “pre-print stage” “propel[s] conflict into print” 
and because the media tend to take a “snapshot selection” of a science that evolves over 
decades (Boykoff, 2007, p. 485).  These studies point to a tension between science and the 
“micro-processes that undergird professional journalism” (Boykoff, 2007, p. 486). 
Although this journalistic aspiration is an attempted “check on biased reporting,” it 
“causes problems when it is applied to issues of science” because it demands “that journalists 
present competing points of view on a scientific question as though they had equal scientific 
weight, when they actually do not” (Gelbspan, 1997, p. 58).  The desire to treat both sides of a 
debate equally is problematic when scientific consensus overwhelmingly favors one side (e.g., 
creationism vs. evolution, the link between vaccines and autism, etc.) 
Critics who cite the problem of journalistic balance may see this idea as a threat to my 
proposed correctives, because no matter what scientists say, journalists may seek to find 
opposing information to counter the findings of qualified scientists.  Although there is 
certainly some truth to this criticism, the use of alternative media outlets may circumvent 
some of the problems associated with contemporary news media.  For example, engaging in 
deliberative exchanges allows the public to question the science for themselves and test ideas 
with climate scientists.  Moreover, first-person interviews and appearances on local news 
limit the ability for journalists to cherry-pick statements with the intention of creating a sense 
of uncertainty.  Finally, websites devoted primarily to iterative and interactive learning 
provide user-generated climate models that cut out the journalistic middleman.  Although 
these correctives do not address the fundamental problem of misapplied journalistic balance 
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in the case of climate science reporting, each provides a supplementary avenue for 
dissemination of accurate information. 
Finally, one may argue that attempting to “sell” science risks backfiring as scientists 
step into the realm of public advocacy (Nisbet and Scheufele, 2009, p. 1776).  For example, 
Nisbet and Scheufele (2009) argued:  
Public communication and engagement should not be conceived of as simply a way to 
“sell” the public on the importance of science or to persuade the public to view 
scientific debates as scientists and their allies do…If the public feels like they are 
simply being marketed to, this perception is likely to only reinforce existing 
polarization and perceptual gridlock. (p. 1776) 
In agreement, Fischhoff (2007) maintained that scientists should stick with “nonpersuasive 
communication” that “lets the science speak for itself”--a strategy that prioritizes pure 
scientific data over a rhetorical translation of scientific findings (p. 7208).  The problem with 
this argument is that scientific findings are going to be presented to the public whether climate 
scientists choose to or not.  As climate scientists remain disengaged from public advocacy, 
their findings are being misrepresented in a wide variety of media sources.   
This criticism serves more as a note of caution than grounds for inaction.  The strategy 
of letting scientific facts speak for themselves has not succeeded, and nonpersuasive 
communication has not created an environmentally concerned citizenry.  However, climate 
scientists should be careful not to step too far beyond the field of climate science when 
making public statements.  For example, a climate scientist may be unqualified to speak about 
the economic costs and benefits of a carbon tax, so should instead stick to discussing the 
impact that a carbon tax would have on carbon emissions or consumption trends.  This may 
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help avoid the criticism that scientists are stepping beyond their field of qualification, and 
instead center public comments on the issue at hand--the clear and present danger from 
climate change based on sound scientific data. 
Areas for Future Research 
 Each of these criticisms, as well as the dissertation process as a whole, has piqued my 
interest concerning areas for future research.  I view this dissertation not as an endpoint, but 
as a jumping-off point for a variety of new and exciting areas of study.  In particular, three 
potential projects come to mind.   
 First, I would like to test specific climate messages with different audiences.  Much 
research has been done concerning demographic gaps in climate belief.  For example, there 
are wide differences in belief of ACC hypotheses in populations who differ based on race, 
gender, education, age, religion, ideology and income (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012, p. 8).  I am 
interested in seeing if different populations react differently to different messages (for 
example, if a specific motivational appeal is more or less likely to succeed with younger or 
older audiences).  In order to overcome demographic gaps and persuade individuals to take 
action to limit climate change, “more direct and personalized channels are needed” (Moser & 
Dilling, 2004, p. 40).  In order to complete this project, I may require some methodological 
instruction or a helpful teammate, because I don’t believe that rhetorical methods are best 
suited to answer this particular question.  
 Second, I would like to investigate the relationship between experience and climate 
belief.  As climactic shifts are becoming more visible, public belief in the existence of climate 
change (although not necessarily the belief that it is caused by humans) has increased.  
However, I fear that public belief is primarily related to immediately visible and recent 
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weather phenomena.  A cursory read of polling data throughout the last five years shows that 
public belief in climate science drastically increases during the winter, then declines in the 
summer.  I hope to investigate this theory further, and add experience to growing list of 
variables that are important for creating an environmentally motivated public. 
Finally, I would like to expand my findings to other scientific fields.  I am interested 
in exploring how findings from these case studies can inform other scientific debates 
concerning evolution, vaccinations, stem cells, etc.  In doing so, I hope to apply my 
conclusions about climate science to create more generalizable theories about the relationship 
between science and rhetoric outside of the field of climate change. 
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